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ABSTRACT

During the 1960's warrants to purchase common shares were
attached to the debt and equity securities of an increasing number of
corporations in order to facilitate the sale or exchange of these securi
ties.

These warrants presented a potential problem to investors who

purchased common shares of the issuing corporations.
The exercise of these warrants could result in the dilution of
the corporations' book value per share, their earnings per share, and
the market value of their shares as well as the voting power of the in
dividual stockholders.

In May, 1969 the American Institute of Certified

Public Accountants (through the issuance of APB Opinion N o . 15) adopted
the treasury stock method for reflecting the potentially dilutive effect
of warrants on earnings per share.
On a theoretical basis the. treasury stock method has certain
disadvantages.

Although the treasury stock method makes no specific

assumptions about the rate of return earned on warrant proceeds, the use
of this method results in an earnings rate on warrant proceeds which is
less than the earnings-price ratio of the corporation.

Such a rate is

unrealistically low for corporations with high price-earnings ratios and
perhaps overly optimistic for corporations with low price-earnings ratios.
In addition, the treasury stock method causes the earnings per share of
corporations with warrants outstanding to vary inversely with the price
of the corporations' common stock.
This study evaluates, on a theoretical basis, several methods of
reflecting the potential dilution of warrants in the earnings-per-share
xiii

computations.

The desirability of including the potentially dilutive

effect of warrants in both primary and fully diluted earnings per share
is also considered.

Guidelines for the evaluation of the various methods

of reflecting the potential dilution of warrants in the earnings-pershare computations are developed through an analysis of:

(1) the attri

butes of earnings per share that investors perceive to be useful in the
evaluation of common stocks, (2) the characteristics of warrants which
might affect earnings per share, and (3) the problems encountered by the
Accounting Principles Board in arriving at an acceptable method for
handling warrants.
This thesis includes an in-depth study of the accounting, finance,
and investment literature related to warrants and earnings per share as
well as an intensive examination of the earnings-per-share files of the
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.

In addition, an analysis was made of the characteristics of

warrants listed on the American Stock Exchange between 1950 and 1972.
This study concludes that a minimum of two earnings-per-share
figures for companies with warrants outstanding should be provided to
investors.

These are:

(1) earnings per average common share which ex

cludes the potentially dilutive effect of warrants and (2) fully diluted
earnings per share which includes an estimate of the potential dilution
of earnings per share which might occur through the exercise of warrants.
This study further concludes that the most appropriate method of
reflecting the potentially dilutive effect of warrants in fully diluted
earnings per share is the operating rate of return method.

This method

assumes that the investment of the warrant proceeds will provide a return
equal to the current rate of return on assets.
xiv

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Accountants, aware of the limitations of net income for a single
period, have been reluctant to include earnings-per-share statistics in
the financial statements.

This apprehension of accountants was expressed

by Herman Bevis, a member of the Accounting Principles Board, as follows:
The earnings-per-share statistic for the current year or quarter
is probably the most widely used of all financial statistics. . . .
It is said that some make investment decisions after looking at
this single earnings-per-share statistic, or at the price-earnings
ratio based upon it.
This is frightening to those who take great pains to disclose
important information about elements included and excluded in
measuring net income for the year . . . .
The alarm derives not
from the development and use of per-share earnings figures . . . .
The concern, rather, is the serious oversimplification of the
information as to how it was derived. It is this amplifying
information which puts it in perspective and which we must con
stantly remember is an integral part of the story told by earnings
per share.1
This statement confirms earlier conclusions of the Committee on
Accounting Procedure that it is ". . . undesirable to give major promi
nence to a single figure of earnings per share;

. . ."^

It is not

surprising, therefore, that accounting literature, until 1966, contained

^Herman W. Bevis, "Earnings per Share and the Need for Full Dis
closure," The Journal of Accountancy, CXXI (February, 1966), 52.
2

Committee on Accounting Procedure of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Earnings per Share, Accounting Research
Bulletin No. 49 (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1958), p. 29.

1

2

very little material on earnings per share.

Apparently accountants hoped

that by de-emphasizing earnings per share, investors would also.
But such was not the case.

Interest in common stocks and other

securities increased tremendously during the two decades from 1950 to
1970.

In 1956 there were approximately 8,630,000 stockholders in the

United States.^
1970.^

The number had increased to an estimated 31 million by

If the indirect holdings through pension funds, profit-sharing

funds, variable annuities, and endowment trusts were considered, then an
estimated 100 million Americans had some stake in the stock market by
1970.5
During the same period, merger activity increased considerably.
There were 589 reported mergers in 1958.

By 1967 the number had in-

£
creased to an estimated 1,496.

With this increase in mergers, acquisi

tion-minded companies began to design complex securities to meet their
needs.

These generally took the form of convertible bonds, convertible

preferred stock, and stock warrants which were usually attached to debt
or stock issues.
By 1966 two opposing forces related to earnings-per-share statis
tics existed.

On the demand side, many new and unsophisticated inves-

tors--each with a relatively small investment--had appeared.

Concern

^Phillip L. West, "The Reporting of Earnings to Stockholders,"
The Journal of Accountancy, CVII (February, 1959), 27.
^"Change and Turmoil on Wall Street," Time, August 24, 1970,
p . 53.

York:

^Ibid.
£
Samuel Richardson Reid, Mergers, Managers, and the Economy (New
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 15.

3

over reporting to these investors was expressed by Phillip L. West, vice
president of the New York Stock Exchange:
How does this broadening of share ownership affectus?
I think
it affects us in an extremely important way. The great mass of new
investors are not going to be composed of security analysts. They
are going to have a limited knowledge of a balance sheet and income
statement. They will want company reports which are relatively easy
to understand. But more than that, I feel sure that they will
expect that earnings as reported by the companies are comparable,
at least in the same industry. If their company earned $2.00 a
share and another company in the same industry earned $2.50 a share,
they will consider that this is so.^
On the supply side, complex securities with potential claims on
the stockholders' equity were becoming more numerous.

Financial state

ments, instead of being easy to understand, were becoming more complex.
As a result new, unsophisticated stockholders were more likely to take
refuge in a single earnings-per-share statistic.
A definite problem is that of computing and

reportingearnings-

per-share statistics of corporations with complex securities that are
Q

potentially dilutive

to the common equity.

This problem is acute by

virtue of the fact that many investors apparently rely heavily on
earnings-per-share statistics while ignoring other important information
in the financial statements.
This study is concerned with certain aspects of the problem of
computing and reporting the earnings per share of corporations which
have securities outstanding that are potentially dilutive to the common
equity.

Specifically, the purpose of this study is to evaluate, on a

^West, op. cit., 28.
^For a definition of this and other terms related to warrants
and earnings per share, see Definition of Terms, pp. 20-21.

4

theoretical basis, several methods of reflecting in earnings per share
the potential dilution which might occur through the exercise of
warrants.

The means of accomplishing this objective are discussed in

the remainder of this chapter.

THE NATURE OF.THE PROBLEM

The Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants has issued two opinions which deal with
the problem of calculating and reporting the earnings per share of
corporations that have securities outstanding which are potentially
dilutive to the common equity.

APB Opinion No. 9 was issued in December,

1966 and subsequently revised by APB Opinion No. 15 in May, 1969.

In

APB Opinion No. 15, the Board required earnings-per-share statistics to
be included on the face of the income statement so that, hopefully,
users of the statistics would also evaluate the underlying financial
data on which the statistics are based.

For companies with complex

capital structures, two earnings-per-share figures, "primary" and "fully
diluted," are presented.

"Primary earnings per share" is designed to

reflect dilution by assuming the conversion or exercise of those poten
tially dilutive securities which are the equivalent of common stock.
"Fully diluted earnings per share" reflects maximum potential dilution of
current earnings per share on a prospective basis by assuming conversion
or exercise of all securities having a dilutive effect on current
earnings.
There are two distinct types of securities which may have a dilu
tive effect on earnings per share--convertible securities and warrants.

5

Both may derive a major portion of their value from their common stock
characteristics.

Because their characteristics as securities in their

own right differ, convertible securities and warrants do not present the
same problems in the earnings-per-share computation.
The calculation of the effect of the conversion of convertible
securities on earnings per share presents little difficulty since these
securities are convertible into a specific number of common shares in
accordance with the terms of the issue.

In computing the earnings per

share of corporations with outstanding convertible debt, interest net of
tax is added back to net income and the number of shares issuable is
added to the common shares outstanding.

For companies with outstanding

convertible preferred stock, the dividends applicable to the stock are
included in earnings and the number of shares issuable is added to the
common shares outstanding.

The classification of convertible securities

as common stock equivalents for purposes of computing primary earnings
per share does present a problem.

This problem arises because convertible

securities have an investment value which is not related to their common
stock characteristics.

The Accounting Principles Board did considerable

research on this problem of classification prior to the release of APB

9

Opinion No. 15.

The release of APB Opinion No. 9 and APB Opinion No. 15

has also stimulated research by others.

^This statement is made on the basis of a review of the earningsper-share files of the Accounting Principles Board.
■^See, for example, Harold Bierman, Jr. and Ernest Liu, "The Com
putation of Earnings per Share," The Accounting Review, XLIII (January,
1968), 62-67; Werner G. Frank and Jerry J. Weygandt, "Convertible Debt
and Earnings per Share: Pragmatism vs. Good Theory," The Accounting

6

No classification problem exists in regard to warrants because
they have no cash yield and therefore no investment value other than that
related to their common stock characteristics.

Warrants are always

classified as common stock equivalents when their effect on earnings per
share is dilutive.

As a consequence, the potentially dilutive effect of

warrants on earnings per share is included in both the primary and fully
diluted computations under the guidelines of APB Opinion No. 15. An in
vestor, therefore, is denied an estimate of the magnitude of the potential
dilution of warrants on earnings per share.

The question of whether war

rants should be classified as common stock equivalents for purposes of
computing primary earnings per share will be considered in this study.
If warrants are assumed to be exercised for purposes of calcu
lating either primary or fully diluted earnings-per-share, some assump
tion must be made as to the return which will be earned on the proceeds.
A greater proportion of the Accounting Principles Board's research was
devoted to the classification problem associated with convertible securi
ties than was devoted to the earnings-on-proceeds problem of warrants.
In addition, none of the published research on earnings per share deals
with the problem.

Since different assumptions may have materially dif

ferent effects on earnings per share when the number of warrants outstand
ing is significant in relation to the number of shares outstanding, this
study will concentrate on this aspect of the earnings-per-share problem.

Review, XLV (April, 1970), 280-289; Thomas R. Hofstedt and Richard R.
West, "The APB, Yield Indices, and Predictive Ability," The Accounting
Review, XLVI (April, 1971), 329-337; and Werner G. Frank and Jerry J.
Weygandt, "The APB, Yield Indices, and Predictive Ability: A Reply,"
The Accounting Review, XLVI (April, 1971), 338-341.
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PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

The Accounting Principles Board considered four basic methods of
treating outstanding warrants in the computation of earnings per share
before it decided on the treasury stock method.

These were:

I - equivalent shares considered as outstanding - no credit given
for earnings on potential proceeds
II - equivalent shares considered as outstanding - credit given for
earnings on potential proceeds:
(a) - at some earnings rate determined from data independent
of the corporation's own rate of return
(b) - at a rate based on the earnings of the corporation in
relation to the current market price of its common
stock
III - shares outstanding considered to include shares under option
reduced to a portion based on the relationship of the
exercise price of the warrant and the current market price
of the common stock - also known as the purchase of treasury
stock method
IV - shares outstanding considered to include shares under option
reduced to a portion based on the relationship of the market
price of the warrant and the current market price of the
common stock - the Graham-Dodd formula.^
In analyzing these methods, the Board apparently did not develop
a consistent set of criteria.

In early drafts prepared in July and

August, 1968, warrants were not considered common stock equivalents at
the time of issuance unless the market price of the optioned stock was
150 percent of the exercise price.

If warrants were not classified as

common stock equivalents at the time of issue, they would not

^Letter from Frank T. Weston, member of the Accounting Principles
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, to
Philip L. Defliese, Chairman, Subcommittee on Convertible Debt of the
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, dated January 20, 1969.
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subsequently be so classified until the market price of the stock was 200
percent of the exercise price.
alents,

After being designated common stock equiv

they remained in that classification until the market value of

the stock obtainable was equal to or less than the exercise price.
During this period the Board felt that the assumption as to the use of
funds should be consistent with the company's financial policy.
absence of such a policy, the Board preferred:

In the

(1) the rate of interest

being paid on outstanding debt, net of tax effect, (2) an assumed invest
ment in government or similar obligations, net of tax effect, or (3) the
assumed use of funds to purchase stock of the issuing company at current
prices.
The major criterion at this stage appeared to be interperiod and
intercompany comparability of earnings per share because few warrant
issues would be classified as common stock equivalents under these guide
lines.

At the same time, however, warrants classified as common stock

equivalents would cause a lack of intercompany comparability because of
the wide latitude of options permitted the companies on the assumed use
of proceeds.

However, this criticism may not be valid because the pre

sumption is that management would use the funds in accordance with sound
financial policies.

Nevertheless, showing the maximum dilutive effects

of war jants did not appear to be a criterion in the early drafts.
Further lack of consistency in evaluation of the methods is evi
denced by the changes made in subsequent drafts.

For example, in the

November 6, 1968 exposure draft on earnings per share, the treasury stock
method was rejected as being inappropriate due to ", . . the number of
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estimates, restrictions, and other factors involved.,IJ-

In the remaining drafts and the final opinion, the treasury stock
method was reinstated in a more dilutive form by the elimination of the
percentage test to determine common stock equivalency.
appeared to shift toward showing greater dilution.

Thus the criteria

Intercompany compara

bility of earnings-per-share figures was also improved through the elimina
tion of alternate assumptions as to the use of funds.

The treasury stock

method, however, does not offer the same degree of comparability as
certain other alternate assumptions because earnings per share as computed
under this procedure will vary inversely with the price of the common
stock.

This specific point is discussed in depth in Chapter 5 of this

study.
Perhaps one reason for the 'adoption of the treasury stock method
was that the Securities and Exchange Commission favored it.
in commenting on the November 6, 1968 exposure draft, wrote:

Andrew Barr,
"We

believe that the assumed use of funds to purchase treasury stock is an
appropriate basis and that it will produce the most reliable results in
many instances.
On the other hand, committees from two of the organizations most
concerned with earnings per share were opposed to the treasury stock

^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings
per Share, November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 12.
(Mimeographed.)
12

Letter from Andrew Barr, Chief Accountant of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, dated January 7, 1969.
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method.

In a letter to J. S. Seidman, a member of the Accounting Prin

ciples Board, Frank T. Weston, also a member of the Accounting Principles
Board, demonstrated that the treasury stock method assumes a rate of re
turn on the proceeds from warrants which is approximately equivalent to
the reciprocal of the price-earnings ratio.
Company,
of

Thus, in 1968, Ford Motor

with a price-earnings ratio of 65, would

1.5percent on warrant proceeds.

U. S. Steel,

have an earnings rate
with a price-earnings

ratio of 12, would have an earnings rate of 8.5 percent.^

David Norr,

Chairman of the Financial Accounting Policy Committee of The Financial
Analysts Federation, stated that this letter " . . .

seemed most impres

sive in destroying the treasury stock method."!-*
The Corporation Finance Committee of the Investment Bankers
Association of America commented:
The "treasury stock" method is faulty because:
(a) it assumes an unlikely event (corporations rarely retire
common stock with warrant proceeds),
(b) it assumes an illegal event (SEC anti-manipulative rules),
(c) it assumes an impractical event (substantial market
purchases of common stock would increase price), and
(d) it produces a more favorable result than that likely to
occur (most corporations would not immediately earn equal
return on new equity funds as old).

l^Letter from Frank T. Weston, member of the Subcommittee on Con
vertible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles Board
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, to J . S.
Seidman, member of the Accounting Principles Board of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated March 28, 1969.
l^Letter from David Norr, Chairman of the Financial Accounting
Policy Committee of The Financial Analysts Federation, to Frank T.
Weston, member of the Accounting Principles Board of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated April 3, 1969.
^Memorandum from the Corporation Finance Committee of the In
vestment Bankers Association of America to the APB Subcommittee on Con
vertible Securities of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, dated February 19, 1969.

11

The preceding discussion suggests that the formulation of an
appropriate method of reflecting warrants in the earnings-per-share com
putation requires a set of criteria for evaluating the various alterna
tives.

These criteria should be derived from the attributes of

earnings-per-share statistics that investors appear to use in valuing
common stocks and from the characteristics of warrants which affect the
earnings-per-share statistics.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate,

on a theoretical basis, several methods of reflecting warrants in the
earnings-per-share computation.

The desirability of including the poten

tially dilutive effect of warrants in both primary and fully diluted
earnings per share will also be considered.

This evaluation will be

based on guidelines developed throughout this study.

Based on this

evaluation recommendations will be made for the computation of earnings
per share of companies with warrants outstanding.

IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY

Warrants were not considered residual securities under APB
Opinion No. 9 .

They might, however, be included in pro forma earnings

per share if their exercise would result in material potential dilution.
No explanation has been offered in the literature for the Accounting
Principles Board's failure to designate warrants as residual securities.
Perhaps the Board felt that the volume of warrants being issued at the
time the opinion was written was not material to the earnings-per-share
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problem.

During 1966, for example, only 12 companies issued warrants.

At the same time, only 19 warrants were being traded on the American
Stock Exchange.
Warrants were considered common stock equivalents in APB Opinion
No. 15, which was issued in May, 1969.

The decision to include warrants

was probably influenced by their increased usage, especially as a merger
currency and as distributions to stockholders in lieu of dividends.

In

1968, 65 companies issued warrants, followed by 123 companies in 1969.
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Warrant trading also increased on the American Stock Exchange to 42
issues in 1969.

There are approximately 62 issues being traded in 1974.

Equally as important as the increased usage of warrants is the
extent of the potential dilution to the common stockholders.

Royer, in

a study of 167 warrant issues offered between 1950 and 1969, found a
potential dilution of 10 percent or more in approximately one third of
the cases.^

He defined dilution for this purpose as the ratio of the

optioned shares to the sum of shares outstanding and the optioned shares
on the issue date of the warrants.
Individual cases point out how serious the problem can be.

For

example, as of December 31, 1970, National General Corporation had

■^investment Dealers' Digest, Corporate Financing Directory
(Section 11) (New York: Investment Dealers' Digest, Inc., 1967), cited
in Pierre Royer, "Long-Term Warrants as Financing Instruments," (unpub
lished Doctor's dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1970), p. 15.

^®Ibid.
^Pierre Royer, "Long-Term Warrants as Financing Instruments,"
(unpublished Doctor's dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1970),
p . 196 .
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warrants outstanding for the purchase of approximately 10,858,000 of its
shares.

Outstanding common shares were only 4,977,000.

In August, 1968,

LTV Aerospace Corporation issued $40 million of subordinated debentures
with detachable warrants to purchase 1,200,000 shares of its common
stock.

This amounted to approximately 70 percent of the cotnaon shares

outstanding.

The evidence suggests that warrants will become even more

significant in the earnings-per-share problem as their usage increases.
The Accounting Principles Board in APB Opinion No. 15 adopted
the treasury stock method of reflecting the use of proceeds that would
be obtained upon exercise of warrants.

A review of the correspondence

in the Board's earnings-per-share files and of the various drafts of the
opinion indicates much indecision and controversy over its adoption.
Of the three members of the Accounting Principles Board dis
senting to the issuance of APB Opinion No. 15 and five members assenting
with qualifications, six objected to the treasury stock method.

The

extent of the dissents on the Board suggests that additional research is
needed to determine the effect on earnings per share of various assump
tions regarding the rate of return earned on the proceeds from the
exercise of warrants.

This is further reinforced by the previously cited

opposition of committees from the two leading organizations most concerned
with using earnings per share--The Financial Analysts Federation and the
Investment Bankers Association of America.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The critical problem that arises from the assumption that warrants
have been exercised for purposes of computing earnings per share is that
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of attributing earnings to the warrant proceeds.

Several alternative

assumptions as to the use of warrant proceeds, each with a different
effect on earnings per share, have been cited.

A set of criteria for

evaluating these alternatives is needed in order to determine the most
appropriate method of reflecting the potentially dilutive effect of war
rants in earnings per share.

This study proposes to derive these guide

lines from the attributes of earnings per share that investors appear to
use and from the characteristics of warrants that are important to the
earnings-per-share computation.

A discussion of these two factors

follows.

Attributes of Earnings per
Share Used by Investors
A premise of this study is that investors use the trend and the
variability of the trend in earnings per share as one of the factors in
determining the price-earnings multiple with which they evaluate common
stock prices.

Ceteris paribus, they place a higher multiple on stocks

which exhibit a high growth rate and low variability in earnings per
share.

The following example demonstrates this point;
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Earnings per
Share

Dr. Pepper

Royal Crown Cola

1970
1969
1968
1967
1966

$0.61
0.50
0.45
0.39
0.32

$0.96
0.61
0.92

$0.45

$0.86

$18.75

$14.88

30.7

15.5

40.4

17.3

Average, 1966-1970
Average price, 1970
Price-earnings ratios
On 1970 earnings
On average 5-year
earnings

0.86
0.95
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While other factors influence expectations, the wide discrepancy in the
price-earnings ratios of two companies engaged in similar operations
must be attributable in part to the trend and variability of their
earnings per share.
Management is also aware of this emphasis that investors place
on the trend and variability of earnings per share.

Chock Full o'Nuts

in its 1964 annual report shows earnings per share (as adjusted) for the
years 1961-1964 as 60 cents, 61 cents, 60 cents, and 62 cents, respec
tively.

But the president, in his letter, added the following postscript:

P.S. I would like to point out that we deferred our costs of
introducing new products in the years 1961, 2, and 3.
Had we written these expenditures off in the years in which they
occuried, we would have shown a very good growth pattern-42c a
sharefor
the
yearending July31,
1961
50c ashare for the year ending July 31, 1962
67c a
sharefor
the
yearending July31,
1963

20
Compiled from Moody's Handbook of Common Stocks: Second 1971
Edition (New York: Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 1971), pp. 291, 803.
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74<: a share for the year ending July 31, 1964
Bernstein, in commenting on this example, states:

"In both instances,

the average earnings per share for the four years are about 60c, t>ut the
different trends displayed would undoubtedly cause significantly differing market evaluation of the company's stock,"
These examples also illustrate the effect of the base year upon
the earnings trend, particularly when the earnings are highly variable.
For example, selection of 1966 as the base year for computing the com
pound annual growth rate of Royal Crown Cola would result in a much
lower growth rate than if 1967 were selected.

Similarly, Chock Full

o'Nuts' growth rate would be significantly different had the company
chosen to expense new product costs in the years in which they were
incurred.

Characteristics of Warrants
Another premise of this study is that warrants are the equivalent
of common stock from the date they are issued because all of their value
is derived from their common stock characteristics.
of two elements:

This value consists

a tangible value and a premium value.

The price of a

warrant will fluctuate between its tangible value as a minimum and the
price of the related common stock as a maximum.

The warrant premium is

highest when the common stock is selling at or below the exercise price

*^1964 Annual Report: Chock Full o'Nuts Corporation, cited by
Leopold A. Bernstein, Accounting for Extraordinary Gains and Losses
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1967), p. 49.
22

Leopold A. Bernstein, Accounting for Extraordinary Gains and
Losses (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1967), p. 49.
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because the market recognizes the leverage potential of the warrant.

As

the price of the common advances, the leverage potential declines be
cause of the increasing tangible value of the option.

As a result, the

premium declines and the warrant price approaches its tangible value.
The premium is also affected by the expiration date of the warrant.

As

the expiration date approaches, the premium declines and the warrant
price approaches its tangible value.
Warrants are bought to be traded rather than exercised.

Since

arbitrageurs prevent warrant prices from falling below their tangible
values, an investor desiring common stock would find it cheaper to buy
the stock directly.
warrants leverage.

It is the option not to buy common stock which gives
As a result, warrants are usually not exercised until

close to their expiration date.
These characteristics of warrants have two implications for
earnings-per-share computations involving warrants:
1.

Warrants are always common stock equivalents because both

their tangible value and their premium value are dependent upon the
underlying common stock price and/or expectations about that price.
2.

Since warrants are not bought to be exercised and are usually

not exercised until shortly before their expiration, the price of the
warrant or of the common stock bears no relationship, at any given time,
to the imminence or probability of exercise nor to the ultimate dilution
in earnings per share.
By their nature, warrants which are exercised always result in
dilution to existing stockholders in the sense that the holders of war
rants are issued common stock at less than the current market price.
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This is true because warrants are never exercised unless the market price
of the stock exceeds the exercise price of the warrant.

This type of

dilution resulting from the difference between the option price and the
market price on the exercise date is not reflected in the financial
statements.

Such dilution is in the nature of an opportunity cost repre

senting income foregone by rejecting an alternative.

Accountants record

events resulting from alternatives selected rather than those rejected
because of the difficulty in accumulating data on what might have been.
The dilution, if any, which will ultimately be reflected in
earnings per share is caused by an increase in the number of shares
issued through the exercise of warrants that is proportionately greater
than the increase in earnings that results from the investment of the
funds received.

Dilution with which the accountant is concerned, there

fore, is a function of the common shares outstanding, the shares issuable
upon the exercise of warrants, the earnings on capital provided by the
existing common stockholders, and the earnings on the proceeds of warrants
exercised.

METHODOLOGY

Finance, investment, and accounting literature will be surveyed
to determine how investors use earnings per share and to determine the
characteristics of warrants which affect the earnings-per-share computa
tion.

In addition, the characteristics of all warrants listed on the

American Stock Exchange during the period from 1950 to 1972 will be
analyzed.

Based upon these desired information characteristics, guide

lines for computing earnings per share when warrants are outstanding
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will be developed.

These guidelines will be employed in evaluating the

various earnings-per-share statistics which result from the use of dif
ferent assumptions in regard to the earnings on warrant proceeds.

From

this evaluation will come recommendations for computing the earnings per
share of companies with warrants outstanding.
Much of the data for this study will come from current finance
and accounting journals and books.

The Wall Street Journal, The Wall

Street Journal Index, Moody's Industrial Manual, Standard and Poor's
Corporate Records. Value Line Investment Survey, and other financial
services are the data sources for the individual companies being
analyzed.

Data will also be secured from the annual reports of specific

companies and from Form 10-K Annual Report filings with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.

In addition, copies of much of the correspon

dence in the earnings-per-share files of the Accounting Principles Board
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants are available.

LIMITATIONS

This study does not attempt to answer the normative question,
"Should investors use earnings per share in evaluating common stocks?"
A fundamental assumption is that investors do use earnings per share in
evaluating common stocks.
APB Opinion No. 15 is concerned with the effect of all types of
potentially dilutive securities on earnings per share.

This study is

limited to a consideration of the effects of warrants on the earningsper-share computations.

The warrants studied are those listed on the

American Stock Exchange during the period from 1950 to 1972.

This
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limitation is necessary because warrant prices are required in the study.
No inferences can be made about warrants which are not traded because
their characteristics may be substantially different from the population
under study.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

The definitions which follow are of terms associated with war
rants and earnings per share:
Common stock equivalent. A term used by the Accounting Principles Board
in APB Opinion No. 15 to designate a security which, because of its
terms or the circumstances under which it was issued, is in substance
equivalent to common stock. Warrants are designated common stock
equivalents under the treasury stock method if the average market
price of the related common stock exceeds the exercise price.
Dilution (Dilutive). A term used by the Accounting Principles Board in
APB Opinion No. 15 to indicate a reduction in earnings per share re
sulting from the assumption that convertible securities have been
converted or that options and warrants have been exercised or other
shares have been issued upon the fulfillment of certain conditions.
Under the treasury stock method, warrants are dilutive when the
average or current market price of the related common stock exceeds
the exercise price.
Earnings per share. As defined by the Accounting Principles Board in
APB Opinion No. 15, it is the amount of earnings attributable to each
share of common stock. It may be used without qualification only when
no potentially dilutive securities or ■crther agreements-pToviding for
contingent issuances of common stock are outstanding.
Exercise price. As used in this study, the amount that must be paid for
a share of common stock upon exercise of a warrant. Depending upon
the terms of the warrant agreement, the amount may be paid in cash or
by surrender of other securities at their par value.
Fully diluted earnings per share. As defined by the Accounting Principles
Board in APB Opinion No. 15, the amount of current earnings per share
reflecting the maximum dilution that would have resulted from conver
sions, exercises, and other contingent issuances that individually
would have decreased earnings per share and in the aggregate would have
had a dilutive effect.
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Intrinsic value. The present worth of a warrant assuming immediate exer
cise of the option privilege. It is calculated by subtracting the
exercise price from the market price of the related stock. The term
is synonymous with tangible value and theoretical value.
Premium value. The value investors are willing to pay for the leverage
a warrant offers. It is calculated by subtracting the warrant's tangi
ble value from its market price. For comparative and analytical
purposes, the premium is often expressed as a percentage of the market
price of the optioned stock.
Primary earnings per share. As defined by the Accounting Principles
Board in APB Opinion No. 15. the amount of earnings attributable to
each share of common stock, including common stock equivalents.
Security. As defined by the Accounting Principles Board in APB Opinion
No. 15. the evidence of a debt or ownership or related right. Warrants
are securities under this definition.
Tangible value. The present worth of a warrant assuming immediate exer
cise of the option privilege.
It is calculated by subtracting the
exercise price from the market price of the related stock. The term
is synonymous with intrinsic value and theoretical value.
Theoretical value. The present worth of a warrant assuming immediate
exercise of the option privilege. It is calculated by subtracting the
exercise price from the market price of the related stock. The term
is synonymous with intrinsic value and tangible value.
Treasury stock method. The method designated by the Accounting Principles
Board in APB Opinion No. 15 for recognizing the use of proceeds that
would be obtained upon the exercise of options and warrants in computing
earnings per share. It assumes that the proceeds would be used to
purchase common stock at average or current market prices.
Warrant. A negotiable security giving the holder the right to purchase
a designated number of shares of common stock at a definite price
during a stipulated time period. For purposes of this study, this
definition excludes employee stock options and warrants to purchase
securities other than common stock.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Chapter 2 will discuss what use investors make of earnings-pershare statistics.

Accounting, finance, and investment literature will be

surveyed in order to determine the attributes of earnings per share that
investors perceive to be important.
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Chapter 3 will be devoted to an analysis of the characteristics
of warrants listed on the American Stock Exchange during the period from
1950 to 1972.

The amount of potential dilution and of actual dilution,

the contractual provisions, the exercise ratio, the life span, the reasons
for issue, and other characteristics will be discussed.
In Chapter 4 the concepts of residual securities and common
stock equivalents will be examined.

The difficulties encountered by the

Accounting Principles Board in the promulgation of APB Opinion No. 15
will be studied through a review of the Board's earnings-per-share files.
A knowledge of these difficulties will be helpful in formulating the
guidelines for the earnings-per-share computations of companies with
warrants outstanding.
The guidelines for earnings-per-share calculations involving
warrants will be developed in Chapter 5.

These guidelines will be em

ployed to evaluate several methods of computing the earnings per share
of companies with outstanding warrants.

Finally, based on this evalua

tion, a recommended method of computing earnings per share will be
devcloped.
Chapter 6 summarizes the major points developed throughout this
study and sets forth the primary conclusions drawn from this research.

Chapter 2

ATTRIBUTES OF EARNINGS PER SHARE USED BY INVESTORS

Since a basic premise of this study is that investors and
security analysts use earnings per share extensively in common stock
valuation, a knowledge of how the statistics are used is essential to
establishing the attributes of earnings per share that are important to
investors.

From these attributes, guidelines for computing the earnings

per share of companies with warrants outstanding can be formulated.
These objectives can be accomplished through a survey of account
ing, investment, and finance literature.

First, the circumstances sur

rounding the origin of the basic valuation model predominantly used today
by practicing analysts--capitalization of earnings--is investigated.

The

failure of accountants to provide adequate income statements and their
attitude toward earnings-per-share statistics were influences which con
tributed to the development of this model.
The basic methods of common stock analysis are also examined to
discover those methods which utilize earnings-per-share data.

Next,

significant research related to common stock valuation is analyzed for
any implications related to earnings per share.

The emphasis of this

study, however, is on how earnings per share is actually used in valuing
securities and not on the manner in which it should be used.

Finally,

after determining how earnings per share is used in security analysis,
the attributes important to investors are formulated.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EARNINGS PER SHARE

Prior to the early 1920's, the purchase and sale of common stocks,
with few exceptions, was considered to be a speculative activity.

The

few stocks qualifying as investments were those with a long record of
stable dividends and earnings with average prices close to their par or
asset values.

Such stocks were considered similar to junior grade bonds

and were evaluated in much the same manner--principally on the basis of
a balance sheet analysis.
During this period, earnings-per-share statistics were not cited
in financial publications.

Instead, in addition to absolute amounts,

earnings were reported as a percentage of the aggregate par value of
common stock outstanding.

The New York Times Annalist, for example,

reported the earnings of United States Steel Corporation for the first
half of 1913 as follows:

"The balance after preferred dividends,

$33,696,527, is equal to 6.63 percent on $508,302,500 common stock for
the six months."^

In commenting on Packard Motor Company's earnings,

the same publication stated:

"The Packard Motor Company, which earned

36.6 percent on its $5,000,000 common stock during the 1912 fiscal year
ended August 31, has paid no common dividends for three years, but has
retained the cash for working capital."
Investors changed their attitude toward common stocks during the
early 1920's and accepted common stocks as legitimate investments.
this change of attitude, the financial press began publishing

^■The New York Times Annalist, August 4, 1913, p. 138.
^The New York Times Annalist, January 20, 1913, p. 30.

With
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earnings-per-share statistics.

The circumstances which led to the

acceptance of common stocks as investments, the early importance of
earnings per share in the evaluation of common stocks, and the accoun
tant 's attitude toward earnings per share during this period are dis
cussed in this section.

The Acceptance of Common
Stocks as Investments
In 1924, Edgar Lawrence Smith planted the seeds of what has been
called the new era of common stocks.-*

Smith's theory was that a well-

diversified investment in common stocks, if held for a long period, would
give a better return than an investment in bonds.

Smith supported his

theory by a study which showed that a well-diversified portfolio of
common stock of important companies had consistently outperformed a bond
portfolio over any ten-year period since the Civil War if the return in
cluded price changes as well as interest or dividends.
Smith's study became the official textbook of the new-era stock
market of the roaring twenties.^

In fact, his original theory was 11. . .

copied and distorted by other financial writers and market letter fabri
cators until its author was forced to disclaim responsibility for the
absurdities that were being committed in his name."-*

Common stocks as a

■*Edgar Lawrence Smith, Common Stocks as Long-Term Investments
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924).
^Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, Security
Analysis: Principles and Technique (4th e d .; New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1962), p. 409.
^Emerson Wirt Axe, "The Stock Market Still Blocked by Unliqui
dated Debris for the 'New Era,'" The Annalist, April 17, 1931, p. 722.
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class were accepted as investments of little risk because of the persis
tent secular price uptrend of the stocks in Smith's portfolio.

This

almost complete reversal of investor attitudes toward common stocks was
succinctly explained by Emerson Wirt Axe, who wrote:
Before the war, buying stocks was always regarded as dangerous.
And west of Pittsburgh it was not even moral. One might as well
have been a grain trader or a gambler. But the Liberty loans
accustomed people to buying securities and the widespread discus
sion of E. L. Smith's theory of common stocks as long term invest
ments convinced the public that security speculation was both safe
and respectable. Finally, the spectacular advance in stock prices
over the last six years and the great increase in the number of
issues listed have advertised the stock market as never before.
Like golf and bridge, stock speculation, once the amusement of
the few, has become a national pastime.6
The new-era philosophy of the 1920's signaled the end of the
evaluation of common stocks as investments on the basis of balance sheet
analysis.

As would be expected in the booming 1920's, a growth stock

cult emerged which favored the income statement and earnings per share
as the basis of common stock evaluation for investment purposes.

Since

this study is concerned with making earnings-per-share statistics as
meaningful as possible to investors who might use them for the evaluation
of companies with warrants outstanding, a closer look at the philosophy
of the new era is appropriate.

Axe, a financial writer for The Annalist

during the 1920's, analyzed the tenets of this philosophy shortly after
the October, 1929 crash.

Following is a summary of some of the principles

he observed:
1.

What has happened in the past is of little interest; every stock
must be judged on its own merits.

^Emerson Wirt Axe, "A 'Through the Looking-Glass' Stock Market;
Popular Illusions Rule," The Annalist, April 18, 1930, p. 840.
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2. A distinction between speculation and investment is not valid.
Speculation merges into investment and investments contain
speculative elements.
3. The idea that the purchase of common stocks involves consider
able risk is unsound. Common stocks are a better long-term
investment than bonds if purchased in sufficient diversifica
tion.
4.

There is no such thing as "the market" because individual stocks
move differently. Consequently it is more important to know
what to buy than when to buy. Good stocks can be bought
anytime.

5.

The worth of a stock can be judged reasonably well by examining
annual reports and earnings statements. The fact that insiders
know the contents of statements before they are published does
not materially reduce their value for price forecasting purposes.

6.

The trend of stock prices is always upward and bear markets are
unlikely.7
Thus, basic investment concepts such as asset backing and earn

ings and dividend yields were abandoned.

Current price was of little

significance because earnings growth would soon justify the price.
attempt was made to establish a fundamental investment value.

No

The only

quantitative input which remained was the earnings growth rate, which was
usually projected on the basis of the most recent results without adequate
g

consideration to factors which might cause the rate to change.

Thus

the trend of earnings per share, correctly or incorrectly, became estab
lished as one of the major factors in the evaluation of common stocks

^Emerson Wirt Axe, "New Popular Theories of Investment, Specula
tion Go Down the Drain in Stock Crash," The Annalist, November 1, 1929,
p. 859.

been
had,
Wirt
'New

Q
Axe commented that trend " . . . meant simply that earnings had
increasing for three or four years--which earnings of most companies
because business had been improving since 1924 . . .
See Emerson
Axe, "The Stock Market Still Blocked by Unliquidated Debris from the
Era,'" The Annalist, April 17, 1931, p. 722.
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during the 1920's.

Trend in earnings per share, whether used alone or in

conjunction with other quantitative or qualitative factors, is still a
major factor in common stock valuation and this trend is one of the attri
butes of earnings per share that must be considered in earnings-per-share
Q
computations involving warrants.7

Early Importance of
Earnings per Share
With the change in investor attitudes toward common stocks as
investments and with the almost exclusive reliance upon earnings trend
in their evaluation, the financial press began publishing earnings-pershare statistics in their earnings announcements during the early 1920's.
This was a logical development because it allowed valid interperiod com
parisons of the net income of companies with changing capital structures.
While an investor might be impressed with a company which doubled its net
income with no change in shares outstanding, his attitude would change if
he learned that the number of shares had doubled through the sale of
additional stock to the public.

Thus earnings per share relates the net

income theoretically available to common stockholders to each unit of
capital provided by those stockholders.

^The point that common stock evaluation procedures of the 1920's
were still practiced, to some extent, at least, in the early 1960's is
made by Graham, Dodd, and Cottle, who stated; "The carouse of the
1920's succeeded in mixing up speculative and investment viewpoints in
inextricable fashion--nor have we yet been able to put asunder the
approaches that were so undivinely joined together." See Benjamin
Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, op. cit., p. 409. That such
procedures persisted until the late 1960's is affirmed by Bellemore and
Ritchie. See Douglas H. Bellemore and John C. Ritchie, Jr., Investment:
Principles, Practices, Analysis (3d ed.; Cincinnati: South-Western Pub
lishing Company, 1969), p. 298.
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The number of common shares outstanding is the common denominator
which reduces aggregate earnings to a basis that is comparable with stock
prices, which are always stated on a per-share basis.

The stating of

earnings on a per-share basis also allows a comparison of earnings with
dividends, which are usually quoted on a per-share basis.

Through the

use of the price-earnings ratio, comparison among corporations with dif
ferent capital structures, as well as interperiod comparisons of the same
company, can be made.

Weston and Davidson, both members of the Account

ing Principles Board at the time APB Opinion No. 15 was released, have
concluded that the purpose of earnings-per-share statistics is as
follows:
For the present we may conclude that the purpose of earnings
per share data is to attribute the earnings of a corporate entity
for a specified period to the capitalization structure of the
entity existing during that period. Stated another way, the
purpose is to relate the earnings for a period to the various
categories of equity based on their relative legal and/or economic
relationships, preferences and privileges .^
By 1923, earnings-per-share data of many companies were being pub
lished by the financial press.

For example, of the 29 companies report

ing earnings in February 12, 1923 issue of The Annalist, 19 also reported
earnings per share. ^

But whether earnings per share, as published

during this period, achieved its purpose of making the earnings of dif
fering corporate capital structures more comparable is questionable.
When comparative earnings-per-share figures were published, they were

^Frank T. Weston and Sidney Davidson, "What Will Accounting
Changes Do to Earnings?" Financial Analysts Journal, XXIV (SeptemberOctober, 1968), 59.
^ T h e Annalist. February 12, 1923, p. 254.
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often as misleading as absolute earnings.

For example, in 1923 The

Annalist reported the quarterly earnings of Underwood Typewriter Company
as follows:
Underwood Typewriter Company, for quarter ended September 30,
1923, reports net profits of $488,468, after depreciation but before
Federal taxes, equivalent, after preferred dividends, to $1.05 a
share (par $25) earned on outstanding $10,000,000 common stock com
pared with net profits of $341,993, or $3.08 a share (par $100),
earned on outstanding $9,000,000 common stock in third quarter
of 1922.12
Mergers also created problems in earnings-per-share reporting.
General Foods reported earnings per share, after adjustment for a twofor-one stock split in September, 1925, for the years 1924-1926 as $4.72,
$3.35, and $7.71, respectively.

The apparent drop in earnings per share

in 1925 was not caused by adverse economic conditions or poor management,
but by the method of computing the figure.

General Foods had acquired

Jell-0 Company on December 25, 1925 through the issuance of 570,000 shares
of common stock.

In computing earnings per share, the earnings of Jell-0

were excluded from the numerator, but the shares issued for its acquisi
tion were included in the denominator.

A more comparable figure, based

on average shares outstanding, would have been $5.83.

13

An investor who

used the trend of earnings per share in evaluating the common stock of
General Foods would almost certainly reach a different conclusion if he
were aware of the method of computing 1925 earnings per share.

Without

this information, he would conclude that the three-year trend, although
upward, was highly variable.

Conversely, if he used only the latest two

^2The Annalist, November 12, 1923, p. 650.
1^
Wadsworth H. Mullen, "The Effect of Capital Stock Increases on
per Share Earnings and Book Value," The Annalist, July 10, 1931, p. 43.

31

years, he would conclude that earnings had more than doubled when in fact
the increase was only about 32 percent.
Failure to adjust retroactively for stock dividends also destroyed
the comparability of earnings per share.

This was perhaps more serious

than the failure to adjust for stock splits, because the average investor
would be less likely to investigate a small decrease in earnings per
share caused by a 5 or 10 percent stock dividend than he would a larger
decrease caused by a stock split.^
The issuance of stock dividends was a common practice during the
1920’s . ^

There was considerable evidence that the public and some

financial writers did not understand the ultimate effect of this practice
on stock prices.

Stock dividends were devised as a means of allowing a

corporation to obtain capital for expansion from its stockholders in the
simplest manner by retaining cash that would otherwise be paid out as
dividends.

At the same time, it permitted stockholders to realize cash

from sale of the stock received as a dividend.

Advocates of stock divi

dends presented the argument that the final effect of a stock dividend
was the same as if a company had paid a cash dividend and each stock
holder had in turn reinvested that cash in new stock of the company.

With

appropriate accounting procedures for stock dividends, this argument
might have been valid, but some companies were issuing stock dividends

l^Ibid., pp. 43 and 44.
15

See, for example, Walter J. Matherly, "Last Year's Flood of
Stock Dividends," The Annalist. March 12, 1923, p. 380 and "The
Principal Causes of the Stock Market Crisis," The Annalist, January 31,
1930, p. 310.
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without capitalizing any retained earnings while others capitalized a
nominal amount. 1°
The fallacy of this argument is illustrated in the following ex
ample.

Adalbert Wolff, in an article for The Annalist, advocated

periodic stock dividends for the reasons cited above.^

He used as an

example the North American Company, which regularly declared a 2 1/2
percent quarterly stock dividend during most of the 1920's.

Earnings

per share were $3.85 in 1926 and $3.86 in 1927, but the market value of
the stock dividends in each year was approximately $7.00.

R. H.

Montgomery, the distinguished accountant and author, in a letter to the
editor of The Annalist pointed out that cash dividends could not legally
exceed earnings per share for any extended period of time.

He specu

lated, therefore, that a change from stock dividends to cash dividends
would bring about a radical change in the market value of the stock.
He concluded, "To me, as an accountant, it appears to be a pyramiding
which entirely disregards the actual earnings per share and presents a
1Q

false picture to stockholders."
E. H. H. Simmons, president of the New York Stock Exchange, con
cluded that the excessive use of stock dividends and the failure of the
vast majority of investors to understand their true effect on stock prices

■^J. M. B. Hoxsey, "Accounting for Investors," The Journal of
Accountancy, L (October, 1930), 265 and 266.
^Adalbert Wolff, "Periodic Rights and Stock Dividends--Experience, Successful and Otherwise," The Annalist, July 6, 1928, pp. 5-6.
^■®R. H. Montgomery, "Periodic Rights and Stock Dividends," The
Annalist, July 27, 1928, p. 141.
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contributed to the high level of security prices in the summer of 1929
and the resulting panic in October, 1929.^

In 1929, the governing com

mittee of the exchange had created a special committee on stock dividends
to study the accounting aspects of the problem.

This committee issued two

reports which were adopted by the governing committee on September 11,
1929 and April 30, 1930.

The conclusion was that the minimum charge

against retained earnings for stock dividends " . . .

appears clearly to

be the sum of the theretofore capital and capital surplus per share, for
o r\

each share issued as a dividend." u

The exchange would not, however,

delist a company for failure to comply with this ruling provided there
was full disclosure of the accounting method used.

21

Despite this early

action by the New York Stock Exchange, the first official pronouncement
by accountants on the subject of stock dividends was not issued until
September, 1941.

Accounting Research Bulletin No. 11, Corporate Account

ing for Ordinary Stock Dividends, as revised in November, 1952, required
a charge to earned surplus for the fair value of the additional shares
^ 22
issued.
With the shift in emphasis from the balance sheet to the income
statement and with the increasing availability of earnings per share,

■^"The Principal Causes of the Stock Market Crisis," The Annalist,
January 31, 1930, p. 310.
M. B. Hoxsey, op. cit., 267.
21Ibid., 282.
22

Committee on Accounting Procedure of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Restatement and Revision of Accounting
Research Bulletins, Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43 (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1953), p. 51.
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investors began using price-earnings ratios and their reciprocal, earnings-price ratios, for the evaluation of common stocks.

Even the Harvard

Business Review published a study of "normal" rates of capitalization by
industry for the years 1922 through 1925.

While the article was not a

defense of the capitalization of earnings on theoretical grounds, it did
not attack the practice, as shown by the following:
Because of simplicity, the capitalization of earnings is often
used as a method for appraising the value of common stock of a
going concern. Since, in the last analysis, the value of any
particular business is its capacity to earn profits, this method
would seem to conform to sound economic theory. . . . The problem
is not so much the justification of the method, but rather
determination of the proper rate which should be used in capital
izing earnings, and the extent to which this rate can be of real
use in valuing the common stock of a going concern.^
The conclusion was that while a normal rate of capitalization of earnings
computed by averaging several yearly rates probably could not be used in
valuing common stocks with any degree of success, ". . . a yearly rate
can be computed and used as a starting point in valuing common stocks.
The use of price-earnings ratios in valuing common stocks had
become so widespread by 1929 that the president of the New York Stock
Exchange, E. H. H. Simmons, cited it as one of the contributing factors
in the October, 1929 stock market crash.

He stated:

Another contributing cause was the practice of gauging the
value of securities by multiplying their most recently reported
net earnings by some factor which was deemed to be applicable to
the industry in which the company was engaged. This method

9^
^-"'Summaries of Business Research; Market Capitalization Rates
of Industrial Earnings," Harvard Business Review. VI (October, 1927),
75.
24Ibid., 80.
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of valuation, while perfectly proper, leads to inflation in periods
of great industrial activity. 5

Accountants' Attitude
toward Earnings per Share
The enthusiasm of investors for valuing common stocks by applying
price-earnings ratios to earnings per share was not shared by accountants.
As the preceding discussion has shown, there was need for improvement in
the method of computing and reporting earnings per share.

But accoun

tants, who believed that valuation techniques based heavily on earnings
per share were misleading, chose not to encourage such techniques by
refusing to include earnings-per-share statistics in the financial state
ments.
During the two decades from 1920 to 1940, The Journal of Accoun
tancy published only one article on earnings per share.

In April, 1930,

Natvig pointed out the usefulness of earnings-per-share statistics for
measuring market values and the need for a standard method of computing
them.

26

An editorial the following month, in answer to the article, con

cluded that ". . . it is a fallacy to allow oneself to be governed by
earnings 'per share' in estimating probable market

value.

"^7

This attitude of accountants toward earnings per share prevailed
until the publication of APB Opinion No. 9 in December, 1966.

For

^"Principal Causes of the Stock Market Crisis," The Annalist,
January 31, 1930, 310.
^ A n d r e a s s. Natvig, "Earnings per Share," The Journal of
Accountancy, XLIX (April, 1930), 252-263.

27"Earnings per Share," The Journal of Accountancy, XLIX (May,
1930), 325.
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example, in April, 1951, The Journal of Accountancy published an article
by W. F. Stanley, Vice President and Secretary of Southwestern Public
Service Corporation, urging accountants to include earnings and dividends
28

per share in the financial statements. °

The editors invited J. E.

Robertson, a partner in Haskins & Sells, New York, to respond to the
Stanley article.
cluded:

In summarizing Robertson's comments, the editors con

"Little significance can be attached to earnings per share as a

figure purporting to express operating results.

It is unwise, therefore,

2Q
to encourage stockholders to rely on this item." 7
This attitude was again confirmed in 1955 when Bertrand J. Belda
urged accountants to use uniform methods in computing earnings per share.
Carman Blough, editor of accounting and auditing problems in The Journal
of Accountancy, commented on Belda's letter as follows:

"We do not join

in Mr. Belda's enthusiasm for the earnings per share figure as a measure
of a company's performance, since it is usually necessary to know the
elements going into the make-up of the net income figure if the per share
figure is to be meaningful."^®

Blough did agree, however, that since a

great deal of importance was attached to earnings per share by financial
reporters, security dealers, and investors, more attention should be paid

28

W. F. Stanley, "Financial Statements Should Report Earnings and
Dividends per Share." The Journal of Accountancy. XCI (April, 1951),
566-568.
29

J. E. Robertson, "Why Accountants De-emphasize Earnings per
Share," The Journal of Accountancy. XCI (April, 1951), 568.
30

Carman G. Blough (ed.), "Accounting and Auditing Problems:
The Calculation of Earnings per Share," The Journal of Accountancy. C
(September, 1955), 62.
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to the development of uniformity in its calculation.
As the result of accountants' refusal to accept earnings-pershare statistics, very little attention was paid to their calculation.
But at least one financial writer showed evidence of having given con
siderable thought to the problem.

In 1931, Wadsworth H. Mullen wrote an

article for The Annalist suggesting methods for making earnings per share
more comparable under conditions of various forms of capitalization
i n c r e a s e s . M u l l e n considered the effects on earnings per share caused
by:

(1) stock issuances for the acquisition of assets, (2) stock divi

dends, (3) the conversion of senior securities, and (4) the exercise of
stock purchase warrants, stock rights, and employee stock options.
A description of Mullen's method for making prior period earnings
per share comparable with the period in which warrants were exercised is
appropriate to this study.

Mullen began by computing the average rate of

return on owners' equity (i.e., net income divided by average owners'
equity) for the period in which the warrants were exercised.

He then

assumed that the earnings on the warrant proceeds would accrue at this
rate for the fraction of the period prior to the exercise of the warrants
and at a comparable rate for previous periods.

Finally, he computed

earnings per share on a retroactive basis by adding these assumed earn
ings to the numerator and by increasing the denominator by the number of
shares issued for the warrants.

31Ibid.
32
Wadsworth H. Mullen, "The Effect of Capital Stock Increase on
per Share Earnings and Book Value," The Annalist, July 10, 1931, pp.
43-45.
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Perhaps the reason accountants chose to ignore earnings-per-share
statistics had to do with the quality of the income statements that they
were providing to investors during the 1920's.

In fact many companies

did not publish income statements at all, the rationalization being that
", . . a concern 'gives aid and comfort to its enemies'

(i.e., competi

tors) when it makes a complete and illuminating financial state
ment . . .

Numerous examples of the complete inadequacy of financial

information being provided to stockholders and investors were cited by
William Z. Ripley in an article pleading for the stockholder's right to
information.

The following excerpt is typical:

. . . It is certainly out of line with good business practice
that the Amoskeag Manufacturing Co., the greatest cotton mill in
the world, should render an income account not in dollars but in
yards, along with a petty trial balance; or that the Waltham Watch
Co., owned by more than 3,000 people, two years after reorganiza
tion, after having appealed to the public for subscription to its
securities, should still vouchsafe nothing but a skeleton balance
sheet. Neither does the former instance obscure unprofitable
operation nor does the latter, as it appears, cover up the full
measure of current profits. Both meager reports are incompatible
with the best modern standards of business practice.34
All too frequently, even those firms providing income statements
condensed the information to such an extent that the statements were
practically useless for security analysis purposes.

In 1929, Laurence

H. Sloan published a comparative study of corporation profits for the
years 1926 and 1927.

As a result of this study, Sloan joined Ripley in

the plea for better and more complete financial statements.

He found, for

■^Laurence H. Sloan, Corporation Profits: A Study of Their Size,
Variation, Use, and Distribution in a Period of Prosperity (New York:
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1929), pp. 344-345.
■^Sjilliam Z. Ripley, "Stop, Look, Listen!: The Shareholder's
Right to Adequate Information," The Accountant, March 5, 1927, p. 347.
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example, in an analysis of the income statements of the 545 leading indus
trial corporations, that only 235, or 43 percent of the total, included
gross income.^5
Gullible investors, confronted with completely inadequate income
statements, became convinced " . . .

that nearly all companies conceal a

substantial proportion of their earnings and that because they do there
is no telling how much the stock may be w o r t h . R i p l e y used National
Biscuit Company as an example of the situation which gave rise to this
type of attitude on the part of the investing public.

He charged that

the company understated post World War I profits through excessive de
preciation.

In 1922 National Biscuit abandoned this policy and with the

resulting increase in profits, the price of its stock bounded upward . ^
This attitude of investors also contributed to the high prices of stocks
just prior to the stock market break in October, 1929.^®
Under these conditions, the practice of evaluating common stocks
by applying a price-earnings multiplier to the latest earnings per share
was not surprising.

Income statements, if available at all, simply did

not provide sufficient detail to make a meaningful evaluation of past
performance, much less provide a basis for the projection of future per
formance.

Investors and security analysts had no other choice; they used

OC

JJSloan, op. cit., p. 62.
gross revenue.

Gross income, as used by Sloan, means

■^Emerson Wirt Axe, "A 'Through the Looking-Glass' Stock Market;
Popular Illusions Rule," The Annalist, April 18, 1930, p. 840.
■^Ripley, op. cit., p. 348.
38"The Principal Causes of the Stock Market Crisis," The Annalist,
January 31, 1930, p. 310.
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the information that management and their accountants made available.
By failing to require management to publish informative and timely
income statements during this period when common stock evaluation tech
niques were being formulated, accountants must share much of the respon
sibility for the earnings-per-share "syndrome."

In addition, the failure

to establish uniform methods of computing earnings-per-share statistics
until almost half a century later compounded the error.
Of course, the argument could be advanced that public accountants
were not firmly enough established to force management to provide ade
quate financial information to investors.

It was not until the estab

lishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1933 that companies
registering securities were required to obtain the opinion of certified
public accountants.

But Sloan, writing in 1929, felt that, given a

concerted effort, public accountants could bring about the needed improve
ments.

He stated:

The public accountant has an interest at stake. He certifies
the report. It is our opinion that if any important group of
public accountants would agree to insist upon certain standards
of adequacy--even though that adequacy fell far short of what we
have expressed as our opinion of the ideal--that the accountants'
position would be strengthened, and that the resistance would
actually prove to be much milder than it is assumed to be.
Indeed, we ascribe the major portion of the unsatisfactory
situation which obtains in regard to corporation statements to
inertia and tradition, more than to a conscious effort to with
hold information which should really be g i v e n . 39
In summary, investors accepted common stocks as investments during
the 1920's.

And their basis for evaluating these stocks shifted from the

traditional balance sheet analysis, which emphasized the past, to an

•^Sloan, op. cit., pp. 345-346.
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income approach, which emphasized the future.

Since many companies pub

lished no income statements, or statements with little detail, investors
began using earnings per share and price-earnings ratios to evaluate
common stocks.

Little emphasis was placed on the fundamental values

which, prior to World War I, had been required in order for a common
stock to be considered an investment.
Accountants rejected this new income approach and attempted to
discourage its use by refusing to include earnings-per-share statistics
in the financial statements.

This refusal to include earnings-per-share

statistics in the financial statements did not achieve the desired goal
of discouraging an emphasis on earnings per share for common stock
evaluation purposes.

Earnings per share continued to be one of the most

important financial statistics used by investors.

Thus the accountants'

refusal to report earnings per share merely handicapped investors by
preventing the development of a uniform method of computing and reporting
earnings per share.
Probably as a result of the 1929 stock market crash, the almost
exclusive reliance on future expectations was modified somewhat in the
1930's and 1940's.

More attention was paid to the past record of a com

pany and its financial condition as evidence of a promising future.

This

was a throwback to the period prior to World War I when very few common
stocks were considered of investment quality.

But emphasis continued to

be on an upward trend in earnings per share and expectations that the
trend would continue into the f u t u r e W i t h the bull market of the

^Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, Security
Analysis: Principles and Technique (4th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1962), p. 413.
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1950's the enthusiasm for common stocks continued to increase.

Once

again, as in the 1920's, the search for "growth stocks" was in full
swing.

Despite some adverse market reactions in the 1960's, the emphasis

on future expectations continues.

With this background on the develop

ment of common stocks as investments and the emergence of earnings per
share as an important financial statistic used in their evaluation, the
role of earnings per share in current theory and practice will be ex
amined more closely.

BASIC METHODS OF COMMON STOCK ANALYSIS

Over the years, two distinctive schools of thought have emerged
on the question of how to make common stock investment decisions.

Tech

nical analysis utilizes little or no financial information generated by
accountants and will be discussed only briefly.

Fundamental analysis

depends upon financial information and particularly on earnings per
share.

Technical Analysis
In its purest form, technical analysis is concerned only with
technical market data such as price and volume trends.

Technicians

study the market itself rather than the external factors reflected in
the market.

They recognize that stock prices are the result of such

factors as expected earnings and expected dividends and the rate at which
these expectations are capitalized.

Technicians contend, however, that

these factors are reflected in the supply and demand for stocks at a
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given price.^

In their view, by studying the past trading history of

price and volume movements, future trends can be detected.
The first, and perhaps best known, of the technical methods was
the Dow Theory, named after Charles H. Dow, one of the founders of Dow
Jones & Company.

Dow published the basic methodology of his theory in a

number of editorials in The Wall Street Journal between 1900 and

1902.^

Other technical analysis methods include point-and-figure charting, bar
charting, filter techniques, odd lot theory, advance-decline line, and
Barron's confidence index.
Criticism of technical analysis has been extensive.

Critics argue,

and technicians admit, that if many investors used technical analysis,
price movements would occur as a result of the techniques used and
profits would disappear.

Advocates counter that this is not likely to

occur because the average investor is not likely to spend the time and
effort required by the methodology.^

More serious are the implications

of the random walk hypothesis, which will be discussed in a subsequent
section of this chapter.

Extensive empirical testing of a number of tech

nical trading rules in general supports the conclusion that stock prices
cannot be predicted on the basis of past price data alone.^

^^-Donald E. Vaughn, Survey of Investments (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), p. 322. See also Robert A. Levy,
"Conceptual Foundations of Technical Analysis," Financial Analysts Journal.
XXII (July-August, 1966), 83.
^ H e n r y A. Latane and Donald L. Tuttle, Security Analysis and
Portfolio Analysis (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1970), p. 354.
43ibid., p. 271 and Vaughn, op. cit., p. 400.
44gee George E. Pinches, "The Random Walk Hypothesis and Tech
nical Analysis," Financial Analysts Journal. pp. 104-110 for a compre
hensive summary o£ these studies and their results.
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Although pure technical analysts have no need for financial infor
mation such as earnings per share, some financial advisors advocate a
combination of fundamental and technical analysis.

Vaughn reports good

trading and investment results by using fundamental analysis to select
desirable issues.

Timing of the purchase is then determined by the

technical indicators.^
Latane and Tuttle also recommend technical analysis as a timing
device to be used in conjunction with fundamental analysis.
AfL

some skepticism as to its reliability, however. °

They express

The majority opinion

seems to be summed up by Bellemore and Ritchie, who state:
A wide review of empirical evidence and the judgment of most
successful investors--those who have built up substantial capital
over the years— leads to the comment that the technical methods
for forecasting have not proved very rewarding. '

Fundamental Analysis
The major premise of fundamental analysis is that an investment
value can be determined for individual common stocks apart from their
current price.

In theory, this value is simply the present worth of all

future cash payments expected to be received from the security.
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A

second premise of fundamental analysis is that actual price will at some
future point converge to this investment value if the analyst is correct

^Vaughn, op. cit., p. 321.
^Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., p. 354.
47

Douglas H. Bellemore and John C. Ritchie, Jr., Investment:
Principles. Practices. Analysis (3d ed.; Cincinnati: South-Western
Publishing Company, 1969), p. 98.
^®Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., pp. 260-261.

45

in his estimate of the investment value.49

In essence, determining the

investment value of a stock is equivalent to predicting the security's
future price.
Fundamental analysis, as the name implies, utilizes basic economic
and financial information and other external factors which affect the
stock market.

The fundamental analyst, in addition to investigating

general business conditions as reflected in the economy as a whole and
in the specific industries in which he is interested, analyzes the finan
cial statements of individual companies.

He considers qualitative

factors as well as quantitative factors in arriving at an investment
value for each security under observation.

This value is then compared

with the existing market price to determine the appropriate investment
decision— buy, sell, or hold.
Since this chapter is concerned with the attributes of earnings
pershare that are used by investors in valuing common stocks,

two ques

tions relative to fundamental analysis need to be answered.
1.

Is fundamental analysis used extensively, as opposed to

technical analysis?
2.

Is earnings per share a statistic frequently used by

fundamental analysts?
There are no statistics available showing the relative frequency
of use

of the two basic methods of security analysis.

Further as

pre

viously pointed out, some analysts advocate a combination of the two

49Ibid., p. 12.
-^Robert A. Levy, "Conceptual Foundations of Technical Analysis,"
Financial Analysts Journal. XXII (July-August, 1966), 83.
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methods.

Vaughn indicates that technical analysis gained in popularity

during the early 1 9 6 0 ' s . A t

least one mutual fund, Technivest Fund,

seeks maximum capital growth by emphasizing technical analysis.
On the other hand, Andrew Feretti, moderator of a Certified
Financial Analysts research seminar on investment company portfolio
management, concluded that few mutual funds base their investment deci
sions entirely upon technical analysis.

To the contrary, he stated;

"Fundamental security analysis is typically given the greatest weight,
because it is indispensable to an understanding of the environment in
which an investment plan is o u t l i n e d . L a t a n e and Tuttle also conclude;
"Few investors make buy-sell decisions solely on the basis of technical
analysis . . . "54

jn summary, the conclusion is that the vast majority

of investors, as opposed to traders, utilize fundamental analysis in
making investment decisions.
The answer to the second question with respect to the frequency
of use of earnings per share is that earnings per share is a primary
financial statistic used by fundamentalists in valuing common stock.
This will be demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter through an
analysis of the fundamental school's methodology.
Perhaps as a result of the stock market crash in 1929, there has

^^Vaughn, op. cit., p. 321.
^Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., p. 378.
^Andrew P. Feretti (ed.), Investment Company Portfolio Manage
ment; Proceedings. C.F.A. Research Seminar, May 26-27, 1969. Charlottes
ville. Virginia (Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1970), p. 78.
-^Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., p. 353.
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been an appreciable amount of market-oriented research, particularly
during the 1930's and from 1950 to present.

This research, largely per

formed by academicians, has centered around common stock valuation
methods, price behavior, and portfolio management.

While some of the

theory produced by the research has been accepted by practitioners, none
has been particularly successful in practice, largely because of the
difficulty of quantifying the data.

Before analyzing how practitioners

employ earnings per share in valuing common stock, some of the more im
portant research in the areas noted above will be examined for its
implications to common stock valuation and earnings per share.

SIGNIFICANT THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
RELATED TO COMMON STOCK VALUATION

Present value theory was applied to common stocks in the 1930!s.
Although its emphasis is on cash flows, the application of present value
theory relies heavily on earnings per share.

In the 1950's and 1960's,

interest in the random walk theory was revived through extensive empirical
testing.

The results of these tests led to the efficient markets theory

which tends to discredit technical analysis.

An examination of these

theories and their implications to fundamental analysts who use earnings
per share follows.

Present Worth Valuation Theories
Although present value theory had been in use for many years in
the construction of bond tables, the idea that it was also applicable to
common stocks is attributed to Robert F. Weise, who published an article
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on the subject in the September 8, 1930 issue of Barron's.^

The first

full development of present worth theory for valuing common stocks was
by John Burr Williams in his book, The Theory of Investment Value.^6

The

theory is simple in that the investment value of a common stock is the
future stream of dividends discounted at an appropriate rate or rates.
The difficulty lies in its application.

Future dividends must be esti

mated to infinity, and an appropriate discount rate or rates must be
selected.

The technique may be modified for investment horizons shorter

than infinity.

The modification consists of discounting to present value

an estimate of the market price of the stock at the end of the holding
period.
Advocates of the present value theory of common stock, by making
certain limiting assumptions about the growth rate of dividends or earn
ings and dividend payout ratios, have published a number of present value
tables that should encourage unsophisticated investors to use the tech
nique.

One such set of tables will be examined in detail to demonstrate

the importance of earnings per share to present worth valuation theory.
Molodovsky, May, and Chottiner have constructed a series of tables
for determining the earnings multiplier for various rates of return under
various assumptions as to the earnings growth r a t e A l t h o u g h input
and output of the tables are in terms of earnings per share, the

55Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., p. 300.
JDJohn Burr Williams, The Theory of Investment Value (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1938).
c7
-"Nicholas Molodvsky, Catherine May, and Sherman Chottiner,
"Common Stock Valuation: Principles, Tables and Application," Financial
Analysts Journal. XXI (March-April, 1965), 104-123.

49

theoretical structure " . . .

rests on the foundation that the value of a

common stock is the present worth of its future stream of dividends."

58

The conversion from earnings per share to dividends per share is made
possible through the assumption that the dividend payout ratio is a func
tion of earnings growth.
Molodovsky's tables are based on the assumption that earnings
per share will grow at a constant rate for a limited period and then
decline in a linear function to a zero growth rate, which is assumed to
continue to infinity.

Output of the tables is in terms of a multiplier

for normal earnings of $1.00 per share.

Thus the present value of the

share of common stock being evaluated is the product of this multiplier
and the normal earnings per share.

Molodovsky's recommendations for

determining normal earnings per share are as follows:
Normal earnings are not a precise figure. They may be found
by trend-line analysis using the least-squares criterion. Even so,
judgment must enter in the selection of trend periods.
A less satisfactory but still acceptable approach is to deter
mine normal earnings by averaging last year's earnings, the current
level of earnings, and next year's expected e a r n i n g s . 60
In addition to normal earnings per share, four inputs are
required in order to use the tables.
or indirectly, to earnings per share.

All are related, either directly
These inputs are:

(1) projected

growth rate of earnings per share, (2) constant growth period, (3)

58Ibid., 104.
-*^Ibid., 104-105. Low dividend payouts are the result of a high
investment return which in turn causes a high earnings growth rate.
High dividend payouts are the result of low investment return which
causes low earnings growth. The relationship between dividend payout
ratios and current and lagged earnings growth rates was established
through multiple regression applied to the Cowles Commission data and
Standard & Poor's 500 for the period 1871 to 1962.
60Ibid., 105.
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diminishing growth period, and (4) rate of return.
the projected growth rate of earnings may be

Molodovsky states that

. . the same as the

growth rate of earnings in the immediate past, or it may be higher or
lower depending on circumstances which may alter the earnings trend.
He includes a table which utilizes the ratio of current earnings per
share to earnings per share 10 years ago as a basis for approximating
the compound annual growth rate.

He suggests that the growth rate so

determined may be used if the investor expects a continuation of the past
growth rate.
The constant growth period is the number of years that the pro
jected constant growth rate of earnings per share is expected to con
tinue.

Molodovsky contends that an estimate of its length would be

suggested from the analytical procedure used in determining the constant
growth rate.

The diminishing growth period is the number of years after

expiration of the constant growth rate during which earnings per share
will decline to a zero growth rate.

Molodovsky concludes that this

period will depend upon the characteristics of the company.

A long

period of declining growth would be allowed for a company with excep
tionally good prospects while a short period would be used for companies
with poor prospects.
Molodovsky states that the rate of return is ". . . the investor's desired rate of return from long-term common stock investments,"

62

and that it should bear some relation to alternate investment opportuni
ties.

Thus he appears to factor in risk only indirectly.

61Ibid.
62ibid., 106.

Others are

51

more specific and relate the rate to the uncertainty of the future earn
ings-per-share growth rate estimates.
the discount rate

Bauman, for example, states that

. . i s determined by the degree of uncertainty of

future cash payments, or is determined by the investor's objectives.
Bauman has published a series of present value tables similar in
concept to those of Molodovsky.^4

The principal difference is that the

input is in terms of dividends per share and the output is a multiplier
for normal dividends of $1.00 per share.

But the inputs to Bauman's

present value dividend model, in particular the dividend-per-share
growth rate, depend on earnings per share.

This is shown by the fol

lowing statement:
For a given stock, the dividend multiplier, as previously
stated, is to be determined by the degree of quality and the
future rate of growth in dividends per share; however, the
quality and the future size of dividends are heavily dependent
on the quality and the future rate of growth of earnings per
share. The earnings multiplier is likewise determined by the
degree of quality and the future rate of growth in earnings per
share
Although the present worth theory of valuing common stocks is
widely accepted, the method has not been adopted in practice to any
great extent.

This is shown by Bellemore and Ritchie, who state:

The major reason why most, if not all, successful practicing
financial analysts reject all present worth theories of common
stock valuation which state that the value of a stock is the
discounted value of the future stream of dividends (or earnings)
is simple. They realize from experience that such long-term
projections of earnings and dividends as are required by these

63W. Scott Bauman, "Investment Returns and Present Values,"
Financial Analysts Journal. XXV (November-December, 1969), 108.
64Ibid., 107-120.

65Ibid., 117.
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theories do not produce figures that have enough reasonable
accuracy to be of any practical value. . .
This conflict between theory and practice is really one of dif
ferences in investor time horizons.

Although modifications for shorter

holding periods can be made by estimating the market price of the stock
at the end of a given holding period, the present worth approach
implicitly assumes a permanent investment and an infinitely long holding
period.

On the other hand, the average investor's time horizon appears

to be from one to three years . ^

The logic of a short investor time

horizon is explained by Bellemore and Ritchie, who compare the inves
tor's time horizon to corporate management's time horizon:
. . . Since corporate managements must invest for the long
term, they may act on long-term capital projections in their
capital budgeting and investment decisions, but many managements
emphasize projects returning the most in 5 years. Investors are
not forced to invest for such long terms and therefore need not
accept the great risks of acting on very long-term projections
for 20, 30, 40, or 50 years. . .
Perhaps the major contribution of present-value models to common
stock valuation is that these models force an investor to make explicit
assumptions regarding the factors which influence common stock investment
values.

The traditional multiplier techniques favored by most practi

tioners and investors do not provide the same rigorous framework for

66

Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., p. 307. On this point, see
also Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., p. 263; Graham, Dodd, and Cottle, op.
cit., p. 450; and Ralph E. Badger, Harold W. Torgerson, and Harry G.
Guthmann, Investment Principles and Practices (6th ed.; Englewood Cliffs;
New Jersey: Prentice-Ha11, Inc., 1969), p. 230.
67Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., p. 114. See also Ralph A.
Bing, "Survey of Practitioners' Stock Evaluation Methods," Financial
Analysts Journal. XXVII (May-June, 1971), 57.
68Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., p. 305.
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analysis.

Yet, as the discussion of these multiplier techniques will

show, the two approaches are compatible.

Both depend, to a great extent,

upon earnings per share, past and future, and its trend and variability.
More recent research in the area of stock prices and market be
havior raises questions about fundamental analysts' attempts to establish
investment values apart from current market price.

The earnings-per-

share implications of this research will be examined next.

Random Walk and Efficient
Markets Theories
Although the random walk hypothesis was tested as far back as
1900 as part of a doctoral dissertation by Louis

Bachelier,^

it did not

receive much attention in the finance and investment literature until
the 1950's and 1960's.

In its original form, the hypothesis stated that

changes in stock prices are completely unsystematic, i.e.. changes in
stock prices are statistically independent, or random.

In its narrowest

interpretation, the theory implies that future price movements, being
independent of past price movements, cannot be predicted on the basis of
past price data alone.

Thus, the various theories of technical analysis,

all of which are based on the assumption that the historical patterns
of past price behavior repeat themselves, cannot be used to increase
expected gains if the random walk theory holds.
In its broadest interpretation, the random walk theory states
that prices fully reflect all available information.

fi

Q

This expanded

7Louis Bachelier, "Theory of Speculation," The Random Character
of Stock Market Prices, ed. Paul H. Cootner (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 17-78.
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version implies that the capital market is a perfectly efficient mechan
ism under which prices adjust instantaneously and accurately as soon as
relevant information is received by the participants.

Price movements

under this assumption are random because the information affecting prices
70

arrives in a random manner. u
If the perfect capital market version of the random walk is valid,
fundamentalists who analyze past financial information such as earnings
per share are in much the same position as technical analysts.

As new

information affecting the intrinsic value of a security become available,
the security's price would immediately change to reflect the new intrin
sic value.

Under these conditions, actual prices represent good esti

mates of intrinsic value and attempts by fundamentalists to establish an
intrinsic value separate from current price are useless.^
Testing of the random walk hypothesis has been extensive.^

As

a result of the empirical evidence, the concept of a perfect capital
market has evolved into that of an efficient capital market.

A capital

market in which all participants possessed perfect knowledge, although
useful for theoretical purposes in explaining the random walk theory,
simply did not exist.

Henry C. Wallich, former Assistant Secretary of

^Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., p. 506.
^Eugene F. Fama, "The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices," The
Journal of Business. XXXVIII (January, 1965), 40. As used in this study,
intrinsic value is synonymous with investment value.
72

'See, for example, Paul H. Cootner (ed.), The Random Character
of Stock Market Prices (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press,
1964), which contains 21 articles on the subject. For a more recent
bibliography, see Eugene F. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review
of Theory and Empirical Work," The Journal of Finance, XXV (May, 1970),
416-417.
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the Treasury and member of the President's Council of Economic Advisors,
gives the following explanation:
This is an idealization of even so good a market as the New York
Stock Exchange. News does not travel instantaneously; it is not
acted upon immediately; some people have inside information. Proph
ecies can be self-fulfilling--if enough people follow a leader, the
leader is running something akin to a pool operation. Moreover, a
few rare individuals may genuinely be able to see farther ahead
than the rest. . . .73
In general, the empirical evidence supports a random walk-effi
cient market hypothesis.

Consistent evidence of dependence in day-to-day

price changes showed up as positive serial correlations in Fama's test
of the 30 Dow Jones industrials.^
Fama and Blume^®

The filter tests of Alexander^-* and

also indicate a short-term dependence in price changes.

Fama also found that large price changes tend to be followed by large
price changes, although the sign is unpredictable.^

And Neiderhoffer

and Osborne found a tendency toward excessive reversals in common stock
price changes from transaction to transaction.

^®Henry C. Wallich, "What Does the Random Walk Hypothesis Mean to
Security Analysts?" Financial Analysts Journal. XXIC (March-April, 1968),
160.
^Eugehe F. Fama, "The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices," The
Journal of Business. XXXVIII (January, 1965), 72.
^Sidney S. Alexander, "Price Movements in Speculative Markets:
Trends or Random Walks, No. 2," The Random Character of Stock Market
Prices, ed. Paul H. Cootner (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press.
1964), p. 369.
76Eugene F. Fama and Marshall E. Blume, "Filter Rules and StockMarket Trading," The Journal of Business. XXXIX (January, 1966), 226-241.
^Eugene F. Fama, "The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices," The
Journal of Business, XXXVIII (January, 1965), 87.
^®Victor Niederhoffer and M. F. M. Osborne, "Market Making and
Reveral on. the Stock Exchange," Journal of the American Statistical
Association. LXI (December, 1966), 897-916. Reversals are defined as
pairs of consecutive price changes of opposite sign.
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In each of the above cases, however, Fama has concluded that no
trading rules could be devised to take advantage of the dependence in
price changes because any profit would be absorbed by commissions on the
transactions.^

Thus, although the stock markets do not produce com

pletely random price changes and are therefore not perfect capital mar
kets, they are reasonably efficient markets.
What are the implications of an efficient market to the funda
mentalist who uses financial data such as earnings per share in his
evaluation of common stocks?

Fama has concluded that the average inves

tor should concentrate on portfolio analysis.

If, under the efficient

markets theory, prices always reflect all available public information,
he need not be concerned with whether a security is over or under-priced.
He merely decides on the combination of expected return and risk which
he desires for his portfolio and selects securities randomly from
on

various, or the same, risk classes to achieve this combination.ou
Latane and Tuttle have concluded that in a world of random walks
where the stock markets are essentially perfect or highly efficient, an

^^Eugene F. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory
and Empirical Work," The Journal of Finance, XXV (May, 1970), 414-415.
®^Eugene F. Fama, "The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices," The
Journal of Business, XXXVIII (January, 1965), 40. Portfolio theory is
beyond the scope of this study; however, it does not eliminate the secu
rity analysis function. Current theory has evolved from the "covariance"
model proposed by Harry M. Markowitz in Portfolio Selection; Efficient
Diversification of Investments, Cowles Foundation Monograph 16 (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 96-100. The concept involves combin
ing individual securities into a portfolio with maximum expected return
for a given level of non-diversifiable risk. Thus security analysts are
required to estimate expected return and risk. In practice, the Markowitz
model has not been widely used, nor have the results been very satisfac
tory. On these points, see Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., pp. 865-867
and Wallich, op. cit., 160.
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investor can achieve returns that are larger than the returns for the
entire market in only two ways:
1.

If the capital market ijs essentially perfect, the investor must
be able to obtain "private" information--either information that
is not generally known, or generally known information that has
been transformed in some unique fashion such as through the
creation of complex variables and models not used by most in
vestors .

2.

If the capital market is highly efficient but not essentially
perfect, the investor may be able to use public information
either before it is fully assimilated by the market or, if the
market temporarily overreacts or underreacts, after it is
assimilated

Regardless of the implications of the random walk and efficient markets
theories, earnings per share continues to play an important role in
security valuation, as will be shown in the following section.

THE ROLE OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
IN FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS

This study will proceed under the assumption that a significant
number of investors and their advisors use a fundamental approach in
securing and evaluating information relevant to investment decisions.
By so doing, they increase the efficiency of the market by reducing the
82

possibility of market power0
information.

and by increasing the dissemination of

Whether they are successful in increasing their returns is

not significant to this study as long as they in fact do attempt to do

®*Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., p. 518.
82

Market power is the power of participants in the market to
influence prices through control of the supply or demand for stocks or
through influencing the actions of others by their statements or acts
(self-fulfilling prophesies). See Wallich, op. cit., 161.
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so through fundamental analysis.

Under this assumption, the importance

of earnings per share to this fundamental approach will now be considered.

Importance of Earnings
per Share
Fundamentalists use various methods in developing an intrinsic
or investment value for common stocks, and it is impossible to specify
all such methods in this chapter.

There seems to be general agreement,

however, that there are four basic quantitative factors which affect
prices and are therefore used, in varying degrees, by fundamentalists
in establishing such values.

This is true in formalized methods based

on well-defined theories of valuation as well as for informal and un
sophisticated m e t h o d s . T h e Bellemore and Ritchie listing of these
factors is typical:
1.

Asset values

2.

Projected earnings and expected growth rate of earnings and their
volatility.
Projected dividends and expected growth rate and volatility.
Capitalization multiplier--the price-earnings ratio for
earnings and dividends that is expected in the future.84

3.
4.

In practice, these quantitative factors are modified by qualita
tive factors such as the nature of the industry, management capabilities,
and research and development.

In fact, as Bellemore and Ritchie point

out, quantitative factors, once they are analyzed and used in projections,

®^Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., p. 299.
84

Ibid., p. 327. For similar listings, see Graham, Dodd, and
Cottle, op. cit., p. 443 and Badger, Torgerson, and Guthmann, op. cit.,
p. 217. Others, while not enumerating the factors specifically, are
obviously in agreement, as indicated by the amount of space devoted
to these factors. See, for example, Latane and Tuttle, op. cit., pp.
277-281, 309-329, 405-427.
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become qualitative.85

Earnings per share is clearly an important element

in common stock valuation, since three of these four factors are related
to it.
Evidence of the importance that the financial community attaches
to earnings per share is so extensive that it hardly needs documenting.
One important segment of the financial community is investment banking.
Its attitude toward the importance of earnings per share is expressed
in the following statement:
We trust the Subcommittee fully recognizes the crucial im
portance of reported earnings per share data to equity security
markets. . . . Earnings per share data have probably become the
single most important statistic to market valuation. . .
As would be expected, practicing financial analysts also con
sider earnings per share a vital statistic in security valuation.
Pankoff and Virgil of Washington University have conducted a laboratory
experiment on the usefulness of financial accounting information to
security analysts.

Their subjects were 32 security analysts employed

by retail brokerage firms, commercial banks, and other investment insti
tutions located in St. Louis and New York.

They measured the demand of

these analysts for accounting and other financial information of three
basic types:

company, industry, and general economic.

The most

®^Ibid.
86
Memorandum from the Corporation Finance Committee of the
Investment Bankers Association of America to the Subcommittee on Con
vertible Securities of the Accounting Principles Board of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated January 7,
1969.
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frequently requested item of information was earnings per share.
A recent development in the financial press contributes addi
tional evidence of the importance that the investment community attaches
to earnings per share and the related price-earnings ratio.

On October

2, 1972 Associated Press began reporting the daily price-earnings ratios
of some 3,350 issues listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges
as an addition to its daily price and volume information.

Earnings per

share used in the daily computations are reported earnings for the most
recent twelve months.

Many major newspapers including The Wall Street
Q Q

Journal and The New York Times have subscribed to the service.
The reluctance of accountants to accept earnings per share as an
important factor in security valuation has already been discussed.

Their

later decision to require earnings per share to be included on the income
statement confirms the importance that investors have attached to it.
Recognition of this fact is expressed by LeRoy Layton, Chairman of the
Accounting Principles Board at the time APB Opinion No. 15 was written,
in the following statement;
Many investors are more interested in results of future opera
tions and look to the past only in the hope that it will predict
the future. Rightly or wrongly, earnings per share and its direc
tional trend have become the prime measuring factors in the eyes
of most investors. The maintenance of a favorable trend in earnings
per share has become all-important to management in today's rugged
competition for capital. An upward trend favorably influences stock

Q7
Lyn D. Pankoff and Robert L. Virgil, "Some Preliminary Findings
from a Laboratory Experiment on the Usefulness of Financial Accounting
Information to Security Analysts," Empirical Research in Accounting;
Selected Studies, 1970, Supplement (Journal of Accounting Research, VII,
(1970)), 25.
88"xhe New PE Column in the Stock Tables," Business Week,
September 23, 1972, pp. 71-72.
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prices that have been so valuable in corporate acquisitions. Also,
it affords, in a sense, job security for top m a n a g e m e n t
Similarly, Arthur Andersen & Co., a major accounting firm,
recognizes the importance placed on earnings per share in the following
statement:
. . . While there may be an overemphasis on earnings per share
and a general failure to consider adequately other financial
statistics, earnings-per-share information is in fact used as a
convenient common denominator in investment valuation. Since
earnings per share would undoubtedly be computed by someone,
perhaps incorrectly, it is probably best dealt with in most
situations in the financial statements.9®
The evidence presented has shown that earnings per share is an
important statistic used in security valuation.

The attributes of earn

ings per share which seem important to investors will now be determined
through an analysis of how investors use the statistics in valuing common
stocks.

Earnings per Share
in Security Valuation

A survey of practitioners' stock valuation methods by Ralph A.
Bing, an investment consultant to F. S. Smithers & Co., gives an indica
tion of the variety of fundamental methods used and of the importance of
earnings per share to each of these methods . ^

The respondents to his

QQ

Opinion expressed by LeRoy Layton, Chairman of the Accounting
Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun
tants, in an address ("Accounting Principles under Fire") at Louisiana
State University in New Orleans, April 27, 1970.
^Arthur Andersen & Co., Objective of Financial Statements for
Business Enterprises (Chicago: Arthur Andersen & Co., 1972), p. 75.
^ Ralph A. Bing, "Survey of Practitioners' Stock Evaluation
Methods," Financial Analysts Journal, XXVII (May-June, 1971), 55-60.
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questionnaire included 31.5 percent of the 38 largest commercial banks
and about 10 percent of the mutual funds with assets over $200 million,
as well as a variety of other institutions, including eight large foun
dations, universities, insurance companies, and company-managed pension
funds of large industrial corporations.

The questionnaire provided a

choice of six fundamental methods of analysis, with space provided for
the respondents to specify any other methods they might prefer.

The

methods enumerated by Bing were:
1.

Estimate present value through

discounting all future dividends.

2.

Estimate present value through discounting future dividends and
estimated market value at the end of a specified holding period.

3.

Estimate total future return from dividends and capital gains
for a specified holding period and compare with a normal return
for the stock in question.

4.

Compare present actual price-earnings multiple with a normal
multiple.

5.

Compare price-estimated future earnings multiple at the end of
a specified holding period with a normal multiple of this type.

6.

Compare multiple and growth of
group multiple and g r o w t h . 92

individual stock with an industry

An overwhelming majority of the respondents, 74.8 percent, indi
cated a preference for one or more of the multiplier appraisal techniques.
About 14.8 percent estimate future return and compare it with a normal
return.

Less than 6 percent use a present value technique and only 4.6

percent specified a method other than the six enumerated by Bing.
Eighty-five percent of the respondents use more than one appraisal
technique--an indication that the practitioner's approach to common stock

92Ibid., 56.

9^Ibid.
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valuation is both flexible and pragmatic.

This is affirmed by a comment

of one of the respondents to Bing's questionnaire that "the analyst's
job remains essentially an unstructured one, and analytical approaches
are highly individualistic, eclectic and, therefore, somewhat un
stable."^
Bing's findings confirm those of Morton Backer in his survey of
financial reporting for security investment decisions.

Backer inter

viewed 72 security analysts, of whom 50 were officers or partners in
their respective firms--usually in charge of the investment research
function.

Backer found that the techniques for forecasting the probable

future return from securities vary " . . .

from simple capitalization of

earnings per share at selected price/earnings multiples to sophisticated
statistical methods and mathematical models."

95

He concluded:

"Security

valuation models employed by analysts indicate that future earnings is,
by far, the most important determinant of the value of a share of common
stock.
The basic variable common to all six valuation techniques included
in Bing's questionnaire is earnings per share.

This is true even though

Methods 1, 2, and 3 require estimates of future dividends per share.
Since in the long run dividends are a function of earnings, the usual
practice is to estimate future dividends per share by estimating future

94Ibid.
9S
Morton Backer, Financial Reporting for Security Investment and
Credit Decisions, (New York: National Association of Accountants, 1970),
p. 15.
96Ibid., p. 16.
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earnings per share and dividend payout ratios .^
In addition, all of the valuation techniques except Method 1
require an estimate of the security's sales price at the end of the hold
ing period.

This is explicit in Methods 2 and 3 and implicitly assumed

in the multiplier

te c h n iq u e s .
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The estimation of this sales price is

also heavily dependent upon earnings per share.

A common practice is to

apply an earnings multiple to estimated earnings per share for the terQQ

minal holding period. 7

The earnings multiplier or capitalization rate

is subjectively determined by the quality of the earnings and the
quality of the earnings is, to a large extent, a function of the volatil
ity and growth rate of earnings per share.'*'®®
In summary, most valuation methods used in practice depend,
directly or indirectly, upon (1) estimated future earnings per share and
(2) a price-earnings multiplier or capitalization rate which is greatly
influenced by the expected trend and variability of earnings per share.
The methods by which investors estimate these factors will now be ex
amined more closely.

Earnings per share estimates. A major criticism of multiplier

^Badger, Torgerson, and Guthmann, op. cit., p. 230. An alternate
method is to estimate dividends directly through an analysis of estimated
cash flows. See Committee on External Reporting of the American Accoun
ting Association, "An Evaluation of External Reporting Practices: A
Report of the 1966-68 Committee on External Reporting," The Accounting
Review, XLIV (Supplement, 1969), 83-88.
98

.
Bing, op. cit., 58.

99gadger, Thorgerson, and Guthmann, op. cit., p. 231.

•*®®Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., p. 282.
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valuation methods is that they are so loosely structured that adequate
consideration frequently is not given to all the factors implied in their
usage.

The practice of projecting future earnings per share as a simple

extrapolation of past earnings per share is an example.

Bellemore and

Ritchie, in the following excerpt, imply that this procedure has been
adopted by many analysts:
. . . many analysts in fact, although not admitting it, tend
largely to extrapolate the going trend of earnings and dividends,
correlating this with their quality classification of the company,
and then to use these factors as a basis for selecting a capital
ization rate for earnings (the price/earnings multiplier). How
ever, the really successful investors and professional analysts are
not those who largely extrapolate going trends, especially for
those stocks and industries that are most popular at the moment.
On the contrary, the most important successes of investors and
analysts rest on their ability to anticipate a change in the trend
of earnings for industries and companies and the rate of growth
of earnings before such a change is anticipated by the market in
general. . . .101
This practice of projecting past earnings-per-share trends into
the future has an important implication for earnings-per-share computa
tions involving warrants.

The timing of the recognition of the dilution

to earnings per share caused by the exercise of -warrants is a factor
which must be considered because this timing affects the trend and
growth rate of the earnings per share that will be projected.
Backer found that the procedures used by the analysts he inter
viewed for forecasting earnings per share were similar to those used
internally for budget preparation.102

Sales are estimated first, based

on the company's estimated share of the market, or based on the

•'■^Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., pp. 331-332.
■^Backer, op. cit., p. 18.
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historical sales trend modified by anticipated changes in the trend.
Costs are then related to sales based on historical profit margins and
operating ratios modified for the effect of expected changes in volume,
prices, and costs.
Another method sometimes used by practicing analysts, and
favored by academicians, is the return-on-investment approach.
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In

vestment is usually defined as total capital, including long-term debt.
This method has the advantage of focusing attention on the basic factors
which influence profits--the rate of return on sales and the turnover of
capital invested.
Although the two methods are not entirely independent of each
other, using both techniques would allow a cross-check on the earningsper-share estimates.

Under either method, the projections are usually

short-term, from one to three years.

Capitalization rates.

One of the reasons for estimating future

earnings per share is that the process of estimation allows the analyst
to form an opinion about the quality of earnings.

The capitalization

rate which will be applied to current or future earnings per share is a
subjective function of earnings quality.

Although the quality of earn

ings is affected by many intangible factors such as management capability,
research and development prospects, accounting policy, and financial
policy, it appears to be most heavily influenced by two variables--the

■^•^See, for example, Bellemore and Ritchie, op. cit., pp. 341-342
and Graham, Dodd, and Cottle, op. cit., pp. 409-410.
■'•^Backer, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
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trend and variability of the trend of earnings per share.

Backer ex

plains the relationship between the stability and growth rate of earn
ings per share and price-earnings multiples as follows:
Iii addition to the amount of annual earnings, the long-term
trend and variations from this trend are variables, with a
distinguishable effect on the market price of a stock. Thus
stocks with a record of consistent and rapid growth in earnings
tend to sell at higher P/E multiples than do stocks which have
a record of slow growth or erratic profits. . . .105
Review of a number of research reports from various brokerage
firms confirms these observations.

The following excerpts are typical:

In view of the company's prospects for outstanding growth
in per share earnings over the next several years, the stock of
Hospital Corporation has the potential for above-average appre
ciation. Despite the premium multiple, some expansion in the
price:earnings ratio appears possible given the company's
exceptional earnings outlook, strong management and sound
financial position.^06
Projected earnings growth should average in excess of 207o
annually over next three years, justifying premium multiple.107
The company's excellent outlook for earnings growth and the
high quality of its profits as demonstrated in the current eco
nomic climate, warrant, in our opinion, a multiple of 25 times
earnings.^08
In Chapter 1, the apparent effect of the trend and variability
of earnings per share on the price of Dr. Pepper and Royal Crown Cola

105Ibid., p. 17.
^^Research Department, F. I. duPont, Glore Forgan & Co.,
Hospital Coraporation of America. April 13, 1971.
■^^Research Department, duPont Glore Forgan, Incorporated,
Shapell Industries, May 18, 1971.
i na
iUOInvestment Research Department, E. F. Hutton & Company, Inc.,
Tandy Corporation, January, 1971.
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shares was demonstrated.**^

The following example of a hypothetical

situation illustrates the effect that one assumption as to the use of
warrant proceeds has on the absolute amount of earnings per share and on
its trend and variability.
1.

Assumptions are as follows:

Net income before interest and taxes is $10,000,000 in
Year 1 and increases 10 percent each year.

The tax rate

is 50 percent.
2.

Six percent debentures in the principal amount of
$35,000,000 are outstanding.

3.

Warrants to purchase 2,000,000 shares of common stock at
$15 per share are outstanding during Years 1-3.

4.

Four million common shares are outstanding prior to
exercise of the warrants.

5.

The warrants are exercised at the beginning of Year 4 and
the proceeds are used to retire debentures at par.

Earnings per common share are computed as follows:
Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Net income before
interest and taxes
Interest
Net income before
taxes
Taxes

$ 7,900,000
$ 3.950.000

$ 8,900,000
4.450.000

$10,000,000 $13,010,000
5.000.000
6.505.000

Net income

$ 3.950,000

$ 4,450,000

$5.000,000 $ 6,505.000

$0.99

$1.11

$1.25

13.1

12.1

12.1

$10,000,000 $11,000,000
2.100.000
2.100.000

Earnings per common
share
Percent increase
(decrease) over
preceding period

109See page 15.

$12,100,000 $13,310,000
2.100.000
300.000

$1.08

(13.6)

69

If the assumption were made that warrants are exercised at the
beginning of each period and that the proceeds earn at the interest rate
on debt, net of tax effect, then earnings per common share and common
share equivalents would have been as follows;
Year 1
Net income,
per above
Adjustment for as
sumed earnings on
warrant proceeds
(2,000,000 X $15
X .03)

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

$3,950,000

$4,450,000

$5,000,000

$6,505,000

900,000

900,000

900,000

__________

Adjusted net income

$4,850,000

$5,350,000

$5,900,000

$6.505,000

Earnings per common
share and common
share equivalents

$0.81

$0.89

$0.98

$1.08

Percent increase
(decrease) over
preceding period

(6.9)

9.9

10.1

10.2

The percentages of increase or decrease of earnings per share in
Year 1 over the preceding year have been included for purposes of the
discussion which follows.

In computing these percentages, the assump

tion is that the debentures were issued with warrants attached at the
beginning of Year 1 to refund a similar issue without warrants.

If all

other assumptions remain the same, then earnings per common share in the
period preceding Year 1 would have been $0.87.
This example demonstrates the effect that the timing of the
recognition of the dilution caused by the exercise of warrants can have
on the absolute amount, the trend, and the variability of earnings per
share.

Consider an investor who bases his investment decisions on a
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simple extrapolation of past trends.

Such an investor would give little

consideration to future operating and financial changes which might
affect earnings per share and share prices.
Assume that at the end of Year 2 this investor attempted to esti
mate share prices as of the end of Year 4.

His estimate based on earnings

per common share would probably be considerably higher than it would if
he used earnings per common share and common share equivalents.

In

the first place, his projection of earnings per share in Year 4 would be
higher because the earnings in the base years are higher ($0.99 and $1.11
versus $0.81 and $0.89).

Secondly, his earnings projection would be

higher because the trend as measured by the percentage of increase or
decrease in earnings per share over preceding years is higher (13.870 and
12.1Yo versus -6.9% and 9.9%).
In arriving at his price estimate, the investor would also apply
a higher multiple to his higher estimate of earnings per share in Year 4.
The higher multiple is the result of two factors.

First, the trend of

earnings per common share is higher than the trend of earnings per common
share and common share equivalents.

Second, the variability of the trend

is lower if he uses earnings per common share.

A favorable trend and

variability in the trend would impress the investor and cause him to com
pound his error by assigning a higher multiple to his higher estimate of
earnings.
The preceding example, however, is only as good as its assump
tions, one of which was that the warrants were exercised at the beginning
of Year 4.

If the warrants had expired without exercise, the investor's

price estimate based on earnings per common share may well have been
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closer to actual price in Year 4 than the estimate he would have made
based on the projection of earnings per common share and common share
equivalents.

Thus, the frequency of exercise of warrant issues also has

a bearing on earnings-per-share computations involving warrants.

This

problem will be considered in Chapter 3.
In summary, earnings per share is a vital statistic for many
security valuation models.

In the basic model, current or estimated

future earnings per share is one of the two variables.

The other vari

able is the earnings multiple or capitalization rate, the value of which
is dependent, to a great extent, on the trend and variability of past
and future earnings per share.

SIGNIFICANT ATTRIBUTES OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
USED BY INVESTORS

In evaluating methods of computing the earnings per share of com
panies with warrants outstanding, certain attributes of earnings per share
are important because they affect the value that investors place on
common stocks.

These attributes, which have been discussed extensively

in this chapter, are summarized below.
1.

The absolute amount of earnings per share in any given period

is important because it is one of the variables used in many valuation
models.

As the preceding example demonstrated, the absolute amount of

earnings per share is affected by the timing of the recognition of the
dilution to earnings per share which might be caused by the exercise of
warrants.

Similarly, the absolute amount of earnings per share is

affected by the assumption which is made as to the use of warrant proceeds.
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It is a truism, of course, that the absolute amounts of earnings per
share for successive periods affect the trend and variability of earnings
per share which are discussed below.
2.

The trend of earnings per share is an important attribute

because investors use trend as a qualitative factor in their estimates
of earnings multiples or capitalization rates.

Investors place a higher

value on an upward trend and a high growth rate of earnings per share
than they do on a downward or erratic trend and a low growth rate.

If

warrants are exercised and are in fact dilutive, then trend during the
period the warrants were outstanding is adversely affected unless recog
nition of the dilutive effect is given from the date of issue of the
warrants.

On the other hand, if recognition of the dilutive effect of

warrants is given in the earnings-per-share computation from date of
issue and the warrants expire without exercise, trend is also adversely
affected.

In such a case, the trend as measured by the percentage of

increase in earnings per share is higher than would be justified by the
facts.

The overstated trend can be attributed to the lower base-period

earnings per share which may result from the assumption that warrants are
exercised.

The frequency of exercise of warrant issues is therefore a

factor to be considered in evaluating earnings-per-share computational
methods involving warrants.
3.

The variability of the trend of earnings per share is also a

factor which affects common stock valuation.

Investors place a higher

multiple on earnings with a stable growth than they do on earnings with
an erratic growth.

Financial and market risk factors are therefore in

cluded in the earnings multiple or capitalization rate.

Since the purpose
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of security valuation models that utilize earnings per share is to
predict subsequent market price (the dependent variable), earnings-pershare computational methods which allow the variability of trend (one of
the independent variables) to be influenced by market price are question
able .

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Prior to World War I common stocks as a class were not considered
investments.
balance sheet.

During this period security analysis was based on the
Many firms did not publish income statements and earnings-

per-shre statistics were not cited by financial publications.
Investor acceptance of common stocks as investments followed the
publication of E. L. Smith's book in 1924.

The emphasis of valuation

methods shifted from the balance sheet to the income statement. More
firms began publishing income statements, but generally the detail neces
sary to intelligently project the statements into the future was lacking.
As a result, investors began projecting earnings per share and applying
an earnings multiple to the projected earnings.
Earnings-per-share statistics were often misleading because the
method of computation was not standardized.

Accountants refused to in

clude earnings per share in the financial statements because they did not
wish to encourage valuation techniques based solely on earnings per share.
However, accountants failed in this attempt and the earnings capitaliza
tion model is still a basic common stock valuation technique.

With the

increasing availablility of financial information and improvements in
income statement presentation, however, an assumption that more investors
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now analyze the underlying variables affecting earnings per share appears
logical.
After the stock market crash in 1929, academicians began research
on common stock valuation models, market price behavior, and portfolio
management.

Present value theory, long used in bond analysis, was

applied to common stock valuation.

While the theory is accepted by most

practicing analysts, it has not proved successful as a working model
because of the impossibility of projecting cash flows for long periods
into the future.

Earnings per share is an important statistic in present

value models, however, because dividends per share are usually predicted
on the basis of estimated earnings per share and estimated dividend pay
out ratios.
Beginning with the 1950's, extensive empirical testing of the
theory of random walks was performed.

A market in which changes in stock

prices are completely random implies a perfect market in which all infor
mation affecting security prices is available to all participants simul
taneously.

The empirical evidence indicates that common stock prices are

sufficiently random to cast serious doubt on technical analysis tech
niques which rely on the past behavior of prices.
As a result of the random walk research, the efficient markets
theory evolved.

In such a market, an analyst using fundamental tech

niques can be successful if he is able to discover information not gen
erally known to the investing public or if he can transform public
information in some unique manner.

Earnings per share continues to be

one of the principal variables used by fundamentalists in these efforts.
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In conclusion, earnings per share is a major input to invest
ment decision making.

The attributes of earnings per share used by

investors are the absolute amount, the trend, and the variability of the
trend.

The absolute amount of earnings per share is one of the basic

variables in the widely-used earnings capitalization model and the trend
and variability are major factors influencing the value of the other
variable--the capitalization rate.

Any method of computing earnings per

share involving warrants must be evaluated in terms of the effect it has
on these attributes.
The next chapter will analyze the characteristics of warrants
which are important to the computation of earnings per share.

The

guidelines for computing earnings per share of companies with warrants
outstanding will be formulated from these characteristics and from the
attributes of earnings per share developed in this chapter.

Chapter 3

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WARRANTS

In the preceding chapter the attributes of earnings per share
considered to be of importance to investors were determined through a
survey of the earnings-per-share literature.

Of equal importance in

formulating guidelines for the computation of earnings per share of
companies with warrants outstanding are the characteristics of warrants.
These characteristics are examined in this chapter through an analysis
of warrants listed on the American Stock Exchange.
After a brief review of the historical background of warrants,
the warrants included in this study are described.

The methods of issue

and reasons therefor and the contractual provisions are analyzed next.
Finally, the exercise experience of those warrants which expired during
the period under study is determined.

From these analyses, the charac

teristics of warrants which need to be considered in earnings-per-share
computations are formulated.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF WARRANTS

Warrants have been used as a financing tool for many years.
Hickman cites a warrant issue in 1906,^ but Graham and Dodd attribute

Hj. Braddock Hickman, Statistical Measures of Corporate Bond Fi
nancing Since 1900 (Princeton, New Jersey: National Bureau of Economic
Research, Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 210 as cited in Richard
A.Stevenson and Joe Lovely, "Why a Bond Warrant Issue?" Financial
Executive. XXXVIII (June, 1970), 17.
76
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the first warrant issue to American Power and Light in 1911.^

Regardless

of their date or origin, warrants first became popular during the bull
market of the 1920's.

Hickman reported that 403 of the 450 warrant

issues from 1900 through 1943 were offered between 1924 and 1931.^
The highly volatile nature of warrant prices and their typically
rapid decline in value threw warrants into disrepute during the depression
and war years of the 1930's and 1940's.

Hayes and Reiling cite an exam

ple of investor experience with warrants during this period.

American

and Foreign Power Company warrants, which were attached to a $270

million

issue of second preferred stock, attained a market value in excess of a
billion dollars during 1929.

When recapitalization of the company was

completed in 1952, the warrants were eliminated from the capital structure
and became worthless.^
The next increase in warrant issues came during the bull market
from 1959 to 1961.

With the drop in the market which occurred in 1962,

warrant issues again lagged until 1967.

Interest in warrants has con

tinued since that time with a record of 123 issues being established in
1969.^

As would be expected, warrant issues appear to be most popular

when stock prices are rising.

The reason for this popularity is the

^Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, Security
Analysis: Principles and Technique (4th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1962), p. 656.
O
Hickman, loc, cit., as cited in Stevenson and Lovely, loc. cit.
^Samuel L. Hayes, III and Henry B. Reiling, "Sophisticated Fi
nancing Tool: The Warrant," Harvard Business Review. XLVII (JanuaryFebruary, 1969), 138.
^P. Royer, "Long-Term Warrants as Financing Instruments," (un
published Doctor's dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1970), p. 15.
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leverage which warrants provide to investors.

Successful leverage is

dependent upon rising prices for the underlying common stock.
Other factors have also contributed to the current popularity of
warrants.

The tight-money situation which prevailed in 1968 and 1969

encouraged the use of warrants as a means of reducing interest and divi
dend payments.

In other cases, financially weak companies were forced

to add warrants or a conversion feature to their securities in order to
obtain additional capital.
Increased merger activity has also led to more warrant usage.
Conglomerates, in the highly competitive market for merger candidates,
found that warrants offered in packages with other securities permitted
greater flexibility in meeting the particular needs of the seller.

War

rants, unlike convertible securities, were not considered residual under
APB Opinion No. 9 and, therefore, did not enter into earnings-per-share
computations until exercised.

Conglomerates, being dependent upon con

tinuing earnings-per-share growth for successful acquisitions, appear to
have utilized warrants for this purpose in 1967 and 1968.

The issuance

of APB Opinion No. 15 in 1969 eliminated this advantage of warrants.

DESCRIPTION OF WARRANTS INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY

The determination of the characteristics of warrants that are im
portant to earnings-per-share computations requires the analysis of a
representative group of warrant issues.

A description of the method of

selection of the warrants included in this study and an analysis of the
population selected by industry and date of issue follow.
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Selection of Warrants for Study
The leading exchange for warrant listings has traditionally been
the American Stock Exchange, although in 1970 the New York Stock Exchange
£
began listing warrants for the first time since 1919.

Because of the

much more stringent listing requirements, few issues are listed on the
New York Stock Exchange.

Consequently, the American Stock Exchange is

expected to remain the leading exchange for warrant listings.^

A few

warrant issues are also listed on the Pacific Coast Exchange and the
Toronto Exchange.
The warrants chosen for analysis in this study are those listed
on the American Stock Exchange.

Unlike the New York Stock Exchange, the

American Stock Exchange imposes no restrictions on the life of the war
rants, the exercise price in relation to the market price of the under
lying common stock, or the number of warrants issued in relation to the
common shares outstanding on the warrant issue date.

The major require

ments of the American Stock Exchange are that the securities underlying
the warrant issue be listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the
American Stock Exchange and that the issue be for at least 500,000
Q

warrants.

This study, therefore, includes a majority of the listed

warrant issues.
In order to increase the number of issues studies and to gather
data on characteristics related to the exercise of warrants, all warrants
listed on the American Stock Exchange at any time during the period from

6"Big Board, Breaking Tradition, Plans to List Long-Term War
rants," The Wall Street Journal, February 13, 1970, p. 6 .
^Royer, op. cit., p. 116.

®Ibid., pp. 117-118.
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January 1, 1950 through December 31, 1971 are included.
listed

Selection of

warrant issues was made by examining American Stock Exchange

transactions as published in The Wall Street Journal for warrants listed
on January 2 of each year from 1950 through 1972.

This method assures

the inclusion of all warrants with the possible exception of those listed
for part of one calendar year.
listed

The likelihood of a warrant issue being

for less than one calendaryear is remote.
Only warrants exercisable

are included.

in common stock of the issuing company

This criterion eliminates secondary offerings which do not

result in additional shares of common stock being issued.

An example is

the five-year registered warrants issued by Amerada Hess Corporation on
June 15, 1971 to purchase Louisiana Land and Exploration Company common
at $40.50 per share.

The exercise of these warrants will not result in

the issuance of additional shares of Louisiana Land and Exploration
Company because Amerada Hess holds 1,800,000 shares as an investment.
In order to determine whether warrant characteristics have
changed over time, each characteristic analyzed is first classified by
date of issue.

The periods used for this classification are arbitrary,

except for the years 1967-1968 and 1969-1971.

This classification

provides the basis for a comparison of the characteristics of warrants
issued during the period when APB Opinion No. 9 was in effect with the
characteristics of warrants issued during the period when APB Opinion
No. 15 was in effect.
Some of the tables which follow refer to warrant series and the
others refer to warrant issues.

Warrants of the McCrory Corporation will

be used to explain the difference between the two terms.

On March 7,
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1961 McCrory Corporation offered for each share of Lerner Stores common
stock:

(a) cash in the amount of $33 or (b) $40 principal amount of

McCrory 4 1/2% subordinated debentures due 1976 and a warrant to purchase
1 1/2 shares of McCrory common at $20 per share until March 15, 1976.
This offer resulted in McCrory's issuing warrants to purchase 1,585,274
shares of its common.
Subsequently on June 21, 1961 McCrory merged H. L. Green Stores
by exchanging for each H. L. Green common share 1/5 of a share of new $100
par 4 1/2% cumulative convertible preferred B stock and a warrant to pur
chase 1 1/2 shares of McCrory common at $20 per share until March 15, 1976.
Warrants to purchase 1,091,580 shares were issued as a result of this ex
change .

Each of the preceding transactions resulted in a warrant issue,

but because the terms of the warrants issued in both transactions are
identical except for the date of issue, only one warrant series to pur
chase 2,676,854 common shares of McCrory Corporation is outstanding.
In a tender offer which expired on April 29, 1966 McCrory Corpora
tion made an exchange offer to the security holders of S. Klein Department
Stores which resulted in the issuance of warrants to purchase 2,986,955
McCrory common shares at $20 per share to March 15, 1976 and at $22.50
per share thereafter to March 15, 1981.

This is a new warrant series

because the terms are different from the first series.

Following this

transaction McCrory had two warrant series outstanding, but three separate
warrant issues had occurred.
Some companies do issue warrants from a series on more than one
occasion as is evidenced by the fact that this study includes 106 warrant
issues from 94 warrant series.

The 94 warrant series were issued by 90
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companies with four companies having used two series of warrants either
sequentially within the time span (one company) or concurrently.

Classification of Warrant Issuers
by Industry
The classification of companies into industrial groups has become
increasingly difficult in recent years due to the diversification policies
followed by many companies.

The industry classifications of Table 1 are

those of The Value Line Investment Survey.^

Those companies not included

in The Value Line Investment Survey were classified into its industrial
groups on the basis of their standard industrial classification codes as
published in Standard & Poor's Corporate Directory. ^
The most active warrant issuers, as shown by Table 1, are con
glomerates with 19 issues, real estate investment trusts with 17, and
holding and investment companies with 7.

Warrants have, however, been

used by a wide range of industrial groups.
groups in The Value Line Investment Survey.

Table 1 includes 31 of the 68
The major groups which have

not used warrants appear to be those in old, well-established industries
and those in industries where a few companies are dominant.

These in

clude tire and rubber, copper, steel, maritime, railroad, aluminum,
railroad equipment, and tobacco.
In view of the previous discussion, the fact that conglomerates
are the most active user of warrants is not surprising.

Conglomerate

^The Value Line Investment Survey (New York: Arnold Bernhard &
Co., Inc., 1972).
■^Standard & Poor's Corporation, Standard & Poor's Corporate
Directory (New York: Standard & Poor's Corporation, 1972).
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Table 1. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971
by Industry and by Date of Issue

Number of Issues
Date of Issue
Industry
Aerospace
Air transport
Auto and truck
Auto parts
Baking
Building
Chemical
Conglomerate
Electrical equipment/
electronics
Finance
Food processing
Holding and investment
companies, excluding
real estate
Leasing
Machinery
Meat packing
Metals and mining
Mobile homes
Natural gas
Office equipment/
computer
Packaging and container
Paper
Personal services
Petroleum
Precision Instruments
Real estate
Real estate investment
trusts
Recreation
Retail stores
Telecommunications
Textile
Truck and bus lines
Totals

Prior to
1950

19501959
1

19601966
2

19671968
1
3

19691971

9

2
6
1
2
2
2
1
19

2

2
2
2

1

1
1

1
1

1
2
1
9

1
1

1

2

3

3

1
1
3
1
3

1
1

2
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

2
1
1

3
1
3

5

19

1
2
1

1

1
1

11

27

Total

16

7
1
6
3
4
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
4

1
1

17
3
5
1
2
1

44

106

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, The Value Line Invest
ment Survey, and Standard and Poor's Corporate Directory.

84

managements are aggressive and willing to assume risks, as evidenced by
their acquisitions of other companies.

Such managements are less likely

to be averse to using warrants which involve much uncertainty for the
issuer as well as the investor.

However, since many conglomerate acqui

sitions depend upon consistently increasing earnings per share and APB
Opinion No. 15 adversely affected the earnings per share of companies
with warrants outstanding, the expectation would be that warrant issues
by conglomerates would decline after the opinion was issued.
Further analysis shows this to be true.

There were nine warrant

issues by conglomerates during the 196 7-1968 period and none in the pre
vious period from 1960-1966.

The indication is that some conglomerates

used warrants instead of convertible debentures in their acquisitions
after the publication of APB Opinion No. 9 .

They did this in order to

take advantage of the fact that convertible debentures might be classi
fied as residual securities and adversely affect earnings per share
whereas warrants were excluded from the residual security category.
Analysis of warrant issues early in 1969 reveals that four additional
issues took place before management had knowledge of the adverse affect
that warrants would have on earnings per share under APB Opinion No. 15.
There were, then, really 13 warrant issues by conglomerates during the
period in which APB Opinion No. 9 was in effect and only five issues
under APB Opinion No. 15.

Further, of the nine issues in Table 1

occurring between 1969 and 1971, seven occurred in 1969 and only two in
1971.

While other factors such as interest rates may have been influ

ential, the evidence presented here supports the premise that conglo
merate management's financial decisions were influenced by accounting
rule changes.
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The major change which has occurred among warrant issuers since
1968 is the increase in warrant issues by real estate investment trusts.
Sixteen of the seventeen issues by this group were made during the 19691971 period.
Real estate investment trusts were authorized by Congress in 1960
for the purpose of providing small investors an opportunity to invest in
real estate.

These trusts are similar to closed-end mutual funds, except

that they invest in real estate rather than securities.

They provide

small investors with many of the advantages of mutual funds, such as
diversification, pooling of resources, spreading of risk, professional
management, and easy marketability through transferable shares or
certificates of beneficial interest.^
Although real estate investment trusts were authorized in 1960,
they did not become popular until the stock market decline of 19691970.

Investors became interested in them as a means of achieving a

more stable investment for income and capital gains, as a tax shelter,
and as a hedge against inflation.

Many of the real estate investment

trusts in this study made their initial stock offerings in 1970.

In

order to sell the stock in a declining market, they attached warrants to
the shares of beneficial interest.

A typical offering included a three

to five year warrant to buy an additional share, usually at the same
price as the warrant-stock unit was offered.
By 1971 the price of some of these issues was above the exercise

H j a y Drob, "What You Should Know about Real Estate Investment
Trusts." The Practical Accountant, IV (May-June, 1971), 35.
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price of the warrants.

19

In several of these trusts the number of war

rants outstanding is equal to the number of shares outstanding.

As a

consequence, the dilution recognized in primary and fully diluted earn
ings per share is material.

Since the trusts must distribute at least

90 percent of their ordinary income to shareholders in order to qualify
and such distributions are on actual shares outstanding, dividends per
share in some cases are higher than earnings per share although the
distribution is from current earnings.
One additional characteristic of the industry groups in Table 1
requires investigation.

Warrants are attractive to investors because

the leverage that they offer over the related common stock can be used
to amplify profits.

One of the requirements for successful leverage is

a fluctuation in the market price of the underlying common stock.

Com

panies with highly volatile stock prices are more likely to issue
warrants because their warrants would offer more leverage to investors.
To verify this condition, the beta

13

factors of the companies included

■^M. H. Rich, "Will APB No. 15 Confuse Investors in REITs?" The
Practical Accountant. IV (May-June, 1971), 39.
1^
iJBeta as computed by The Value Line Investment Survey is de
scribed as follows:
A measure of the sensitivity of a stock's price to overall
fluctuations in the New York Stock Exchange Composite Average. A
Beta of 1.5 indicates a stock tends to rise (or fall) 1.5% with a
1% rise (or fall) in the New York Stock Exchange Composite Average.
The 'beta factor' is derived from a least squares regression
analysis between weekly percent changes in the price of a stock
and weekly percent changes in the New York Stock Exchange Average
over a period of five years. In the case of shorter price
histories, a smaller time period is used, but never less than
two years.
See The Value Line Investment Survey (New York: Arnold Bernhard & Co.,
Inc., 1974), p. 225 of the October 11, 1974 Edition 1.
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in The Value Line Investment Survey were analyzed.
1.56 and the range was from .41 to 2.21.

The median beta was

Only five of the 37 companies

included in The Value Line Investment Survey had beta factors less than
one.

In other words, a one percent change in the level of the stock

market would probably result in a 1.56 percent change in the common
stock price of the median company which issues warrants.

The conclusion

is that most of the companies in this study do have volatile stock
prices.
The volatility of stock prices of companies with warrants out
standing has implications for earnings-per-share computations of com
panies with warrants outstanding.

Under the treasury stock method of

APB Opinion No. 15. earnings per share varies inversely with the market
price of the company's common stock.^

The result is that variability

is introduced into earnings per share solely as a result of the method
of computation.
In summary, warrants have been issued by companies operating in
a wide range of industrial groups.

However, the stock prices of these

companies are generally more volatile than those of the average company.
Conglomerates have been most active in issuing warrants, particularly
during the period when APB Opinion No. 9 was in effect.

Many real

estate investment trusts are currently issuing warrants with their common
stock offerings.

The nature of their operations points out a weakness

in earnings per share as promulgated by APB Opinion No. 15.

This

^ T h e treasury stock method of computing earnings per share is
analyzed in Chapter 5.
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weakness is one of the factors which must be considered in formulating
guidelines for earnings per share computations.

METHOD OF ISSUE AND REASONS THEREFOR

Warrants are unlike most debt and equity securities because they
1 C

are very seldom offered alone for cash. J

Instead, they are usually

attached to other securities to facilitate their sale or to reduce
interest or dividends.

Warrants are also used in acquisitions and re

organizations to provide a potential equity interest to the holders of
the securities being acquired or exchanged.

In short, warrants are not

a direct source of capital when issued; they are a catalyst which
management can use as an aid in raising capital from other sources.
Most of the warrants in this study were issued with another secu
rity in exchange for cash.

As indicated by Table 2, 59 of the 106 issues,

or 56 percent, were issued in this manner.

Except for the period prior

to 1950, this method of issue has dominated all others, and its fre
quency of use appears to be increasing.
The second most frequent use of warrants was for acquisitions.
Warrants were issued alone or in conjunction with other securities 32
times, or 30 percent of the total issues, for the acquisition of the
securities of another corporation.

With the current decline in merger

^Royer, in an analysis of 167 warrant issues, reports one in
stance in which warrants alone were offered for cash to an institutional
investor and to a director of the company. See Royer, op. cit., p. 58.
Schwartz advocates offering warrants alone for cash in public offerings
in order to avoid the sale of common stock at a discount from market.
See William Schwartz, "Warrants: A Form of Equity Capital," Financial
Analysts Journal, XXVI (September-October, 1970), 87-101.
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Table 2. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31,
1971 by Use and by Date of Issue

Number of Issues
Date of Issue

Uses of Warrants

Total

Percent
of
Tota 1

Prior to 1950- 1960- 1967- 19691950
1959 1966 1968 1971

1. Issued as a unit
with other
securities for
cash

12

9

11

27

59

56

5

11

11

32

30

1

3

8

7

4. Issued as a dividend
to stockholders

1

3

4

4

5. Other uses

3

3

3

106

100

2. Issued alone or as
a unit with other
securities as
part consideration
for the securities
of another
corporation

3

2

3. Issued alone or as a
unit with other
securities in ex
change for other
securities as part
of a reorganization

2

2

Total

5

16

14

27

44

Source; Compiled from The Wall Street Journal. Moody's Industrial
Manua1, Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual,
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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activity, this method of issuing warrants has declined from 41 percent
of the issues in 1967-1968 to 25 percent of the issues in 1969-1971.
Warrants were issued alone or in conjunction with other securi
ties in exchange for other securities as part of a reorganization or re
capitalization eight times, or 7 percent of the total issues.
one of the oldest uses of warrants.

This is

The newest use of warrants is for

a distribution to stockholders in lieu of or in addition to cash or
stock dividends.
for this purpose.

Four issues, or 4 percent of the total issues, were
Other uses accounted for 3 percent of the total.

A

more detailed discussion of these methods of issuing warrants follows.

Issued with Other Securities
for Cash
The security most frequently offered with warrants in exchange
for cash was straight debt, usually subordinated debentures.

As shown

in Table 3, 30 warrant issues out of 59, or 51 percent, were attached to
non-convertible bonds.
There are two basic reasons for attaching warrants to bond issues.
First, a straight bond might require an interest rate so high as to be
unattractive to the lender.

Lenders sometimes avoid making loans with

high interest rates because of the implication that the lender is making
loans that are too risky.

16

If attaching a warrant to the bond reduces

the effective interest rate to a level acceptable by the lender, then
the issuer has obtained funds which might otherwise have been unattain
able .

■^Richard a. Stevenson and Joe Lovely, "Why a Bond Warrant Issue?"
Financial Executive. XXXVIII (June, 1970), 17.
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Table 3. Classification of Securities Issued with Warrants to Raise Cash
by Type and Date of Issue; Fifty-Nine Warrant Issues Listed on the Ameri
can Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31,
1971
Number of Issues
Date of Issue
Prior
to
1950

Total

Percent
of
Total

19501959

19601966

19671968

19691971

Straight debt

8

7

9

6

30

51

Convertible debt

1

2

3

5

Common stock

3

19

24

41

2

3

59

100

Type of Security

Other
Total

12

1

1

1

1

9

11

27

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's
Bank and Finance Manua1, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual
Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Second, straight-debt funds may be available at interest rates so
high that they are unacceptable to the borrower.

Payment of such high

interest rates might be interpreted as a financial weakness of the bor
rower.

Or, if the firm has liquidity problems, the lower interest rates

provided by the bond-warrant unit may reduce the cash outflow to an
acceptable level.

Further, if the warrants are exercised, there will be

an additional cash inflow.
The two reasons given for attaching warrants to straight debt
are also applicable to convertible debt.

What advantage does the bond-

warrant unit have over a comparable convertible security?
varied.

Opinions are

Stevenson and Lovely contend that a bond-warrant package can

be issued at a higher price than an equivalent convertible bond because
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of the additional options offered by the bond-warrant.

These additional

options are due to the separability of the bond and the warrant.
warrant holder can:

A bond-

(1) sell the bond and hold the warrant, (2 ) hold the

bond and sell the warrant, or (3) hold the bond and exercise the warrants.
None of these options is available to the convertible bond h o l d e r . I n
addition, convertible bonds usually have a call privilege which intro
duces uncertainty about the expiration date whereas very few warrant
issues are subject to call.^®
For these reasons, the number of shares offered in the warrant
option per bond can be less than the number of shares contained in the
conversion option per bond.

At issue date, the conversion price of the

bond multiplied by the number of shares equals the par value of the con
vertible bond.

The only means by which the number of shares can be re

duced is by increasing the conversion price.

But the market tends to

discount the conversion feature if the conversion price is placed too
high.

Hayes and Reiling found that the average conversion premium on a

sample of convertible debentures sol-1 in 1968 was 11.5 percent.

They

state that investment bankers use 10 to 15 percent as a working guide.

19

The exercise value of warrants attached to a bond is seldom equal
to the bond's par value.

Hayes and Reiling found the relationship to be

on

65 percent in 1968.

Royer, in his study of 71 units issued between

17Ibid., 18.
•*-®Samuel L. Hayes, III and Henry B. Reiling, "Sophisticated
Financing Tool: The Warrant," Harvard Business Review. XLVII (JanuaryFebruary, 1969), 148.
19Ibid., 142.

20Ibid.
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1950 and 1969, found the ratio of the exercise value to the par value was
48 percent . ^

Since the issuer can vary the number of warrants offered

with each bond, there is more flexibility in setting the exercise price.
Table 7 on page 115 indicates that the median exercise price for the 30
straight debt-warrant units in this study was 4 percent above the market
price of the related common stock on the issue date.

But the range was

very wide, from more than 25 percent below market to more than 25 per
cent above market.
Since fewer shares are optioned per bond in a bond-warrant unit
than are optioned in an equivalent convertible bond, potential dilution
of shares outstanding is greater if convertible bonds are employed.
Hayes and Reiling imply that, as a result of less dilution in shares,
there will also be less dilution in earnings per share.
eludes that no such generalizations can be made.

23

22

Royer con-

By making certain

restrictive assumptions, Royer demonstrates that earnings per share can
be lower under the bond-warrant option than under the convertible bond
option.

But this occurs only when earnings per share before exercise or

conversion is lower than earnings per share after exercise or conversion.
In other words, neither the convertible bonds nor the warrants were
dilutive to earnings per share.
What Royer has demonstrated is the effect of unfavorable leverage

^ P . Royer, "Long-Term Warrants as Financing Instruments," (un
published Doctor's dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1970), p.
228.
22

Hayes and Reiling, op. cit., 142.

23R0yer, op. cit., pp. 229-232.
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on earnings per share.

When a company is in the unfortunate position of

having a rate of return on assets that is lower than the interest rate
on its debt then conversion of all bonds will increase earnings per
share more than retirement of a portion of the bonds (40 percent in
Royer's illustration) from warrant proceeds.

The conclusion is that a

bond-warrant issue will always produce less dilution in earnings per
share than an equivalent convertible bond issue, provided that the pro
ceeds from the warrants are employed in such a manner as to earn a rate
of return that is equal to or greater than the interest

rate that was

paid on the bonds which were converted.
Theoretically, bond-warrant issues also have cash flow advantages
over an equivalent convertible bond issue.

There are two reasons. First,

the bond discount deductible for tax purposes is likely to be greater in
a bond-warrant issue because tax regulations require the proceeds to be
allocated between the bond and the warrant.

Regulations do not allow a

similar allocation to the conversion option of a convertible security.
The result is that the bond-warrant issue discount islikely

to be

greater, thus requiring less cash outflow for taxes.
Second, warrants will provide additional cash inflow if they are
exercised.

The terms of convertible bond issues generally do not provide

for the payment of additional cash when the bonds are converted.

How

ever, the warrant issuer has very little control over the cash flow from
warrant exercise.

Generally a few warrants may be exercised each year,

but most will not be exercised until the expiration date nears.

There

is, of course, the possibility that the warrants will not be exercised at
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expiration because the market price of the stock may be below the exer
cise price.
Another minor advantage of warrants attached to bonds is that
they may allow a firm to increase its financial leverage if the use of
warrants has the effect of making an otherwise unsaleable issue saleable.
The firm can control leverage subsequent to issue by retaining the right
to accept bonds at par in the exercise of the warrants.

Leverage might

be important for a company which needs new funds but finds that its
existing debt-equity ratio makes it difficult to obtain t h e m . ^
As shown in Table 3, warrants were attached to common stock in
24 of the 59 issues for cash.

Their use for this purpose is increasing.

In the 1969-1971 period, 70 percent of the issues were attached to common
stock.

Fourteen of these 19 issues were by real estate investment trusts.
Warrants are issued with common stock to avoid underpricing of

a new common stock issue.

Normally an issue of common stock must be

offered at less than its current market value if it is to be success
fully marketed.

If the stock is fully priced when the new issue is

offered, the current market price may have to be discounted by as much
as 10 percent.25

gy attaching warrants to the issue, the common stock

can be sold at market.

Avoiding a discount from underpricing might be

important if the company is planning to make acquisitions with its
common stock within the near future.
When a warrant is attached to preferred stock, the dividend can

^Richard A. Stevenson and Joe Lovely, "Why a Bond Warrant Issue?"
Financial Executive. XXXVIII (June, 1970), 20.
25

Hayes and Reiling, op. cit., 143.
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be reduced which results in a reduction of cash outflows for dividends.
The same effect can be achieved with common stock in that fewer shares
of warrant-common stock units will be issued to produce a given amount
of funds.

Issued Alone or with Other
Securities as Part of the
Consideration for the Securities
of Another Corporation
Acquisition-oriented companies that use warrants as part of their
offer have usually combined them with one other security.
by Table 4, this was true for 65 percent of the issues.

As indicated
Warrants were

most frequently attached to straight debt, although in the 1969-1971
period common stock was equally favored.
There appears to be a trend, however, toward more complicated
exchanges.

In the 1967-1968 period only about 9 percent of the issues

involved warrants and two other securities.

In the 1969-1971 period

this increased to more than 45 percent of the cases.

During this period,

the preferred combination of securities was convertible debt and common
stock.
There were two occasions when warrants were the only security
offered in exchange for the securities of another corporation.

In 1968

Ryder Systems, Inc. acquired M. and G. Motor Convoy, Inc. for cash and
warrants.

The warrants were privately held until 1971 when they were

offered at $27.50, which included a premium of $2.50.

In late 1969

Atlantic Richfield issued warrants to Gulf + Western Industries, Inc. in
exchange for a warrant to purchase a similar number of Sinclair shares
held by Gulf + Western.

Gulf + Western and Atlantic Richfield had both
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Table 4. Classification of Securities Issued with Warrants as Part of
the Consideration for the Securities of Another Corporation by Number
and Types of Securities and by Date of Issue; Thirty-two Warrant Issues
Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1,
1950 and December 31, 1971

Number of Issues
Percent
of
Total
Total
Prior to 1950- 1960- 1967- 19691950
1959 1966 1968 1971
Date of Issue

Number and Types
of Securities

No other securities
One type of security
Straight debt
Convertible debt
Preferred stock
Convertible preferred
stock
Common stock
Two types of securities
Straight debt and
common stock
Convertible debt and
common stock
Preferred and common
stock
Other combinations

Total

3

2

1
1

1

1

2

6

4
2
2

2

9
2
2

28
6
6

1
2

2
6

6
19

1

1

3

3

3

10

1

1

3
2

10
6

11

11

32

100

1

3

3

2

5
-

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial
Manua1, Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual.
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K
Annual Report filings with Securities and Exchange Commission.
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made tender offers to Sinclair stockholders, and Atlantic Richfield was
the successful bidder.
Warrants are used in acquisitions and mergers because of the
flexibility they offer.

In the second half of the 1960's, merger activ

ity increased to the extent that a seller's market existed.

For an

offer to be acceptable, it had to be ". . . tailored to meet the unique
price, income, and tax objectives of the target company's security
holders."2^

Warrants offered a means of meeting these objectives.

During the 1967-1968 period when merger activity was at its peak,
warrants offered equity participation to the sellers without an imme
diate adverse affect on earnings per share of the acquiring company.
As previously discussed, convertible securities did not offer the same
advantage ,2^
The following tabulation, prepared from The Value Line Warrant
OQ
S e r v i c e shows how valuable warrants were as a merger currency during
1968 and early 1969:

Acquiring Company

Acquired Company

Avco Corp.
National General Corp.
Loew's Theatres
AMK (United Brands)
Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV)

Seaboard Finance
Great American Holding
Lori H a r d
United Fruit
Greatamerica

Warrant Value as
Percent of Total Value
of Package (Estimated)
41
38
31
33

21

26Ibid., 139.
27

'For support of this position, see Hayes and Reiling, op. cit.,
143, Stevenson and Lovely, op. cit., 19, Royer, op. cit., p. 51.
2®"The New Warrant Game," The Value Line Warrant Service,
December 16, 1969, p. 1.
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The competition between Bangor Punta and Chris-Craft in their
efforts to acquire Piper Aircraft Corporation illustrates the role war
rants have played in acquisitions.

In May, 1969 Bangor Punta announced

an agreement to acquire more than 500,000 shares of Piper from the Piper
family.

Included in the deal were warrants to purchase 1,100,000 shares

of Bangor Punta common.

Chris-Craft had previously made a public offer

for Piper shares by tendering one share of its $2 preferred and a warrant
to buy two Chris-Craft common shares at $25 per share for each Piper
common share.

As a result of the Bangor Punta announcement, Chris-Craft

raised its offer by adding $10 cash to the previous offer.
Any acquisition which includes warrants or convertible debt
offered in exchange for common stock precludes a tax-free transaction,
as explained by Hayes and Reiling:
In an exchange for common stock, preferred stock, whether con
vertible or nonconvertible, constitutes a continuing equity interest
for tax purposes; whereas debentures, whether nonconvertible or con
vertible, are debt. A warrant is only a contract right to purchase
common stock, and therefore is not an equity interest.29
However, bond-warrant units offered in exchange for common stock
can result in the deferral of tax, provided the exchange qualifies as an
installment sale.

The requirements are:

. . . To qualify as an installment sale, the sales price must
exceed $1,000 and not more than 30 percent of the sales price must
be received by the seller in the year of sale. Since the Internal
Revenue Service considers the bond portion of the bond-warrant
unit as payment received when the bond is disposed of rather than
in the year of sale, the seller will be able to postpone part of
the tax on his capital gain, so long as the fair market value of

2%ayes and Reiling, op. cit., 146.
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the warrant segment of the bond-warrant package does not exceed
30 percent of the total package
A convertible bond offers even more deferral possibilities than
the bond-warrant unit because no allocation of the option is required.
Offsetting this advantage, however, is the flexibility offered by the
bond-warrant unit.

Should the seller need funds, he can sell the war

rants and continue to hold the bonds, an option not available to the
convertible bond holder.

Issued Alone or with Other
Securities in a Reorganization
or Recapitalization
One of the oldest uses of the warrants included in this study is
for reorganizations and recapitalizations.

Warrants are recognized as

useful for this purpose as a means of giving former common stockholders,
who would otherwise be eliminated in the recapitalization, a potential
equity interest in the recapitalized firm.
An example is the recapitalization plan of Ward Baking Company
(now Ward Foods,Inc.).

On September 15, 1945 a recapitalization plan

was placed into effect which exchanged for each $7 preferred share 1/4
share of new 5 l/27o voting cumulative preferred, par $100 and 2 1/2
shares of $1 par common stock.

Each class A common share received one

share of the new $1 par common and a warrant to purchase one common share
at $12.50 until March 31, 1951 and at $15 thereafter until April 1, 1956.
Each two class B common shares received one warrant of the same series.
The class B common stockholder was therefore able to recoup the value

JUStevenson and Lovely, op. cit., 18.
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of 1/2 a warrant from his investment where otherwise he would probably
have received nothing.
More recently warrant issues have been used to reduce debt and
simplify capital structure.

For example, Whittaker Corporation used

this device to redeem $43,000,000 of debentures with $21,500,000 of sub
ordinated debentures.

It offered a unit consisting of $500 principal

amount of 10% subordinated debentures due 1988 and warrants to purchase
40 shares at $50 per share for each $1,000 principal amount of 4 1/2%
debentures.

Issued as a Dividend
One of the newest uses of warrants is as dividend distributions
to stockholders.

Four such issues, all of which occurred in late 1968

or early 1969 prior to the release of APB Opinion No. 15. are included
in this study.

Four other issues were made during this period but they

are not included in this study because they have not been listed on the
American Stock Exchange.
While the argument might be advanced that warrants are issued
with debt primarily for the purpose of negotiating lower interest rates,
no such argument is feasible for warrants distributed to stockholders.
Theoretically, there is no dilution of the stockholder's interest because
the distributions are pro rata.

If the stockholders sell their warrants,

they are not getting something for nothing because they are giving up a
right which may have substantial value in the future and which may reduce
their proportionate investment in the company if it prospers.

31"The New Warrant Game," The Value Line Warrant Service. December
16, 1969, p. 2 .
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Warrant distributions to stockholders may be compared to stock
dividends.

The initial conclusion might be that such distributions are

inferior to stock dividends because the stockholder is required to pay
cash before obtaining the additional stock.

However, warrant distribu

tions do not dilute earnings per share as long as the exercise price is
above the market price of the underlying common.

In addition, warrants

do not require a larger cash dividend outlay until exercise.

Stock divi

dends will increase cash outflows immediately if the same dividend per
share is maintained.
Neither stock dividends nor warrant dividends reduce the stock
holders' prorata interest in the company.

If the additional shares

received as a stock dividend are sold, then a reduction of the seller's
interest has occurred.

But the sale of warrants received as dividends

does not have the same immediate effect.

There is no reduction in the

proportionate interest in the company and there will be none until the
warrant is exercised.

If the warrant is not exercised, there is no di

lution of the seller's prorata interest or of earnings per share.

In

addition, the stockholder has received a premium from the sale of his
warrants.
Warrant distributions to stockholders may also be compared to
rights offerings to subscribe to additional shares of stock.

Rights

offerings fill an immediate requirement for additional capital because
they are short-term options which usually run for no more than 45 days.
If the stockholder exercises his rights, then there is no change in his
proportionate interest in the company.
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Unlike rights offerings, the distribution of warrants to stock
holders will not provide additional capital for several years, if at all.
In fact, there may be no need for additional equity capital when the war
rants are exercised.

Further, management can hardly justify setting a

price currently for the equity capital it plans to raise several years
in the future.

An exercise price set currently may have no relation to

the stock's future value.
Schwartz has concluded that the purpose of these dividend warrants was to establish a market for them.
a merger currency in future acquisitions.
study support this theory.

They could then be used as
The facts gathered in this

Bangor Punta issued its Series C warrants as

a distribution to its stockholders in February, 1969.
used them in the acquisition of Piper Aircraft Company.

In May, 1969 it
Ward Foods, Inc.

and U. S. Smelting & Mining Co. (U-V Industries, Inc.) have both
attempted, unsuccessfully, to negotiate mergers with warrants originally
issued as dividends.

Whittaker Corporation issued warrants to its

stockholders as a dividend in March, 1969.

Although Whittaker Corpora

tion has not used these warrants in an acquisition, it did use them to
redeem its subordinated debentures.

Other Uses
Three warrant issues in this study are rather unusual and will
be discussed briefly.

In 1968 Fibreboard Corporation issued 10-year

William Schwartz, "Warrants: A Form of Equity Capital," Fin
ancial Analysts Journal, XXVI (September-October, 1970), 98.
•^See pages 100 and 101.
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warrants to purchase 729,222 of its shares at $22.50 and paid cash of
$41,018,760 to Tenneco, Inc. in exchange for 1,823,056 of its shares held
by T e n n e c o . T h e warrants were subsequently listed after a secondary
offering by Tenneco in June, 1969.
During fiscal 1968 and 1969, Gulf + Western Industries, Inc.
issued to certain key employees under a restricted warrant plan approxi
mately 500,000 warrants to purchase its stock at $55 per share.

Such a

plan appears to have some advantages over a qualified stock option plan.
Although the employee must pay income tax on the market value of the
warrant at date of receipt (a deductible expense for the issuing com
pany), appreciation recognized on the sale of the warrants is a capital
gain if the warrants are held for six months.

Stock acquired through a

qualified stock option plan must be held for at least three years before
it receives capital gains treatment.
Another advantage of warrants is their negotiability.

Rather than

borrowing money to exercise stock options under a qualified plan and then
selling much of the acquired stock to pay the loan, an employee granted
warrants can exercise a portion of the warrants and sell the others.
In late 1968 LTV, Inc. (Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.) issued warrants
in a package designed to improve earnings per share and to increase the
company's borrowing capacity.

The company offered 1.1 units consisting

of 1 share of Braniff Airlines special stock, Class A; 0.6 shares of
National Car Rental special stock, Class A; 0.33 shares of Computer Tech
nology, Inc. common stock; and 1.1 warrants to purchase LTV common stock
Qf
-^These figures reflect a 2 for 1 stock split made on November 1,

1968.
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at $101.96 (as adjusted) per share until January 15, 1978 in exchange for
a share of LTV common stock.

The company also offered various multiples

of the same unit for approximately $250 million of its debt securities.
Nearly 2,000,000 shares were acquired in this offer.

The result was that

the outstanding shares were reduced by about 50 percent, but the poten
tial dilution of outstanding shares through the exercise of warrants is
approximately 60 percent.
This warrant issue appears to have been designed specifically to
take advantage of APB Opinion No. 9 by substituting warrants for common
stock. IS

Unfortunately, the reduction in shares came during the period

when the company began experiencing losses and resulted in an increase
of the net loss per share rather than the anticipated increase in earn
ings per share.

If the company returns to a profit position, common

stock equivalents under APB Opinion No. 15. assuming the exercise price
of the warrants is less than the market price of the common, will reduce
earnings per share and thus defeat one of the purposes of reacquiring the
shares.
In summary, warrants have been issued in a variety of methods,
but they are usually attached to other securities.

Only two cases were

encountered in which warrants were issued alone in exchange for other
securities.

Warrants have been issued alone as distributions to stock

holders prior to the release of APB Opinion No. 15, apparently to take
advantage of the provisions of APB Opinion No. 9.

There were no cases

35Samuel L. Hayes, III and Henry B. Reiling, "Sophisticated
Financing Tool: The Warrant," Harvard Business Review. XLVII (JanuaryFebruary, 1969), 143.
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in which warrants were issued alone to raise cash, although this use has
been advocated. D
The primary purpose of issuing warrants does not appear to be
that of raising equity capital.

The basic reason for attaching warrants

to securities issued to raise cash is to facilitate the sale of the issue.
The warrants add value to the package and make it more attractive to in
vestors.

Consequently a company which might otherwise have been unable

to do so is able to successfully float a security issue.

The results of

attaching warrants are reflected in a lower interest or dividend rate
and in the higher value received from the sale of the securities.
The primary reason for issuing warrants in a merger agreement
also appears to be that of facilitating the agreement.

Warrants add

value to the total package and offer a potential equity interest in the
acquiring corporation to security holders of the acquired corporation.
Further, under APB Opinion No. 9 , dilution of earnings per share would
not be reflected until the warrants were exercised.
In recapitalizations and reorganizations warrants are also used
to make the deal more palatable to security holders whose interests are
being reduced or eliminated.

In particular, common stockholders can be

issued warrants as a means of retaining a potential equity interest if
the common stock is being eliminated in the reorganization.
The establishment of a merger currency appears to have been the
major reason for issuing warrants as dividends.

If the warrants were

issued in lieu of a stock dividend, they had the additional advantage,

-^See footnote 15, page 88.
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under APB Opinion N o . 9 , of not being dilutive to earnings per share
until exercised.

Even under APB Opinion No. 15, warrants are not dilu

tive until the market price of the common stock exceeds the exercise
price of the warrants.

In addition, warrants do not require an imme

diate increase in cash outflows for dividends.

Stock dividends do

require additional funds for dividends if the same dividend rate is to
be maintained.
The conclusion is that management does not issue warrants for
the purpose of raising future equity capital.

Yet, by the inherent

nature of the warrant instrument, equity capital which may result in the
dilution of earnings per share will be raised at some future date if the
warrants are exercised.

This point must be considered in formulating

guidelines for earnings-per-share computations.

CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS OF WARRANTS IN THE STUDY

Management has great flexibility in setting the terms of warrant
contracts.

Warrants can be tailored to fit the financial requirements of

a company through such contractual provisions as:

(1) the exercise

price, (2) escalations in the exercise price, (3) the means of payment
of the exercise price, (4) the warrant life, and (5) the anti-dilution
provisions.

Once the warrants have been issued, however, management

loses practically all control over the warrants as they become subject
to the whims of warrantholders and the market place.

The contractual

provisions of the warrants in this study are analyzed in this section.
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Exercise Price
A basic consideration in setting the exercise price of a warrant
is the market price of the underlying common stock.

The lower the exer

cise price in relation to the common price, the greater will be the
initial value of the warrant.

Consequently, fewer warrants will have to

be issued in a given transaction and the potential dilution of shares
outstanding will be lower.
No such generalization can be made about the potential dilution
of earnings per share.

Dilution of earnings per share will occur when

the percentage increase in shares outstanding from warrants exercised is
greater than the percentage increase in earnings from the warrant pro
ceeds.

Whether issuing fewer warrants with a lower exercise price or

more warrants with a higher exercise price results in more or less dilu
tion of earnings per share depends upon four factors.

These factors are:

(1) the rate being earned on assets already invested, (2) the rate earned
on warrant proceeds, (3) the number of common shares outstanding prior
to the exercise of warrants, and (4) the number of shares issued for
warrants.

Under certain conditions, issuing fewer warrants at a lower

exercise price will result in less dilution; under other conditions the
result will be higher dilution than if more warrants were issued at a
higher exercise price.
The original warrantholder, whether he received the warrants
attached to securities he purchased, through an exchange of securities
he held, or through a dividend, is interested in the total value he re
ceives in exchange for the consideration given.

He is, therefore, prob

ably not concerned with whether he receives a Smaller number of warrants
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with a lower exercise price or a larger number of warrants with a higher
exercise price as long as the total value is the same.

But subsequent

investors in the warrants would prefer warrants having high leverage.
Leverage is highest when the exercise price is high in relation to the
market price of the common.

This relationship is demonstrated in the

following analysis of the warrant, stock, and exercise price relation
ships of Molybdenum Corporation of America:
Common Stock
Warrants
Exercise
Increase
Increase
Price/
Over
Over
Common
Preceding
Preceding
Price
Period
Price
Period
(Percent) Price_____ (Percent) (Adjusted) (Percent)

Date
10/23/57
12/31/57
12/31/58
12/31/59

190.5
167.8
79.2
54.6

$15,750
17.875
37.625
53.875

13.5
110.5
43.1

$ 3.500
6.125
21.163
36.516

75.0
245.5
72.7

Leverage
Ratio (Percent
Warrant Price
Increase/
Percent Common
Price Increase)

5.6
2.2
1.7

Molybdenum set its exercise price at $30 which was high in rela
tion to the stock price.
from high leverage.

The result was that warrantholders benefited

During the period from October 23, 1957, when the

warrants were listed, to December 31, 1957, the warrant price increased
5.6 times as rapidly as the stock price.

Had the exercise price been set

below the market price, as would have been the case at December 31, 1958,
leverage would have been considerably reduced.

During the succeeding

year, the market price of the warrants increased only 1.7 times as fast
as the common price.
As the preceding discussion points out, the relationship of the
exercise price to the market price of the underlying common stock on the
date of issue influences the value that the warrant will add to the total
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package of securities being offered.

Subsequent changes in the exercise

price will also affect the value of the warrant and may induce exercise
prior to the expiration date of the issue.

In addition, the value of the

warrant is affected by the method of payment of the exercise price.

A

discussion of these aspects of the exercise price follows.
Exercise price in relation to the market price of the common on
date of issue.

In this study, the exercise price of 106 warrant issues

was compared to the market price of the underlying common stock on the
approximate date of issue.

In a few cases, predominantly real estate

investment trusts, prices were not available on the date of issue because
the firms had not yet qualified for listing on an exchange.

In these

cases the average of the over the counter high and low prices for the
period in which the issue occurred was used.

The resulting bias is not

material because the range, as measured by the difference between the
high and the low price, was small.
Warrant issuers in the period from 1950 to 1972 have tended to
set the exercise price at about 110 percent of the market price of the
related common stock on the date of issue, as shown in Table 5.

The

median was below this amount in only one period, 1967-1968, when it was
103 percent.

The decrease in this period is attributable to several

warrant issues in which warrants were used as a merger currency.

In

cluded in the 1967-1968 period are National General Corporation's merger
of Great American Holding, Lowe's Theatres' merger of Lorrilard, and
37
Ling-Temco-Vought's merger of Greatamerica.

•^See page 98.

These companies and others
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Table 5. Comparison of the Initial Exercise Price of 106 Warrant Issues
Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950
and December 31, 1971 with the Price of the Related Common Stock on the
Approximate Date of Issue of the Warrants, by Date of Issue

Number of Issues
Percent
of
Total
Total
Prior to 1950- 1960- 1967- 19691950
1959 1966 1968 1971
Date of Issue

Exercise Price as a
Percentage of the
Stock Price
Less than 75 percent

1

1

2

75 percent to 84 percent
85 percent to 94 percent

2
2

4

4

4

4

7

7

1

1

4

95 percent to 104 percent

2

2

8

12

24

23

105 percent to 114 percent

7

4

7

10

28

26

115 percent to 124 percent

2

2

2

7

13

12

2

2

4

9

8

9

17

16

106

100

1

125 percent to 134 percent

1

135 percent or more

3

3

2

Total

5

16

14

27

44

110%

112%

103%

113%

Median

139%

110%

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial
Manua1, Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual,
Moody's Bank and Finance Manua1 , corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

112

chose to increase the value of the warrants in the security package of
fered the acquired company's stockholders by setting the exercise price
low in relation to the related common price.
The increase in the median to 113 percent in the 1969-1971 period
is caused by the 16 real estate investment trust issues included.

These

trusts, with a median of 116 percent, tended to set the exercise price
higher than the median for the group.
As indicated by Table 6, the exercise price is usually set low in
relation to the market price of the common stock when warrants are
attached to another security and the package is offered for cash.

The

median exercise price was 7 percent above the market price of the re
lated common stock on date of issue.

In contrast, when warrants are

issued as part of a reorganization or recapitalization, the median ex
ercise price was 35 percent above the market price of the common on the
date of issue of the warrants.

The exercise price is also generally set

high when warrants are issued as a dividend to stockholders.
These differences in median exercise prices suggest that manage
ment is less concerned with the value that warrants add to the package
when it is dealing with its own security holders than when it is offer
ing securities to the public.

Ceteris paribus, those warrants with an

exercise price that is high in relation to the underlying common price
are less likely to be exercised.

The result is that management, in its

efforts to obtain current funds, pursues a financial policy likely to
dilute the equity of current stockholders for the benefit of future
stockholders who exercise the warrants attached to the financing instru
ment .
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Table 6. Comparison of the Initial Exercise Price of 106 Warrant Issues
Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950
and December 31, 1971 with the Price of the Related Common Stock on the
Approximate Date of Issue of the Warrants, by Use

Number of Issues
Use

Exercise Price as a
a Percentage of
the Stock Price
Less than 75 percent

As Part
of a
Unit
for
Cash

As Part
of the
Consid
eration
for the
Securi
ties of
Another
Corpo
ration

3

1

As Part
of a
Recapi
taliza
tion or
Reor
ganiza
tion

Total

As a
Divi
dend

Other
4
1

75 percent to 84 percent

3

4

85 percent to 94 percent

2

5

95 percent to 104 percent

17

4

1

1

1

24

105 percent to 114 percent

18

7

1

1

1

28

115 percent to 124 percent

8

3

1

1

125 percent to 134 percent

5

3

1

135 percent or more

3

9

4

1

Total

59

32

8

4

Median

107%

113%

7

135%

13
9

119%

17

3
105%

106
110%

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial
Manual, Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual,
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Further analysis of warrant-security units offered for cash, as
shown in Table 7, discloses that the exercise price was set lower when
the warrants were attached to a debt instrument than when attached to
common stock.

The median exercise price was 4 percent above the related

common price when the warrant was attached to straight debt and 16 per
cent above the related common price when attached to common stock.

This

is further confirmation of the earlier point that management's financial
policy with regard to warrants favors future stockholders to the detri
ment of current stockholders.®®

This policy has special significance

for companies with common stock having preemptive rights.

Theoretically

these stockholders would suffer no dilution through a warrant-common
stock offering because they have the opportunity to purchase their pro
rata share of the new common being issued.

But common stockholders do

not have these preemptive rights when warrants are attached to straight
debt.

These warrants, however, have a lower exercise price and are

therefore more likely to be exercised and cause dilution.
Management also establishes a lower exercise price in relation to
the common price when it issues a warrant-straight debt unit for the se
curities of another corporation.

In Table 8, the median exercise price

is 18 percent above the market price of the related common when the war
rant is attached to a straight-debt instrument.

But if the warrant is

attached to common stock, the median exercise price is 30 percent above

O Q

JOThis statement assumes alternate methods of financing which are
not potentially dilutive are available. If a company is in such dire
need of funds that it can avoid bankruptcy only by selling a warrantsecurity issue, then current stockholders may be benefited despite the
future dilution to their equity.
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Table 7. Comparison of the Initial Exercise Price of Warrants Issued
with Securities to Raise Cash with the Price of the Related Common Stock
on the Approximate Date of Issue of the Warrants, by Type of Security;
Fifty-nine Warrant Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any
Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971

Number of Issues
Type of Security
Exercise Price as a
Percentage of the
Stock Price
Less than 75 percent

Straight
Debt

Conver
tible Common
Debt
Stock Other

Total

Percent
of
Total

3

3

5

75 percent to 84 percent

3

3

5

85 percent to 94 percent

1

2

3

17

29

18

31

1

95 percent to 104 percent

10

105 percent to 114 percent

10

115 percent to 124 percent

2

6

8

14

125 percent to 134 percent

1

4

5

8

3

3

5

100

7
2

135 percent or more

Total

30

Median

104%

3

108%

4

2

24

2

59

116%

107%

107%

Source; Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial
Manual, Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual,
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Table 8. Comparison of the Initial Exercise Price of Warrants Issued with Securities as Part of the
Consideration for the Securities of Another Corporation with the Price of the Related Common Stock on
the Approximate Date of Issue of the Warrants, by Number and Types of Securities; Thirty-Two Warrant
Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971

Number of Issues
Number and Types of Securities
One Type
No Other
Security
Exercise Price as
a Percentage of
the Stock Price
Less than 75 percent
75 percent to 84 percent
85 percent to 94 percent
95 percent to 104 percent
105 percent to 114 percent
115 percent to 124 percent
125 percent to 134 percent
135 percent or more

Two Types

Convertible
Debt
Preferred
and
and
Straight Common
Common
Common
Debt
Stock
Stock Other
Stock Other
1
4

2

Total

2

Median

113%

1
2
2
1
2

2

9

6

6

130%

92%

118%

1
1
2

1
1
1
3

1

Total

1

3

5
4
7
3
3
9

16
13
22
9
9
28
100

2

2

3

3

3

32

166%

110%

113%

161%

Percent
of
Total

116

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual, Moody's Public Utility Manual,
Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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the market price.

If the warrant is issued in combination with both pre

ferred and common stock, the median exercise price is 66 percent above
the related common price.
The potential life span of the warrant issue also appears to have
some influence on the setting of exercise prices.

As indicated in Table

9, the median exercise price in relation to the common price on the date
of issue is higher for warrant issues with extremely short and extremely
long life spans.

The perpetual warrants in this study have a median

exercise price 41 percent above the market price of the common.
Similarly, warrants with a life span of less than four years have a
median exprcise price 31 percent above the common price.
Companies issuing perpetual warrants would be expected to set the
exercise price high in relation to the market price of the common.

If

this were not done, the warrants would soon lose their attractiveness to
investors; with the rise in the price of the common over time, leverage
would be reduced to the point where it would not be particularly advan
tageous .
The reason for setting the exercise price high when the life span
of the issue is short is not so obvious.

An analysis of the issues in

this study indicates that newly formed companies, usually in a high risk
industry such as mining or in a new industry such as mobile homes, have
set the exercise price high in relation to the market price of the
common.

Generally the warrants were attached to common stock issued on

a preemptive basis.

The conclusion is that the managements of these new

and rapidly expanding companies expected a high growth rate in earnings
and stock prices.

By setting the exercise price high and by attaching
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Table 9. Comparison of the Initial Exercise Price of 106 Warrant Issues
Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950
and December 31, 1971 with the Price of the Related Common Stock on the
Approximate Date of Issue of the Warrants, by Potential Life Span

Number of Issues
Potential Life Span (Years)
Exercise Price as a
Percentage of the
Stock Price

Less
than
4

4
to
7

Less than 75 percent

8
to
11

12
to
15

3

1

16
to
19

20
to
23

24
to
27

Perpetua 1

Total

4

75 percent to 84 percent

1

2

85 percent to 94 percent

1

4

1

10

10

1

1

2

24

8

12

5

1

1

28

7

3

1

1

95 percent to 104 percent
105 percent to 114 percent

1

115 percent to 124 percent
125 percent to 134 percent

1

3

5

135 percent or more

1

6

8

3

36

47

Total

Median

4

1
1

1

7

13
9

9

131% 112% 108% 111%

4

3

2

17

4

106

105% 104% 141%

110%

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports,and Form 10-K Annual Report
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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more warrants to each unit of capital sold, a larger amount of capital,
needed for expansion purposes, could be raised when the warrants were
oq

exercised. 3
One additional aspect of Table 9 requires comment.

Warrants with

life spans in the 20-23 and 24-27 year classifications have low exercise
prices in relation to the underlying common stock prices--5 percent and
4 percent, respectively, above the common price on the date of issue.
The expectation would be that warrants with long lives would have a high
exercise price in relation to the common price for two reasons.

First,

a high exercise price would provide better leverage for a longer period
of time if the common price advances over time as would be expected under
normal circumstances.

Second, ceteris paribus, the higher the exercise

price, the lower the dilution of asset values, common stock prices,
earnings per share, and the market price of the common stock if the war
rants are exercised.
Table 9 is based on the initial exercise price and does not con
sider exercise price escalations.

Of the seven issues included in these

two classifications, the terms of three include one or more exercise
price escalations.

Two other issues are callable, an indication that

management may force their exercise prior to their expiration dates.

Changes in exercise price.

One of the means by which management

can possibly induce the exercise of warrants prior to their expiration

3 % h i s policy of setting the exercise price high does not always
achieve its purpose. Two of the three companies issuing warrants with a
life span of less than four years raised very little additional capital
because the exercise price of the warrants was higher than the market
price of the common in the period just prior to expiration of the war
rants. The warrants of the third company have not expired.
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is through an escalation of the exercise price.

This is not a particu

larly effective device for timing the inflow of funds, however, because
the escalated exercise prices and dates of escalation are stipulated in
the original agreement.

The factors which determine whether the warrants

will be exercised in the period immediately prior to an exercise price
escalation are, therefore, not directly under the control of management.
The conditions precedent to exercise are that the theoretical
value of the warrant be positive and that the theoretical value of the
warrant and its market price be approximately equal.

A pending step-up

in the exercise price has much the same effect as the approaching expriation date of a warrant issue.

The premium tends to decline steadily,

beginning about 12 to 15 months before the escalation is effective, so
that the market price of the warrant tends to approach its theoretical
v a l u e . A warrantholder may be forced to exercise the warrant into
common stock because the value of the warrant will decline when the new
exercise price becomes effective.
Other factors in addition to the conditions precedent just dis
cussed also influence the warrantholder.

These include the amount of the

increase in exercise price and the length of the period that the warrant
is exercisable at the higher exercise price.

The shorter this period is

and the greater the exercise price increase, the greater the probability
that the warrantholder will exercise.
The warrants and 5 percent subordinated debentures issued by

^^William Schwartz and Julius Spellman, Guide to Convertible
Securities (New York: William Schwartz and Julius Spellman, 1968),
p. 28.
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Armour and Company in December, 1954 in exchange for its $6 convertible
preferred stock illustrate these points.

The exercise price of the war

rants was $12.50 until December 31, 1956, $15 thereafter until December
31, 1959, $17.50 thereafter until December 31, 1961, and $20 from then
until December 31, 1964 when the warrants expired.

During the 1956-1957

fiscal year when the exercise price increased by 20 percent, warrantholders exercised approximately 36 percent of the 500,000 warrants
originally issued.

In addition to the current increase in exercise price,

the warrantholders were probably incluenced by the fact that another
sizeable increase in the exercise price would occur in three years.
Twenty-one of the 94 warrant series included in this study con
tained a provision for one or more escalations in the exercise price.
The range in the number of increases was from one to six with a median
of one.

Most of the issues^ having exercise price escalations were

attached to debt instruments.

Thirteen, or 59 percent, of the 22 issues

having price escalations were attached to straight-debt securities
issued to raise cash.

Only one issue was attached to common stock

issued for the purpose of raising cash.
The large number of issues having price escalations which were
attached to straight debt, versus the small number attached to common
stock, offers some insight into the setting of the initial exercise
price.

Table 7 on page 115 indicates that the median exercise price

for warrants issued with straight debt was set 4 percent above the

^ T h e distinction between a series and an issue should be noted.
There were 21 series comprising 22 issues with price escalations.
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market price of the common on the date of issue, in contrast to a 16
percent median for warrants issued with common stock.

Management

appears to set the initial exercise price low when warrants are attached
to debt in order to increase the value of the warrants in the warrantdebt package and thereby reduce the interest on the debt.

Potential

dilution in shares outstanding is reduced by this policy.

At the same

time, potential dilution in earnings per share is less because of the
escalated exercise prices if the assumption is made that the warrants
will not be exercised until the period immediately preceding their
expiration.
A recent innovation in warrant agreements allows management some
control over the timing of the exercise of warrants by reduction in the
exercise price.

The agreements stipulate the percentage of decrease in

the exercise price and the minimum period of time that the reduction
must remain in force.

Reduction of the exercise price by a significant

amount for a short period of time makes it advantageous for warrantholders to exercise their warrants before the price returns to its
previous level.^

This feature would be particularly advantageous if

the exercise price exceeded the market price of the common stock near the
expiration date of the warrants.

If management needed funds, it could

reduce the exercise price below the market price, thus receiving funds
through the exercise of the warrants and at the same time benefiting
the warrantholders.
/o

The reduction must be temporary or the only effect would be an
increase in the price of the warrant by approximately the amount of the
reduction in the exercise price. See Richard A. Stevenson and Joe Lovely,
"Why a Bond Warrant Issue?" Financial Executive. XXXVIII (June, 1970), 19.
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Of the 94 series in this study, eight included a provision in
the agreement for reduction of the exercise price.

The amount of the

reduction ranged from 25 percent to 33 1/3 percent.

The first series

to include this provision was Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. (LTV Corp.).^
The last issue to include this stipulation was by Gould, Inc. on July 31,
1969.
The reduction-of-exercise-price feature was not included in any
of the series in this study issued after July, 1969.

The reason was

probably an announcement by the American Stock Exchange that it would
no longer list warrants with this provision unless the issuer agreed to
forgo the right to reduce the exercise price while the warrants were
listed.^

This action was taken by the American Stock Exchange in the

interest of providing an orderly market in warrants.

Reducing the

exercise price causes conversion of the warrants into common and at the
same time it stimulates a rush of buy orders for the warrants.

Means of payment. Most warrant agreements stipulate that the ex
ercise price is payable in cash.

However, in recent years warrants ex

ercisable by either cash or debt at par value have become increasingly
popular.

Such warrants are similar to convertible debt in that they

provide a means of converting debt into equity.

The conditions precedent

for conversion are that the warrants have a market value greater than

Four of the remaining seven series containing a reduction-ofexercise-price provision were issued by companies affiliated with LingTemco-Vought , Inc.
^"American Board Says It Will No Longer List Certain Stock War
rants,” The Wall Street Journal. July 7, 1969, p. 26.
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zero and that the related debt sell at a discount near the expiration
date of the warrants.

The effect of the debt option is to lower the

effective exercise price when the debt is selling at a discount.

This

feature does not offer management much control over cash inflows or
debt-equity ratios, however, because the terms for the warrant-debt
issue must be stipulated prior to the original issue date.
Whether the warrants will be exercised by a cash payment or by
presentation of debt at par, or not exercised at all, will depend on the
market forces in effect when the expiration date of the warrants
approaches.

Some control over the method of exercise can be established

through the setting of the exercise price of the warrants and the setting
of the nominal interest rate and the maturity date of the debt.

The

exercise price should be set low enough so that the warrants will have
a market value greater than zero near their expiration date.

The

nominal rate of interest

on the debt should be

set lower thanthe pre

vailing interest rate so

that the debt will initially sell at a discount.

The maturity date of the debt should be set later than the expiration
date of the warrants to increase the possibility of the debt selling at
a discount prior to the expiration date of the warrants.
date of debt approaches,

the discount tends to

Twenty-one of the 94 warrant series

in

As the maturity

disappear.
this study were issued

with the exercise price payable in cash or debt securities.

Fourteen of

these series were attached to debt issues for the purpose of facili
tating their sale.

Most of the remaining series were offered as part of

a package of securities in mergers and acquisitions.
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Period of Exercise
A basic factor influencing the exercise of warrants is the ex
piration date of the issue.

The life span of the warrants included in

this study and provision for reduction of that span are analyzed in this
section.

Warrant life. As Table 10 shows, the life span of 78 percent of
the

warrant issues included in this

The

median life span was 10 years. Table 10 does provide some

of a trend toward a shorter
for

warrant

study varied between 4 and11 years.
evidence

life. The median life of five years

the 1969-1971 period is lower than the median in any other period.

The shorter life span during this period can be attributed primarily to
real estate investment trusts.

Of the 44 issues during this period, 16

were by real estate investment trusts with a median life of five years.
However, even with the exclusion of real estate investment trusts, the
trend toward a shorter life span is evident.

The median life span of

the remaining 28 issues during this period is approximately 7 1/2 years.
A definite trend away from perpetual warrants is shown in Table
10.

The last such issue was by the Alleghany Corporation in 1952.

The

other three issues originated in the late 1920's and in 1936 as the re
sult of mergers.

One of these issues, that of the United Corporation,

was cancelled by court order in 1955 as the result of a reorganization.
Apparently corporations no longer find desirable a capital structure
which includes a call on their common stock for an indefinite period.
Theoretically, perpetual warrants which have no special features such as
escalations in the exercise price would never be exercised.

From the
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Table 10. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971
by Potential Life Span and by Date of Issue

Number of Issues
Date of Issue
Potential Life
Span (Years)

Prior to 1950- 1960- 1967- 19691950
1959 1966 1968 1971

Less than 4
4 to 7
8 to 11

2

12 to 15

1

1

2

2

10
1

Tota 1

Percent
of
Total

1

3

3

3

29

36

34

4

20

11

47

44

5

2

1

9

8

1

2

1

4

4

1

3

3

4

4

100

16 to 19
20 to 23
24 to 27
Perpetual

Total

Median (Years)

1

1

3

1

5

16

14

27

44

106

10

11

10

5

10

Perpetual

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manual. Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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point of view of investors, these warrants are desirable as long as the
relationship between the exercise price and the underlying common stock
price is such that leverage is favorable.
Warrants which were issued as part of a unit for cash tended to
have a shorter life than those issued for any other reason.

As indi

cated in Table 11, they had a median life of 5 1/2 years as compared to
a median life of 10 years for all the issues included in this study.
Further analysis of these 59 issues in Table 12 discloses that this
shorter life span is associated with those issues which were attached
to common stock.

Included in this group of 24 issues are 14 issues by

real estate investment trusts.
five years.

The median life span of these issues is

Table 13 shows that warrants attached to common stock and

issued as a unit in exchange for the securities of another corporation
also have a median life shorter
issued for this purpose.

than any other warrant-security unit

Only warrants issued without any other securi

ties attached have a shorter median life.

Provisions for reduction of life. A few warrant agreements in
recent years have included a provision for redemption of the issue at the
option of the issuer.
this feature.

Four of the 94 warrant series under study included

This option provides management with a means of forcing

exercise when the theoretical value of the warrant is positive and in
excess of the call price.

If the theoretical value of the warrants is

less than the call price, warrantholders will present the warrants for
redemption if a call is issued.
While callable warrants offer management better financial plan
ning and control of cash flows, they offer no comparable advantages to
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Table 11. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971
by Potential Life Span and by Use
Number of Issues
Use

Potential Life
Span (Years)
Less than 4

As Part
of a
Unit
for
Cash

As Part
of the
Consid
eration
for the
Securi
ties of
Another
Corpo
ration

As Part
of a
Recapi
taliza
tion or
Reor
ganiza
tion

Total

As a
Divi
dend

Other
3

3

4 to 7

28

6

2

8 to 11

20

17

4

3

12 to 15

3

4

1

1

20 to 23

3

1

4

24 to 27

2

1

3

36
3

47
9

16 to 19

Perpetual

Total
Median (Years)

59
5 1/2

3

1

32

8

4

10

10

10

4
3
9 1/2

106
10

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Table 12. Classification of Warrants Issued with Securities to Raise
Cash by Potential Life Span and by Type of Security; Fifty-Nine Warrant
Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between
January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971

Number of Issues
Type of Security

Potential Life Span
of Warrants (Years)

Straight
Debt

Less than 4
4 to 7

5

8 to 11

18

12 to 15

2

Conver
tible
Debt

Total
Common
Stock Other

1

2

2

20

1

2
1

Percen
of
Total

3

5

28

48

20

34

3

5

16 to 19
20 to 23

3

3

5

24 to 27

2

2

3

59

100

Perpetual

Total

30

3

24

2

Median (Years)

10

5

5

10

5 ]/2

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual.
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual. Moody's Bank
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Table 13. Classification of Warrants Issued with Securities as Part of the Consideration for the
Securities of Another Corporation by Potential Life Span and by Number and Types of Securities; ThirtyTwo Warrant Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and
December 31, 1971

Number of Issues
Number and Types of Securities
One Type

Two Types

No other
Security
Potential Life Span
of Warrants (Years)
Less than 4
4 to 7
8 to 11
12 to 15
16 to 19
20 to 23
24 to 27
Perpetual

Straight Common
Debt
Stock Other
2
5
3

3
3

1
4
1

Convertible
Debt
Preferred
and
and
Common
Common
Stock Other
Stock

3

6
17
4

19
53
13

1

1
1
3

3
3
9

3

32

100

10

10

3
2

9

Median (Years)

7

10

6
8\

6

3

10

11 \

3
Perpetual

Percent
of
Total

2

1

Total

Total

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual, Moody's Public Utility Manual,
Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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investors.

The redemption feature of callable warrants severely limits

their premium value, especially when the theoretical value exceeds the
call price.

No investor would be willing to pay more than the theoreti

cal value of a warrant if that warrant is being called at a lower price.
The premium is also likely to be less when the warrant has no
theoretical value and the call price is low.
Keys Fibre warrants indicates the reason.

The plight of investors in

These warrants, issued in

1960, had a stated life of 10 years and were callable at any time at $1
each.

When the company issued a redemption call in 1967, the warrants

were trading at approximately $4.

Since the warrants had no theoretical

value, their price immediately dropped to the call price of $ 1 . ^

The

call feature, although advantageous to management, is not likely to be
accepted by investors because of the hazards it presents.

Anti-dilution Provisions
Most warrant agreements contain an anti-dilution provision.

This

feature is designed to protect warrantholders from a decline in the value
of their warrants which would result from stock splits and stock divi
dends and from the issuance of additional common stock at a price below
the current market price of the common stock or the exercise price of
the warrant.

The usual procedure is to increase the number of shares a

warrant will purchase by the percentage increase in common shares out
standing.

The exercise price is reduced proportionally, so that it

reflects the approximate decline in market price of the common shares

^Schwartz and Spellman, op. cit., p. 24.
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resulting from the issuance of additional shares at a price below the
current market price.

The net result is that a warrantholder can pur

chase the same proportion of outstanding shares at the same total cash
as that prevailing before the issuance of additional shares.
Sperry Rand Corporation warrants illustrate this point.

Warrants

to purchase 2,200,000 common shares at $25 per share to September 16,
1963 and at $28 per share thereafter until September 15, 1967 were
attached to Sperry Rand's 5 1/2 percent debentures dated September 1,
1957.

After stock dividends of 2 percent in March of 1961, 2 percent

in September, 1961 and 4 percent in 1962, the original 2,200,000 common
shares reserved for warrants had increased

to 2,376,000 shares.Each

warrant carried the right to purchase 1.08 shares for $25.

The

exercise

price per share, therefore, had been reduced to $23.15 as a result of
the stock dividends.

Most of the warrants were exercised in 1967 at an

exercise price of $28 per 1.08 shares, or $25.93 per share.
Armour and Company warrants provide an exception to the general
rule that warrantholders are usually protected against dilution.

Its

10-year warrants, issued in 1954 under a recapitalization plan, were not
protected against dilution from stock dividends.
Armour declared two 10 percent stock dividends.

During this period,
Warrantholders who held

their warrants for most of the 10-year period before exercising them
therefore received approximately 17 percent fewer shares than those war
rantholders who exercised their warrants prior to the first stock dividend
and held the shares

for an equivalent period.

In addition, the exercise

price per share was

21 percent higher than it would have been had the

warrant agreement included an anti-dilution provision for stock dividends.
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In summary, management has exercised a considerable amount of
flexibility in setting the contractual terms of the warrants it issues.
This flexibility is achieved through the setting of the exercise price,
provision for changes in the exercise price and the means of payment of
the exercise price, and through establishment of the warrant life and
provisions for the reduction of the warrant life.

There is, however,

a practical limit to this flexibility because the warrant terms must be
acceptable to investors.

In addition, this flexibility may not result

in significant benefits to management in its financial planning function
because the terms of the warrant agreement are stipulated at issue date
and such terms may not achieve the desired results 10 or 15 years in the
future.
In setting the exercise price of warrants, management appears to
favor future stockholders to the detriment of its current stockholders.
This is evident when the ratio of the exercise price to the common stock
price at date of issue is examined.

On the average, this ratio is lower

for warrants issued to potential stockholders.

For example, the median

exercise price is only 4 percent above the market price of the common
when warrants are attached to straight debt for the purpose of raising
cash.

If the warrant is attached to common stock for the purpose of

raising cash, the median exercise price is 16 percent above the common
stock price.
Since common stock is often issued on a preemptive basis to cur
rent stockholders and debt is not, current stockholders assume the risk
of greater potential dilution of asset values and earnings per share when
warrants are attached to debt rather than common stock if the assumption
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is made that the total value of both security packages is equal and the
number of warrants issued is the same for each package.

The risk of

greater potential dilution is further compounded by virtue of the fact
that the warrants with the lower exercise price are more likely to be
exercised.
Two factors, to some extent, offset the risk of greater dilution
to current stockholders from the issuance of warrant-debt securities.
Current stockholders benefit from the lower interest rate which the war
rant-debt security offers.

In addition, 13 of the 30 warrant issues

attached to straight debt have one or more exercise price escallations
prior to their expiration date.

If these warrants are held to expira

tion, dilution in asset values and earnings per share will be reduced
because of the higher exercise prices.
The ratio of the exercise price to the price of the common stock
is also lower when warrants are issued as part of the consideration for
securities of another corporation.

The median exercise price is 13

percent above the common price when warrants are issued for this purpose.
In contrast, the median exercise price is 19 percent above the price of
the common stock when warrants are issued to current stockholders as
dividend distributions and 35 percent when warrants are issued to cur
rent shareholders as part of a reorganization or recapitalization.
The assumption is that the exercise price is set low for warrants
issued in mergers in order to increase the total value of the security
package offered the security holders of the acquired corporation.

In

addition, warrants may be included in the package in order to provide a
potential equity interest to certain security holders of the acquired
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corporation.

The result is greater potential dilution to current stock

holders in either case, assuming the same number of warrants could have
been issued at a higher exercise price.
Management must consider the life span of warrants in setting ex
ercise prices if dilution is to be minimized.

Ceteris paribus, the

longer the life span, the higher should be the exercise price.

The man

agements of companies included in this study have not always followed
this practice.

There is, however, a tendency to incorporate exercise

price escalations into long-term warrant agreements.

In addition, a few

warrant issues contain a call feature which can be used to force the
exercise of warrants at an appropriate time.
From the point of view of the investor, a call feature is unde
sirable because it limits the premium, and hence the leverage, of the
warrant.

A desirable feature for the investor is protection against

dilution of the common equity of the issuing corporation.

Because of

these investor considerations, the anti-dilution feature is included in
most agreements, but the call feature is rarely incorporated into the
agreement.
The conclusion is that management must assume the responsibility
for warrant issues because it sets the terms of the warrant agreement.
Warrants are a risky means of facilitating the sale of other securities
which are issued to achieve the goals of the corporation that are estab
lished by management.

Financial statements reflect the benefits of this

risk through lower cash outflows for interest and/or dividends.

Manage

ment should also be accountable to current stockholders for the cost of
these benefits which includes potential dilution of control, asset values,

136

earnings per share, and of the market price of the common stock.

This

accountability must be considered in formulating guidelines for earningsper-share computations.

EXERCISE OF WARRANTS

The conditions precedent necessary to induce warrantholders to ex
ercise their warrants are that the theoretical value of the warrants be
positive and that the market price of the warrants be close to their
theoretical value.

Since these conditions are not always met, poten

tial dilution of outstanding shares is usually greater than the actual
dilution.

An analysis of the potential and actual dilution and the timing

of exercise of the warrants included in this study follows.

Potential Dilution
Potential dilution, for purposes of this study, is defined as the
ratio of the number of common shares under option by virtue of a warrant
issue or series to the sum of:

(1) the number of common shares outstand

ing at the end of the period during which the warrants were issued and
(2) the number of common shares under option.

This ratio is, in effect,

the dilution in control that current stockholders will experience if all
warrants are exercised and no additional shares of common stock are issued
during the period prior to exercise.
As shown by Table 14, the median potential dilution of the 94
warrant series under study was 20.0 percent.

The potential dilution in

shares outstanding increased substantially in the 1969-1971 period.
Except for the period prior to 1950, the median potential dilution of
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Table 14. Classification of 94 Warrant Series Listed on the American
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971
by Potential Dilution of Shares Outstanding3 and by Date of the First
Issue in the Series
Number of Series Issued
Date of First Issue in Series
Potential Dilution
of Shares Outstand
ing (Percent)

Prior to 1950- 1960- 1967- 19691950
1959 1966 1968 1971
2

1

5.0 to 9.9

4

1

10.0 to 14.9

6

15.0 to 19.9

Less than 5.0

20.0 to 24.9

1

25.0 to 29.9

1

30.0 to 34.9

2

of
Total

4

7

7

2

3

10

11

2

4

3

15

16

2

3

6

4

15

16

1

1

2

2

7

7

2

1

4

8

9

1

2

5

11

12

1

1

2

4

4

2

2

1

35.0 to 39.9
40.0 to 44.9

Percent
Total

1

1

45.0 to 49.9

1

6

7

7

50.0 and over

2

6

8

9

21

39

94

100

Total

Median

5

33.3%

16

13

12 .1% 19.8% 19.4% 30.0%

20 .0%

Source; Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual. Moody's Bank
and Finance Manua1, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the number of common
shares under option by virtue of a warrant issue or series to the sum of:
(1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the period
during which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares
under option.
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30.0 percent for che 1969-1971 period is the highest of any period.
This increase in potential dilution was caused by the 15 warrant series
issued by real estate investment trusts.

Warrants issued by these real

estate investment trusts had a median potential dilution of 49.9 percent
with a range from 22.0 percent to 50.0 percent.

In contrast, the re

maining 24 series in the 1969-1971 period had a median potential dilu
tion of only 17.7 percent.

Table 15 presents the same information as

Table 14, except that the analysis is by warrant issue rather than war
rant series.

The median potential dilution on this basis is 18.8 percent.

Analysis of the 106 warrant issues by use (Table 16) reveals no
material differences in the median potential dilution except that war
rants issued as dividends have less potential dilution than any other use.
When the 59 warrant issues attached to other securities for the purpose
of raising cash are analyzed by type of security, however, the median
potential dilution of those warrant issues attached to common stock is
significantly greater.

As indicated by Table 17, the median potential

dilution of warrants issued with common stock is 33.3 percent.

This com

pares with a median of 12.8 percent when the warrants are attached to
straight debt.

Perhaps management is less concerned about potential

dilution of the stockholder's equity under such circumstances because
many common stock issues are on a preemptive basis.
Fourteen of the 24 warrant issues shown in Table 17 as being
attached to common stock were by real estate investment trusts.

The

median potential dilution of shares outstanding for these 14 issues was
49.9 percent, as compared with 11.2 percent for the remaining 10 issues.
Most of the warrants issued by these real estate investment trusts were
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Table 15. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971
by Potential Dilution of Shares Outstanding3 and by Date of Issue
Number of Issues
Date of Issue
Potention Dilution
of Shares Outstand
ing (Percent)

Prior to 1950- 1960- 1967- 19691950
1959 1966 1968 1971

Total

Percent
of
Total

Less than 5.0

2

1

3

4

10

9

5.0 to 9.9

4

1

4

7

16

15

10.0 to 14.9

6

2

4

5

17

16

15.0 to 19.9

2

4

7

3

16

15

1

2

2

3

9

8

2

1

4

8

8

2

5

10

9

1

2

2

2

2

20.0 to 24.9

1

25.0 to 29.9

1

30.0 to 34.9

2

1
1

35.0 to 39.9
40.0 to 44.0

1

1

45.0 to 49.9

2

6

8

8

50.0 and over

2

6

8

8

27

44

106

100

Total

Median

5

16

14

33.07. 10.8% 19.4% 16.4% 23.7%

18.8%

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manual. Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the number of common
shares under option by virtue of a warrant issue or series to the sum of:
(1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the period
during which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares
under option.
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Table 16. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971
by Potential Dilution of Shares Outstanding3 and by Use

Number of Issues
Use

Potential Dilution of
Shares Outstanding
(Percent)
Less
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0

As Part
of a
Unit
for
Cash

As Part
of the
Consid
eration
for the
Securi
ties of
Another
Corpo
ration

1
6
4

2
6
2
6
3
3
3
1
1
2
3

Total

59

32

Median

17.7%

than 5.0
to 9.9
to 14.9
to 19.9
to 24.9
to 29.9
to 34.9
to 39.9
to 44.9
to 49.9
and over

7
7
13
8
5
3
5

2 0 .2%

As Part
of a
Recapi
taliza
tion or
Reor
ganiza
tion

Total
As a
Divi
dend

Other
1

2
1
1
1
1
1
1

8

19.2%

1

10
16
17
16
9
8
10
2
2
8
8

3

106

1
1
1
1
1

4

13.4%

26.1%

18.8%

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manua1, Moody's Transportation Manual. Moody's Bank
and Finance Manua1, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the number of common
shares under option by virtue of a warrant issue or series to the sum of:
(1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the period during
which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares under
option.
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Table 17. Classification of Warrants Issued with Securities to Raise Cash
by Potential Dilution of Shares Outstanding3 and by Type of Security;
Fifty-Nine Warrant Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any
Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971
Number of Issues
Type of Security
Potential Dilution of
Shares Outstanding
(Percent)

Straight
Debt

Conver
tible
Debt
1

Total
Common
Stock

Other

2

7

1

7

4

13

Less than 5.0

4

5.0 to 9.9

6

10.0 to 14.9

8

15.0 to 19.9

5

20.0 to 24.9

3

25.0 to 29.9

2

1

3

30.0 to 34.9

1

4

5

1

2
1

1

8

1

5

35.0 to 39.9
40.0 to 44.9

1

1

45.0 to 49.9

6

6

50.0 and over

4

4

Total

30

Median

12.8%

3

11.8%

24

33.3%

2

18.5%

59

17.7%

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal. Moody's Industrial Manual,
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the number of common
shares under option by virtue of a warrant issue or series to the sum of:
(1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the period during
which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares under option.
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attached to the original public offering of their shares of beneficial
interest.

The effect, therefore, is the same as if the shares had been

issued on a preemptive basis.

Each shareholder has the opportunity to

retain his pro rata interest in equity by exercising his warrants.
Table 18 analyzes the potential dilution of warrants attached to
securities issued in acquisitions and mergers by the type of security
with which the warrant was combined.

The conclusion is that the number

of warrants issued, and therefore the potential dilution, is simply one
of many factors entering into the terms of the agreement.

When the

warrants are attached to common stock, however, the median potential
dilution of 16.6 percent is lower than the median of 20.2 percent for
the group.

Apparently managements of the acquiring firms are concerned

about the potential dilution of warrants in such cases because the
security holders of the acquired firms are receiving equity securities
from the outset.
Potential dilution is less in those issues in which the exercise
price is set near or slightly above the market price of the common on
date of issue.

In general, as the exercise price is set higher in rela

tion to the common price, the potential dilution increases.

As indicated

by Table 19, the median potential dilution was 15.2 percent when the
exercise price was from 105 to 114 percent of the common price.

When

the exercise price was in the range from 115 to 124 percent of the common
price, the median potential dilution increased to 30.5 percent.

This

result is not unexpected because as the exercise price is increased in
relation to the common price, the less the warrant contributes to the
value of the total package of securities being offered.

Consequently,

Table 18. Classification of Warrants Issued with Securities as Part of the Consideration for the
Securities of Another Corporation by Potential Dilution of Shares Outstanding3 and by Number and Types of
Securities; Thirty-Two Warrant Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange at Any Time between January
1, 1950 and December 31, 1971

Potential Dilution of
Shares Outstanding
(Percent)
Less
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0

than 5.0
to 9.9
to 14.9
to 19.9
to 24.9
to 29.9
to 34.9
to 39.9
to 44.9
to 49.9
and over
Total
Median

No other
Security

1
1

Number of Issues
Number and Types of Securities
One Type
Two Types
Convertible
Debt
Preferred
and
and
Straight
Common
Other
Common
Common
Debt
Stock
Stock
Stock
1
2
2
1
1
1

1
2
1

1
3

Total

Other

1

1

2
1

2
2
1

1
1
2
4.4%

9
22.07=

6
16.67=

6
9.67=

1
3
22.07=

1
3
33.37=

3
17.07=

2
7
2
6
3
3
3
1
1
1
3
32
20.27=

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual, Moody's Public Utility Manual,
Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe ratio, expressed as a percentage of the number of common shares under option by virtue of a
warrant issue or series to the sum of:
(1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the
period during which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares under option.
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Table 19. Classification of 106 Warrant Issues Listed on the American
Stock Exchange at Any Time between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971
by Potential. Dilution of Shares Outstanding3 and by Initial Exercise Price
Expressed as a Percentage of the Price of the Related Common Stock on the
Approximate Date of Issue
Number of Issues
Potential
Dilution
of Shares
Outstanding
(Percent)

Exercise Price as a Percentage
of the Stock Price
Less
than
75%

75%84%

85%- 95%
94% 104%

105%114%

Less than 5.0

2

2

3

5.0 to 9.9

1

3

7

7

4

4

4

115%- 125°/
124% -134%
1

1

10

1

4

16

1

1

2

17

2

1

2

16

1

2

9

3

8

2

10

1

2

1

1

15.0 to 19.9

1

1

20.0 to 24.9

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

2

3

1

2

25.0 to 29.9
30.0 to 34.9

1

40.0 to 44.9

1

45.0 to 49.9

1

1

2

2

50.0 and over

1

1

3

3

7

24

28

13

Total
Median

1

1

35.0 to 39.9

4

4

Total

1

10.0 to 14.9

1

135%
and
over

1

2

2

8
8

9

17

21.9% 20.7% 16.3% 15.4% 15.2% 30.5% 22.6% 19.1%

106
18.8%

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual.
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual. Moody's Bank
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the number of common
shares under option by virtue of a warrant issue or series to the sum of:
(1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the period during
which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares under
option.

145

in a given transaction, more warrants will have to be issued than would
be the case if the exercise price were set lower.
APB Opinion No. 15 becomes somewhat paradoxical when it is con
sidered in the light of the facts discussed in the preceding paragraph.
Under the treasury stock method, warrants are not dilutive until the
market price of the common stock exceeds the exercise price.

Yet, the

higher the exercise price in relation to the market price of the common,
the higher potential dilution is likely to be.

On the other hand, the

possibility exists that actual dilution might be less when the exercise
price is set high in relation to the common stock price.

Actual dilution

might be less because the likelihood of the market price of the common
exceeding the exercise price of the warrant is less, ceteris paribus,
when the exercise price is set high in relation to the common price.

Actual Dilution
Actual dilution, as used in this study, is the ratio of the num
ber of common shares issued through the exercise of warrants to the num
ber of common shares outstanding at the end of the period in which the
warrant issue expires.

Actual dilution will seldom be as great as the

potential dilution as defined in this study.

This is true even if all

of the warrants are exercised because during the period in which the
warrants are outstanding most companies will have issued additional
shares of common.

The warrantholder may not be protected against the

dilution caused by the issuance of these additional shares either be
cause the warrant agreement excludes certain types of common stock issues
or because the right to purchase common existed prior to the warrant
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agreement.

Examples of the former are warrant agreements which exclude

from their anti-dilution provisions small stock dividends of less than
1 or 2 percent and those which exclude shares issued under employee stock
option plans.

An example of the latter might be shares issued through

the conversion of convertible securities outstanding prior to the war
rant agreement.
Actual dilution will also be less than potential dilution because
less than 100 percent of the warrants will be exercised in most cases.
Even in successful issues where the market price of the common exceeds
the exercise price of the warrants in the period immediately preceding
the expiration date of the warrants, some warrants are not exercised.
For example, there were warrants to purchase 2,376,000 shares of Sperry
Rand Corporation stock outstanding in the period preceding their expira
tion on September 15, 1967.

During this period the market price of

Sperry Rand common exceeded the exercise price of the warrants.

Yet

warrants to purchase approximately 48,000 shares were not exercised.
There were 20 warrant issues listed on the American Stock Ex
change which expired between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971.
Table 20 compares the potential dilution of the common equity of these
companies with the actual dilution which was experienced.

There were

five issues, or 25 percent of the total issues under analysis, which had
a potential dilution greater than 15 percent.
an actual dilution as high as 15 percent.

Yet no issue resulted in

In fact, three of these issues

resulted in dilution of less than 3 percent.
One of the arguments of those opposed to reflecting warrants in
earnings-per-share computations is that many warrants are not exercised
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a

Table 20. Comparison of Potential Dilution of Shares Outstanding with
Actual Dilution of Shares Outstanding;^* Twenty Warrant Issues Listed on
the American Stock Exchange which Expired between January 1, 1950 and
December 31, 1971
Number of Issues
Actual Dilution*! (Percent)
Potential
Dilution0
(Percent)
Less
3.0
6.0
9.0
12.0
15.0
i8.0
21.0
24.0
27.0

Less
than
3.0

than 3.0
to 5.9
to 8.9
to 11.9
to 14.9
to 17.9
to 20.9
to 23.9
to 26.9
to 30.0

2
3
2
2

Total

12

Percent
of total

60.0

3.05.9

6 .08.9

9.011.9

1
2

12.014.9

10.0
15.0
15.0
25.0
10.0

2
1

10.0
5.0

1

2

10.0

2

20

100.0

1

1
1

1

1

1

4

1

5.0

20.0

5.0

Percent
of
Total

2
3
3
5
2

1

1

Total

10.0

100.0

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Industrial Manual.
Moody's Public Utility Manual, Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank
and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K Annual Report
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
aThe
ratio, expressed asa percentage, of the number of common
shares under
option by virtue
ofa
warrant issue or series to the sum of:
(1) the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the period
during which the warrants were issued and (2) the number of common shares
under option.
bThe
ratio, expressed asa percentage, of the number of common
shares issued through the exercise of warrants to the number of common
shares outstanding at the end of the period in which the warrant issue
expired.
cMedian, potential dilution:
^Median, actual dilution:

10.4%..

2.1%.
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and, hence, do not cause dilution.

Without prejudging the merits of the

argument, it is clear than many warrants are in fact not exercised and
this fact must be considered in formulating guidelines for earnings-pershare computations of companies with warrants in their capital structure.
For the 20 warrants included in this study, the median of the potential
dilution was 10.4 percent, a figure significantly greater than the median
of the actual dilution encountered, 2.1 percent.

The principal reason

for this difference is reflected in Table 21, which shows that the median
of the percentage of warrants exercised was 59 percent.
Table 21 also provides data on the exercise experience of warrant
issues in which the exercise price was set high in relation to the market
price of the common stock on the approximate date of issue.

There were

eight issues in which the exercise price was 125 percent or more of the
market price of the common on the approximate date of issue.

The median

percentage of exercise of these issues was 8 percent as compared with 59
percent for the group.

For the population under study, the conclusion

is that, in general, the higher the ratio of the exercise price of the
warrant to the price of the underlying common stock on the approximate
date of issue, the lower is the likelihood of exercise.

Timing of Exercise
The basic factor influencing the time of the exercise of the war
rants in this study was the expiration date of the warrants.

The median

percentage of exercise of the 20 warrants in this study was approximately
59 percent.

However, as indicated by Table 22, the median percentage of

exercise in the period immediately preceding the period of expiration of

Table 21. Classification of Twenty Warrant Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange which Expired
between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971 by Percentage Exercised and by Initial Exercise Price
Expressed as a Percentage of the Price of the Related Common Stock on the Approximate Date of Issue

Number of Issues
Exercise Price as a Percentage
of the Stock Price
Percentage Exercised
Less than 10 percent
10 percent to 19 percent
20 percent to 29 percent
30 percent to 39 percent
40 percent to 49 percent
50 percent to 59 percent
60 percent to 69 percent
70 percent to 79 percent
80 percent to 89 percent
90 percent to 100 percent

Less than
75%

75%84%

85%94%

95%104%

105%114%

115%124%

125%134%

2
1

1

2

1
1

1

4

1

135% and
over

Total

2
1

7
2

1

1

2

3
7
20

Total

1

1

1

7

2

2

6

Median

84%

86%

97%

97%

50%

50%

19%

59%

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal, Moody’s Industrial Manual, Moody’s Public Utility Manual,
Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Table 22. Classification of Twenty Warrant Issues Listed on the American Stock Exchange which Expired
between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 1971 by Percentage Exercised and by Period of Exercise Relative
to Expiration Date

Number of Issues
Number of Accounting Periods
Preceding Period of Expiration
Cumulative Percentage
Exercised
Less
1.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
85.0
90.0
95.0

than 1.0 percent
percent to 4.9 percent
percent to 9.9 percent
percent to 14.9 percent
percent to 19.9 percent
percent to 29.9 percent
percent to 39.9 percent
percent to 49.9 percent
percent to 59.9 percent
percent to 69.9 percent
percent to 79.9 percent
percent to 84.9 percent
percent to 89.9 percent
percent to 94.9 percent
percent to 100.0 percent

10 or
more
12

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

12
1

11
1

10
1
1
1

10
2

10
3

9
2
2

10
2
1
2

10
2
1
1
1

9
2
1
1

6
1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1

1

1
2

1
1

1
1

2

2
1

2
1

1
1
1

1
1
2

1
2

1
7

Total

12

13

13

14

15

Median

0 .0%

0 .0%

0 .0%

0 .0%

0 .1%

17

17

20

20

20

0 .1%

0 .8%

0 .6%

0 .8%

1 .8%

20
59.3%

Source: Compiled from The Wall Street Journal. Moody's Industrial Manua1, Moody's Public Utility Manual.
Moody's Transportation Manual, Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, corporate annual reports, and Form 10-K
Annual Report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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each issue was just 1.8 percent.

The conclusion is that warrants are not

exercised until shortly before expiration unless there are other factors,
usually contained in the warrant agreement, which induce early exercise.
The second most influential factor in inducing exercise of the
vjarrants in this study was an escalation in the exercise price of the
warrants prior to their expiration date.

As shown in Table 22, there

were four warrant issues in which 50 percent or more of the warrants had
been exercised by the third period preceding the period of expiration.
An analysis of these four issues reveals that the terms of each issue in
cluded at least one escalation of the exercise price.

In fact, the four

issues had a total of 11 escalations of the exercise price.

46

One other factor was observed to have influenced the timing of
the exercise of the 20 warrants in this study for which a complete history
is available.

Assuming the conditions precedent to exercise are met,

announcement of a sizeable stock dividend will cause some warrantholdcrs to exercise if the warrant issue is not protected against dilu
tion from stock dividends.
Armour and Company warrants.
stock dividend.

This appears to have happened in the case of
In fiscal 1959 Armour issued a 10 percent

Almost 5 percent of its warrants were exercised in this

period, apparently because the warrants were not protected against dilu
tion from stock dividends.^

Situations such as this are rare because

most warrants are protected against dilution from large stock dividends.

^ S e e pages 119-122 for a discussion of the reasons that an esca
lation of the exercise price may induce exercise of the warrants.
^ T h e fact that there was an escalation of the exercise price
early in the 1960 fiscal year may also have induced some warrantholders
to exercise.
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Other factors are also influential in inducing the exercise of
warrants, although these factors were not encountered in the 20 warrant
issues under study.

Some of these factors will be discussed briefly.

Occasionally the theoretical value of a warrant may exceed its
market price.

This is most likely to occur when the market price of the

warrant is high in relation to its exercise price.

Under such conditions

the market price of the underlying common stock is high in relation to
the exercise price of the warrant.

As a result, the premium on the war

rant is likely to disappear because the warrant offers very little lev
erage.

If the theoretical value of the warrant does exceed its market

price, arbitrageurs may buy the warrants and sell the equivalent shares
of common stock short.
short sale.
arbitrageur.

The warrants are then exercised to cover the

The result is a small but almost certain profit to the
At the same time the price of the warrant will usually

advance to its theoretical value.
Royer cites the perpetual warrants of Alleghany Corporation as an
example of arbitrage.

In 1961 approximately 45 percent of its 2,000,000

warrants were exercised by arbitrageurs because the theoretical value of
the warrants exceeded their market price.
An increase in the dividends on the underlying common stock may
also induce the exercise of warrants.

Theoretically exercise would

occur when the cash dividend return on the exercise price of the common
stock exceeded the cost of funds required for the exercise.

Royer cites

^®P. Royer, "Long-Term Warrants as Financing Instruments," (un
published Doctor's dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1970), p.
138.
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Glenn L. Martin Company warrants as an example.
issued in 1952, Martin was not paying a dividend.

When these warrants were
In 1954, when the

company began paying a cash dividend of $1 per share, approximately 95
percent of the warrants were exercised.

The $1 dividend represented a

return of 10.5 percent on the exercise price of $9 .5 0 .^9
For completeness of discussion, two other factors which may in
duce the exercise of warrants should be mentioned at this point, although
these factors have been discussed previously in this chapter.-’®

A

temporary reduction in the exercise price may result in the exercise of
some warrants.

Or, if the warrants are callable, a call for redemption

of the issue will result in exercise if the theoretical value of the war
rant is above the call price.
In summary, the potential dilution of shares outstanding of the
90 companies issuing warrants must be considered material.

Further,

although the median potential dilution of all companies over all time
periods is 20.0 percent, it has increased from 19.4 percent during the
1967-1968 period to 30.0 percent during the 1969-1971 time period.

The

implication is that the dilution of earnings per share of those companies
issuing warrants is likely to increase in the future if these warrant
issues with higher potential dilution are exercised.
In general, potential dilution is higher for warrant issues in
which the exercise price is set high in relation to the underlying common
stock price.

The treasury stock method, however, does not recognize

49Ibid., p. 144.
■*®See pages 122-123 and pages 127-131.
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this higher potential dilution until the market price of the common stock
exceeds the exercise price of the warrants.

The result is that warrants

with less potential dilution, many of which are issued at lower exercise
prices in relation to their related common stock prices, are reflected
in earnings per share earlier than issues with greater potential dilution.
Evidence presented in this section indicates that the relation
ship between the exercise price of the warrant and the underlying common
stock price has little or no bearing on the ultimate number of warrants
which will be exercised and, hence, on the dilution of earnings per
share except in the period immediately preceding the expiration date of
the warrant or, in some cases, the period immediately preceding an
escalation of the exercise price.

During such periods, the relationship

between the exercise price of the warrant and the market price of the
common does assume importance in that a condition precedent to exercise
is that the theoretical value of the warrant be positive.

Many of the

warrants will be exercised if the common price exceeds the exercise
price; none will be exercised if the exercise price is greater than the
common price.

The conclusion is that determination of the common stock

equivalence status of warrants on the basis of a relationship between
the exercise price of the warrants and their underlying common stock
price has no validity except in the period immediately before the expira
tion date.
Many warrants expire without exercise.

The median percentage

of exercise-of the warrants in this study was only 59 percent.

This

median is highest when the exercise price is set in the range from 95 to
114 percent of the common stock price on date of issue.

However, even
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when the exercise price is high in relation to the common stock price,
some warrant issues are exercised.

Of the six warrant issues in this

study with exercise prices higher than 135 percent of their respective
common stock prices on date of issue, 80 percent or more of the warrants
of two issues were exercised.

This ratio of 33 1/3 percent compares

favorably with a ratio of only 50 percent for the entire 20 issues in
which there were 10 issues having 80 percent or more of their warrants
exercised.

In formulating guidelines for earnings-per-share computa

tions, the fact that many warrant issues are not exercised must be con
sidered.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Warrants have been used by companies in many industry groups.
They were particularly popular with conglomerates during the period when
APB Opinion No. 9 was in effect.

While there were other reasons, such

as the high level of merger activity, for using warrants during this
period, part of their popularity must be attributed to the fact that war
rants were not considered residual securities under the opinion.
Although warrant issues by conglomerates have declined since
early 1969, usage by companies in other industries has increased to the
extent that the number of issues continues to increase.

Along with the

greater number of issues there is also an increase in the potential
dilution of each issue.

Both the increased usage and the increased

potential dilution of each issue can be attributed to the popularity of
real estate investment trusts as tax shelters.

Dividends per share of

these trusts may exceed earnings per share as computed under APB Opinion

156

No. 15 for extended periods of time because of tax regulations in regard
to the distribution of earnings and because of assumptions made with
respect to warrants by the opinion.
Warrants are usually attached to other securities issued for
purposes of:

(1) raising cash, (2) acquiring the securities of another

corporation, and (3) reorganization or recapitalization.

The primary

purpose of attaching warrants is to facilitate the sale or exchange of
the securities to which the warrants are attached.

Even when warrants

are issued alone as distributions to stockholders, the fundamental pur
pose of the issue does not appear to be that of raising future equity
capital.

Instead, the basic reason appears to be that of establishing

a market for the warrants which will then be used as a merger currency
in future acquisitions.

Regardless of management's reasons for issuing

warrants, the possible effect is the issuance of additional equity
securities, perhaps at an exercise price well below the current market
price if the warrants are exercised.
Management has much flexibility in setting the terms for its war
rant issues.

Unfortunately, all terms must be included in the agreement

when the warrants are originally issued.

Terms which appear to provide

some degree of control over an issue may be valueless 5 or 10 years
later when management desires to force the exercise of an issue or to
terminate its life without exercise.
control initially include:

Terms over which management has

(1) initial exercise price, (2) changes in

the exercise price, (3) means of payment of the exercise price, (4)
warrant life, and (5) changes in warrant life.
In setting warrant terms management must strike a balance between
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its goals and those of warrant investors because of conflicting interests.
For example, the call privilege allows management more certainty in
financial planning through the ability to force the exercise or the re
demption of an issue.

Few warrant issues include the call privilege,

however, because of its detrimental effect on warrant prices.

Similarly,

the temporary-reduction-of-exercise-price feature is not permitted for
warrants listed on the American Exchange because it is not conducive to
an orderly warrant market.
The exercise price tends to be higher with respect to the market
price of the underlying common stock when warrants are issued to a cor
poration's own security holders.

This is true whether the warrants are

distributed to the stockholders as a dividend, attached to common stock
issued on a preemptive basis, or issued in a reorganization or recapi
talization.

On the other hand, when warrants are attached to debt

instruments in a public offering or issued in a merger or acquisition,
the exercise price tends to be lower with respect to the common stock
price.

Warrants with a low exercise price add more value per warrant to

the total financial package than warrants with a higher exercise price.
At the same time, however, these warrants are more likely to result in
dilution of current stockholders' equity because the likelihood of exer
cise is greater.
The potential dilution of shares outstanding per warrant issue
or series is increasing, suggesting that dilution in earnings per share
will also increase.

For the time period under study, the average poten

tial dilution is 20 percent; however, it is 30 percent for the 1969-1971
period.

Potential dilution for warrants which expired between 1950 and
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1971, however, is considerably higher than actual dilution, 10.4 percent
versus 2.1 percent.

This difference is largely due to the fact that many

warrant issues are not exercised.

Of the 20 issues that expired during

Lheperiod under study, 10 had an exercise ratio
and

10 had a ratio greater than 79 percent.

of less than 40

percent

The median exercise ratio

was approximately 59 percent.
Warrants are generally not exercised until shortly before their
expiration date.

Exercise prior to the expiration date, however, will

sometimes occur if any of the following factors is present:

(1) an

escalation in the exercise price, (2) large stock dividend declared and
warrants are not protected against dilution, (3) theoretical value of
warrant exceeds its market price, (4) an increase in dividends on the
underlying common stock, (5) a temporary reduction in the exercise price,
or (6) a call for redemption when the theoretical value of the warrant
is above the call price.
The
clusion that

data presented and analyzed in this chapter lead to

the con

a number of warrant characteristics need to be considered

in the formulation of earnings-per-share computational guidelines.

A

discussion of these characteristics follows.
1.

Warrants are not a part of the legal common equity.

they are merely a contractual right to purchase common stock.

Warrant-

holders have no voice in management, and they do not participate in divi
dends except to the extent that their warrants are protected against
dilution.

This point is demonstrated by the experience of certain real

estate investment trusts cited in this chapter.

Due to the tax regu

lations of these trusts in regard to income distribution and to the

Instead,
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inclusion of warrants as common stock equivalents, dividends per share
may exceed earnings per share.

The fact that warrants are not legal

common equity is, therefore, a characteristic which must be considered
in formulating earnings-per-share computational guidelines.
2.

Warrants are not issued for the primary purpose of raising

common equity, although additional common equity will result if the war
rants are exercised.

Instead, management attaches warrants to other

securities in order to facilitate their sale and lower interest or divi
dend rates.

Since the financial statements reflect these benefits from

the date of issue of the warrants, consideration should be given to
apprising stockholders of the potential cost of these benefits in terms
of dilution of their equity.

Earnings per share is perhaps the most

feasible method for accomplishing this purpose.
3.

Warrants are not purchased for the primary purpose of acquir

ing common equity.

The use of warrants for this purpose would be illogi

cal because warrants almost invariably trade at a premium above their
theoretical value.
offer investors.

Rather, warrants are purchased for the leverage they
A given change in the price of the underlying common

stock will usually produce a greater change in the warrant price.
result is a greater profit (or loss) per dollar invested.

The

Warrant

purchasers, therefore, favor the warrants of companies whose common stock
has a history of high volatility.
4.

Unless the warrant agreement contains special features or

unusual circumstances occur, the majority of warrants which are ulti
mately exercised are not exercised until the period immediately prior to
their expiration date.

This characteristic is a complement of the
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preceding characteristic; namely, warrants are purchased for the leverage
they offer rather than for the purpose of acquiring common stock.
Special features which may induce exercise prior to the expiration date
include exercise price escalations, temporary reduction of the exercise
price, or a call provision.

Warrants may also be exercised prior to their

expiration due to an increase in the dividends paid on the underlying
common stock.

Stock dividends may also be a factor if the warrants are

not protected by an anti-dilution provision.
5.

Many warrants are never exercised.

The basic reason for non

exercise is the failure of the issue to meet one of the conditions prece
dent to exercise which is that the theoretical value of the warrant must
be positive in the period immediately preceding the expiration date of
the warrant.
6.

Earnings-per-share computations should consider this factor.
In general, the lower the exercise price of the warrant is

in relation to the price of the underlying common stock on the date of
issue, the greater the value that the warrants will add to the security
package being offered.

As a result, fewer warrants can be offered per

unit of capital solicited.
7.

Ceteris paribus, the lower the exercise price of the warrant

in relation to the related common stock price on the date of issue, the
greater is the likelihood that the warrant will be exercised.

This is

merely a reflection of the fact that the market price of the common stock
must exceed the exercise price of the warrant in the period immediately
preceding the expiration date of the warrant if exercise is to occur.
The lower the exercise price is in relation to the common price, the
higher the probability that this condition will prevail.
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8.

On the average, the higher the exercise price of the warrant

in relation to the price of the underlying common stock on the date of
issue, the greater potential dilution of shares outstanding is likely to
be.

This follows as a corollary to Characteristic No. 6.

When the ex

ercise price is high in relation to the common price, each warrant con
tributes less value to the total package.

Therefore more warrants per

unit of capital are likely to be issued in a given transaction.
ever, actual dilution of shares outstanding may be less.

How

As pointed out

in Characteristic No. 7, the probability of exercise is less when the
exercise price is high in relation to the common price.
9.

Except in the period immediately preceding the expiration

of the warrant, the relationship between the exercise price of the war
rant and the market price of the underlying common stock has no bearing
on the ultimate number of warrants which will be exercised.

This is true

unless unusual conditions such as a substantial increase in the dividend
rate of the common stock cause exercise prior to the expiration of the
warrant.

The relationship between the exercise price and the common

price does assume importance in the period in which the warrant expires.
If the market price of the common stock exceeds the exercise price of
the warrant, then practically all warrants will be exercised.

If the

market price of the common is lower than the exercise price during this
period, then the warrants will expire without exercise.
Several of the preceding warrant characteristics could be used
to support the argument that warrants are not common stock equivalents.
For example, management does not issue warrants for the purpose of
raising future common equity.

Nor does the investor purchase warrants
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for the purpose of acquiring common equity.

Legally, warrants are not

common equity until they are exercised, and, in fact, many issues are not
exercised.
The fact remains, however, that any value a warrant may have is
derived, directly or indirectly, from the value of the underlying common
stock.

Further, issuance of warrants is a management decision which may

result in dilution of a current stockholder's equity.

Current stock

holders should, therefore, be informed of the results of this decision in
terms of its potential cost as well as its benefits.
These factors, as well as the attributes of earnings per share,
will be considered in Chapter 5 in formulating guidelines for computing
earnings per share of companies with warrants outstanding.

The common

stock equivalency concept of APB Opinion No. 15 will be analyzed in
Chapter 4 for this same purpose.

Chapter 4

THE CONCEPT OF COMMON STOCK EQUIVALENTS

The concept of common stock equivalents evolved from the residual
security concept and is the end product of the Accounting Principles
Board's efforts to make the residual security concept operational while
retaining as much of the original theory as possible.

The resolution

of conflicts between theory and practice was no easy task.

The Board

spent over a year on the problem and prepared at least eight drafts of
APB Opinion No. 15 in the process.

A knowledge of the residual security

concept and the problems of application presented by its theory is there
fore essential to an understanding of the concept of common stock equiva
lents.

A review of both concepts, in terms of the problems presented by

the residual concept and the solutions adopted by the concept of common
stock equivalents, will be helpful in formulating guidelines for the
earnings-per-share computations of companies with warrants outstanding.

BACKGROUND--THE RESIDUAL SECURITY CONCEPT

The term residual security was first used by the Committee on
Accounting Procedure in Accounting Research Bulletin No. 4 9 .

This bulle

tin, issued in April, 1958, made reference to the term as follows:
. . . Where used without qualification, the term earnings per
share should be used to designate the amount applicable to each
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share of common stock or other residual security outstand-

m g . . . .1

Since the bulletin offered no. suggestions as to what types of
securities might be included in the other residual security category,
the purpose of this section is to determine the reasons for the develop
ment of the residual concept in APB Opinion No. 9 and to investigate the
theory of the residual concept.

In addition, the criteria for deter

mining residual status under APB Opinion No. 9

and the Accounting

Principles Board's early efforts to codify guidelines for determining
residual status in its revision of APB Opinion No. 9 are examined.

Reasons for Development
The earnings-per-share literature during the period following the
issuance of Accounting Research Bulletin No. 49 ignores residual securi
ties completely.

Rappaport, in his SEC Accounting Practice and Procedure,

does cite a situation in which two classes of common stock are combined
to compute earnings per share for registration statement purposes.

He

does not, however, use the term "residual security."
Rappaport's illustration deals with privately owned companies
which rearrange their capitalization before going public.

Frequently

these companies provide for two classes of common stock, Class A and
Class B.

Both classes are alike in all respects except that Class B is

entitled to a small dividend and is convertible into Class A at any time.
The owners offer Class A shares to the public and retain the Class B

^■Committee on Accounting Procedure of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Earnings per Share, Accounting Research
Bulletin No. 49 (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1958), p. 30.
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shares.

Rappaport concludes that, because of the unrestricted converti

bility, it is proper to combine the two classes to compute earnings per
share p"
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 49 remained in effect until
December, 1966 when it was replaced by APB Opinion No. 9 .
in Chapter 1,

3

As discussed

investor interest in common stocks and other securities

had increased tremendously during this period.
had increased almost threefold.

The number of mergers

With mergers came a variety of complex

securities designed to meet the needs of the acquiring company's
management and the acquired company's security holders.
The increasing use of convertible preferred stock for merger pur
poses appeared to be a major concern of the Accounting Principles Board.
This concern was indicated by Frank T. Weston in the following statement:
The genesis of the problem is the increasing vogue of con
vertible preferred stock. While convertible debt issues have
had a fairly lengthy period of renewed popularity beginning a
number of years ago, convertible preferreds have only lately
come into widespread use, particularly those types with unusual
characteristics.4

Louis H. Rappaport, SEC Accounting Practice and Procedure (2d
ed.; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1966), pp. 8.33-8.34.
Rappaport concludes, however, that if the conversion and divident rights
are limited--for example, until certain levels of earnings are
achieved--two earnings per share figures, one assuming conversion, may
be necessary for full disclosure of the situation. This latter point is
in accordance with Accounting Research Bulletin No. 4 9 . See Committee
on Accounting Procedure of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Earnings per Share, Accounting Research Bulletin No. 49
(New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1958),
p. 32.
See page 2.
^Frank T. Weston, "Increased Emphasis on Reporting Earnings per
Share," Financial Analysts Journal. XXIII (July-August, 1967), 49.

Weston explained the reasons for the development of these con
vertible preferred stocks as follows:
. . . It appears that they were the response of ingenuous cor
porate managers to a combination of various pressures, including
such diverse and apparently unrelated ones as (a) the desire to
achieve poolings of interests accounting for a proposed business
combination, thus necessitating a type of equity or ownership
security, (b) the desire to obtain immediate earnings leverage
following the combination by limiting the dividend requirements
applicable to the stock to be issued, so that the hoped-for
increase in earnings of the acquired entity would improve the
earnings applicable to the common shares, (c) the necessity, in
many cases as a condition of the proposed combination, to pay
cash dividends in amounts equivalent to those previously
received by the stockholders of the company being acquired and (d)
the requirement that some features be added to the stock for the
above purposes which would permit the recipients to share in the
long-range potential of the combined business.^
Convertible preferred stock and convertible debt posed a dif
ficult problem of valuation for analysts and investors in general.

To

the extent that their valuation is based on fixed dividend or interest
features--senior security characteristics--convertible securities could
be considered equivalent to other preferred stock or debt.

However, to

the extent that their valuation is based on conversion rights--a residual
or equity security characteristic--these complex securities are more in
the nature of common stock.

As such, they share in the earnings and in

the growth potential of the company in essentially the same manner as a
true equity security.^
Under these circumstances, the Accounting Principles Board con
cluded that the conventional method of computing earnings per share might

•*Ibid.

6Ibid., 49-50.
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be inappropriate.

This is explained by Weston as follows:

The marketplace realistically evaluated the various charac
teristics, and it became clear, particularly in the more extreme
cases, that, under certain conditions, these complex securities
were basically equivalent to common shares. When such a deter
mination could be made, it also became apparent that the classic
method of computation of earnings per share applicable to the
common shares was not appropriate; it would be improper to
attribute all the earnings (above the preferred fixed dividend
requirements) to the common shares when these complex preferred
shares were, due to their forms, also entitled to share in the
economic benefits of such earnings.
A method of overcoming this weakness in the classic method of
computation when applied to these complex "residual-type"
preferred stocks was therefore necessary .1

Theory of the Residual Concept
In order to solve the problem, the Accounting Principles Board
developed the residual security concept that had been alluded to in
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 4 9 .

Residual securities were defined

in APB Opinion No. 9 as follows:
. . . When more than one class of common stock is outstanding,
or when an outstanding security has participating dividend rights
with the common stock, or when an outstanding security clearly
derives a major portion of its value from its conversion rights
or its common stock characteristics, such securities should be
considered "residual securities" and not "senior securities" for
purposes of computing earnings per share.®
The term earnings per share, therefore, included actual shares
of common stock outstanding as well as shares potentially issuable under

^Ibid., 50. Although this reference refers specifically to con
vertible preferred stock, Weston indicates on page 52 of the article that
convertible debt issues may also qualify as residual securities.
Q
Accounting Pronciples Board of the American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants, Reporting the Results of Operations, Opinions
of the Accounting Principles Board, No. 9 (New York: American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1967), p. 120.
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the terms of those securities classified as residual.

APB Opinion No. 9

also required supplementary pro forma computations of earnings per share
to disclose material potential dilution by other contingent issuances
of common shares not included as residual securities in the earnings per
share computation.

Such contingent issuances included " . . .

(a) out

standing senior stock or debt which is convertible into common shares,
(b) outstanding stock options, warrants or similar agreements and (c)
agreements for the issuance of common shares for little or no consideraQ
tion upon the satisfaction of certain conditions . . . ."

The Board

strongly recommended that both earnings-per-share computations be dis
closed in the statement of income.
As a theory, the residual security concept was conceptually
sound.

A security was residual if it derived a substantial portion of

its value from its common stock characteristics rather than from its
investment value as a senior security.

Under these circumstances the

value of the security is dependent, to some extent, upon the value of
the related common stock.

The value of the common stock, in turn, is

dependent, in part at least, upon its earning power.

This earning power,

under the terns of the residual issue, may be shared with the residual
security owners.

The residual security concept, therefore, leads to

the conclusion that residual securities should be treated as common stock
for purposes of computing earnings per share.
The residual security concept is supported by a number of the
basic accounting concepts which underlie generally accepted accounting

9Ibid., p. 123.
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principles.

Comment on two of these concepts is appropriate because

critics have used the logic on which these concepts are based as argu
ments against the residual concept.

These concepts are substance over

form and approximation.^

Substance over form.

Critics have argued that, legally, residual

securities are not common stock since residual security holders do not
generally have the usual rights associated with common stock.

Such

security holders do not vote or participate in dividends with common
shareholders.

These critics therefore argue that residual securities

should not be included in the earnings-per-share computations.

This

line of reasoning ignores the well-established concept of substance over
form.

The concept is explained by the Accounting Principles Board as

follows:
. . . Usually the economic substance of events to be accounted
for agrees with the legal form. Sometimes, however, substance and
form differ. Accountants emphasize the substance of events rather
than their form so that the information provided reflects the
economic activities represented.^
The fact that residual securities are not legally common stock is, there
fore, not a valid reason for rejecting the residual security concept.

^These concepts are called features by the Accounting Principles
Board. See Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles
Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises, Statement of
the Accounting Principles Board No. 4 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1970), pp. 44-48.
1 ^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants, Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Under
lying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises, Statement of the
Accounting Principles Board No. 4 (New York; American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1970), p. 48.
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If residual securities are in substance the equivalent of common stock,
their inclusion in the computation of earnings per share may result in
a better presentation of the economic realities of the situation.

Approximation. Another criticism raised by opponents of the re
sidual security concept is the necessity of estimates in classifying
securities as residual.

Under APB Opinion No. 9 a security was residual

if it derived a substantial portion of its value from its common stock
characteristics.

In practice this meant estimating the security's in

vestment value from its senior security characteristics and comparing
this estimate with its total value.

The investment value estimate was

usually determined by capitalizing the security's cash yield at a rate
appropriate for the risk assumptions.

The necessity of estimates in

determining residual status does not invalidate the residual security
concept since approximation is a basic concept of accounting.

Estimates

are necessary if accounting is to provide timely information.***

Criteria for Determining Residual
Status under APB Opinion No. 9
Under the residual concept " . . .

neither conversion nor the

imminence of conversion is necessary to cause a security to be a common
stock equivalent."

13

The right to convert and the fact that the secur

ity is deriving a substantial portion of its value from that right are

***Ibid., pp. 46-47.
13
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings
per Share. November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 6.
(Mimeographed.)
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factors that make the security a residual one.

An integral part of the

original residual security concept theory was the fact that the residual
equity of a corporation (hence its capital structure) may change as the
result of fluctuations in the securities and money markets.

14

The num

ber of shares used in the earnings-per-share computation, therefore,
could vary from period to period in accordance with market fluctuations
even though the actual common shares outstanding remained constant.

To

be consistent, the theory did not permit retroactive adjustments of
prior period earnings-per-share statistics when changes in residual
status occurred.

The reason for this conclusion was that financial

statements are primarily historical in nature and should reflect the
capitalization structure as it existed during each period presented.^
Potential dilution of earnings per share was not one of the
criteria for establishing residual status under APB Opinion No. 9 .
Potential dilution could not be a criterion if the residual concept was
to be internally consistent because, under certain conditions, a secur
ity classified as residual could increase earnings per share.

In

contrast, the sole criterion for including convertible and option
securities in supplementary pro forma earnings per share was the poten
tial dilution of earnings per share.

APB Opinion No. 9 strongly

recommended disclosure of supplementary pro forma earnings per share if
earnings per share might be subject to dilution through contingencies
permitting the issuance of common shares in the future.

^^Ibid., pp. 6-7.

1f i

The resulting

15Ibid., pp. 8-9.

^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Reporting the Results of Operations. Opinions
of the Accounting Principles Board, No. y (New York; American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1967), pp. 123-124.
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inconsistency

between the two methods of computing earnings per share was

resolved by the Board by excluding residual securities from the dilu
tion requirements of pro forma earnings per share.

Early Efforts to Codify Guidelines
for Residual Status
During the two years in which APB Opinion No. 9 was in effect,
the concept of residual securities became " . . .

established in the

financial community as a logical approach to the computation of earnings
per share

when complex securities with common stock characteristics are

outstanding."

18

However, the concept presented certain implimentation

problems which were inherent in the theory.

The Accounting Principles

Board's first published effort aimed at resolving these conflicts be
tween theory and practice was an exposure draft circulated to members of
the Institute and the financial community in November, 1968.

In this

and earlier drafts, the Board chose to adhere almost literally to the
residual concept.

In fact, the exposure draft merely clarified the

residual concept of APB Opinion No. 9 and furnished guidelines to provide
consistency in its application.

The Board's efforts to codify guidelines

for determining the residual status of convertible securities and war
rants are discussed in this section.

Convertible securities.

APB Opinion No. 9 provided no specific

17Ibid., p. 123.
^•®Frank T. Weston and Sidney Davidson, "What Will Accounting
Changes Do to Earnings?" Financial Analysts Journal. XXIV (SeptemberOctober, 1968), 59.
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guidelines for determining the residual status of securities other than
that contained in the definition of residual securities.

Consequently

the "major-portion-of-value" test in the definition of residual securi
ties by APB Opinion No. 9 was used to determine the residual status of
convertible securities.

The Accounting Principles Board described the

procedure as follows:
. . . In practice this test has been applied by comparing a
convertible security's market value with its investment value,
and the security has been considered to be residual whenever
more than half its market value was attributable to its common
stock characteristics at time of issuance. Practice has varied
in applying this test subsequent to issuance with a higher
measure used in many cases. Thus, a convertible security's
status as a residual security has been affected by equity and
debt market conditions at and after the security's issuance.
Most of the Board's early efforts in revising APB Opinion No. 9
were directed towards establishing guidelines to determine the residual
status of convertible securities.

The objective was to provide for a

consistency of application in practice within the framework of the re
sidual concept.

The basic criterion for determining the residual status

of convertible securities, the relationship between the convertible
security's market price and its investment value, was retained.

20

A

19
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants, Earnings per Share. Opinions of the Accounting
Principles Board, No. 15 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 220.
20

uAn alternate method of determining residual status, called the
market parity test, was also considered by the Board. It was first
presented in the Lytle-Schuetze Draft dated October 3, 1968 and retained
as a possible option in the exposure draft of November 6, 1968. The mar
ket parity test compares the convertible security's market value to the
market value of the security into which it is convertible. If the market
prices of the two securities are substantially equivalent, the conver
tible security is considered to be residual. The advantage of this test,
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convertible security, however, was classified as residual if its market
price was 150 percent or more of its investment value on the date of
issue whereas 200 percent had been used under APB Opinion No. 9 .

Guide

lines were also established for determining the residual status after
issuance and for determining reversion to nonresidual status.

In an

effort to prevent frequent changes in status caused by temporary fluctua
tions in market prices, the Board established a minimum period for which
a given status would remain in effect.

Various guidelines for deter

mining the residual status of convertible securities under the invest
ment value test were considered by the Board.

Those considered through

the date of the exposure draft of November 6, 1968 are shown in Table 23.

Warrants.

The November 6, 1968 exposure draft also clarified

the status of warrants as residual securities.

Practitioners had not
21

considered warrants residual under APB Opinion No. 9 .
for treating warrants as nonresidual is not clear.

The rationale

Certainly warrants

derive a major portion of their value from their common stock

as compared with the investment value test described above, is the use
of more readily available market prices. Thus the problem of estimating
the investment value of a convertible security is eliminated. A
majority of the Board preferred the investment value test because it more
directly supported the tenets of the residual concept as presented in APB
Opinion No. 9 . See Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, Lytle-Schuetze Draft, Proposed APB
Opinion: Earnings per Share, October 3, 1968 (New York: American Insti
tute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), pp. 20-21 and
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings per
Share, November 6, 1968 (New York; American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), pp. 8 and 27.
^Samuel L. Hayes, III and Henry B. Reiling, "Sophisticated
Financing Tool: The Warrant," Harvard Business Review, XLVII (JanuaryFebruary, 1969), 144.
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Table 23. Various Guidelines Considered by the Accounting Principles
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants for
Determining the Residual Status of Convertible Securities under the
Investment Value Test

Total Value of Convertible Security as a
Percentage of Its Investment Value
To Classify as Residual

Date of
Draft

On Date of
Issue

8/28/68

150% or more

Subsequent to
Date of Issue

To Revert to
Nonresidua 1
Status

100% or less

6 months
6 months
3 months

1007, or less

6 months
6 months
3 months

100% or less

6 months
6 months
6 months

110%, or less

6 months
6 months
6 months

200% or more

9/18/68

150% or more
2007c, or more

10/3/68

150% or more
150% or more

11/6/68

Period in
Status before
Change of
Status
Permitted

150% or more
200% or more

Source: Compiled from drafts of the proposed earnings per share
opinion prepared by the Accounting Principles Board of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
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characteristics.

In fact, warrants have no senior security character

istics nor do they have an investment value because they do not pay
interest or dividends.
Hayes and Reiling, although opposed to the idea that warrants
were nonresidual, offered the following reasons why warrants might have
been considered nonresidual:
Furthermore, since warrants, unlike common stock, do not
represent ownership in a company, they carry no voting rights, no
rights to dividends, and no claim on assets in liquidation. In
addition, a fixed price must be paid the issuer on their exercise;
they are merely contract rights like options and are therefore
not within the traditional debt or equity balance sheet classifi
cation; and, finally, they are arguably not even "securities."
These are grounds for the claim that a warrant does not have enough
common stock characteristics to conform to the second part of the
APB's definition of residuals.22
Perhaps the Board did not specifically include warrants in its
definition of residual securities because the use of warrants had
declined drastically in the middle 1960's when APB Opinion No. 9 was
written.

23

However, by 1968 when the exposure draft for APB Opinion No.

15 was being written, there was some evidence that warrants were being
used as a substitute for convertible securities in order to avoid the
adverse effect of residual securities on earnings per share.
ample, only five warrant

For ex

issues listed on the American Stock Exchange

during the period from 1960 through 1966 originated in conjunction with
mergers and acquisitions.

There were, however, 11 such issues during

22Ibid.
23

See page 77 on this point.
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1967 and 1968.^

In late 1968 and early 1969 corporations began using

warrants in lieu of cash or stock dividends.^

And in October, 1968

LTV, Inc. made liberal use of warrants as part of a unit of securities
26

offered in exchange for its common stock. °

This employment of warrants

in new areas, as well as the increased usage of warrants generally, prob
ably influenced the Board to include warrants as a residual security in
the November 6, 1968 exposure draft.
In the formulation of guidelines for the classification of war
rants as residual securities, the Board in early drafts appeared to
equate the relationship between the exercise price of warrants and the
market price of the underlying common stock with the relationship be
tween the market price of a convertible security and its investment
value.

A comparison of Tables 23 and 24 indicates that the respective

relationships, expressed as percentages, were the same in the August and
September, 1968 drafts.

In subsequent drafts, the residual status of

warrants was made more inclusive by reducing the percentages.
The classification of warrants as residual securities presented
the Board with an additional problem not encountered in convertible se
curities.

The exercise of warrants usually results in a receipt of funds

ly the issuing corporation.

Therefore some assumption must be made as to

the use of these funds and the return thereon.

As indicated in Table 24,

the Board considered several methods of imputing a return on the funds

^ S e e Table 2, page 89. For further discussion of the use of
warrants for mergers and acquisitions related specifically to con
glomerates, see pages 82 and 84.
25

See pages 101-103.

26

See pages 104-105.

Table 24. Various Guidelines Considered by the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants for Determining the Residual Status of Warrants and the Assumed Use
of Funds from Exercise

Date of
Draft

Market Price of Underlying Common Stock
as a Percentage of
Exercise Price of Warrant
To Classify as Residual
To Revert to
Nonresidual
Subsequent to
On Date of
Issue
Date of Issue
Status

8/28/68

150%, or more

1, 2, 3, 4

100% or less

1, 2, 3, 4

100% or less

6 months
6 months
3 months

1, 2, 3, 4

100% or less

6 months
6 months
6 months

1, 5, 2, 3

100% or less

6 months
6 months
6 months

150% or more
200% or more

10/3/68

125% or more
125%, or more

11/6/68

Assumed Use of
Funds from
Exercise3

6 months
6 months
3 months

200% or more

9/16/68

Period in Status
before Change of
Status Permitted

125% or more
150% or more

Source: Compiled from drafts of the proposed earnings per share opinion prepared by the Accounting
Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
aKey to the assumed use of funds:
(1) Consistent with the company's financial policies; (2)
The rate of interest being paid on outstanding debt, less tax-effect; (3) An assumed investment in
government or similar obligations, less tax-erfect; (41 The assumed use of funds to purchase stock of
the issuing company at current price; (5) The current borrowing rate of the company, less tax-effect.
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assumed to be received from exercise.

This problem will be considered

in the following section of this chapter.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF
COMMON STOCK EQUIVALENTS

The exposure draft of November 6, 1968 was circulated to the
full membership of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun
tants and to other interested members of the financial community.

As

previously discussed, this draft adhered almost literally to the original
residual concept.

As a result, the emphasis of the draft was on the

codification of guidelines for determining the status of residual securi
ties .
The magnitude of the opposition to the residual concept was per
haps surprising in view of Weston and Davidson's statement of its accep
tance by the financial community.27

As indicated in Table 25, many

influential accounting and finance organizations disapproved of the
concept as it was presented in the exposure draft.

The Accounting

Principles Board also received many letters from corporate executives
expressing dissatisfaction with the concept.

The Financial Executives

Institute, in a poll of its members, found that 74 percent of those
responding disapproved of the concept as interpreted by the exposure
draft.28
As a result of the broad opposition to the residual concept as

27See page 172.
28"propOSed APB Opinions on 'Earnings per Share' and 'Accounting
for Convertible Debt and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase Warrants,"'
Financial Executive, XXXVIII (March, 1969), 12.
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Table 25. Summary of Selected Comments of Certain Accounting and Finance
Organizations on the November 6, 1968 Exposure Draft of the Proposed
Opinion on Earnings per Share by the Accounting Principles Board of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Organizations a
Comments

1

2

3

4

5

X

X

X

X

6

7

8

X

X

Residual Concept in General
Approve with reservations
Disapprove

X

X
X

X

Guidelines for Determining Residual Status
of Convertible Securities
Prefer investment values test
Prefer market parity test
Prefer test based on dilutive effect of
other securities on earnings per share
of common stock

X
X

X

Assumptions as to Use of Warrant Proceeds
Prefer those recommended in exposure
draft
Prefer other assumptions

X
X

Objections to Proposed Opinion
General
Too complex and confusing
Determination of earnings per share not
an accounting issue, but one of
security valuation
The method of calculating a particular
earnings-per-share figure is a func
tion of the purpose of the figure

X

X

X

X

X

Specific
Change of status between residual and
nonresidua 1
Prohibition of restatement of earnings
per share to reflect changes in re
sidual status
Increase in primary earnings per share
caused by residual securities
Changes in earnings per share caused
solely by changes in market price of
securities

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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Table 25 (Continued)
Organizations3
Comments

1

2

3

4

5

X

X

X

X

6

7

8

X

X

Specific (continued)
Arbitrary selection of residual guidelines
Fully diluted earnings per share should
include securities which increase earn
ings per share
Earnings-per-share figures which are pro
forma should be labelled as such. Both
earnings-per-share figures in exposure
draft are pro forma

X

X

Alternate Proposal
Two earnings per share, one based on
actual common shares outstanding and
the other assuming full dilution

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Source; Compiled from comment letters received by the Accounting Prin
ciples Board in response to their Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion;
Earnings per Share, November 6, 1968.
aKey to organizations responding:
(1) Securities and Exchange
Commission; (2) Corporate Reporting Committee of the Financial Execu
tives Institute; (3) Financial Accounting Policy Committee of the
Financial Analysts Federation; (4) Accounting and Auditing Research
Committee and Research Staff of the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants; (5) Airline Finance and Accounting Conference; (6) Retail
Committee on Accounting Principles of the Controllers Congress of the
National Retail Merchants Association; (7) Task Force Committee of
American Accounting Association on Exposure Drafts of Proposed APB
Opinions on Accounting for Convertible Debt and Debt Issued with Stock
Purchase Warrants and Earnings per Share dated November 6, 1968;
(8) Corporation Finance Committee of the Investment Bankers Associa
tion of America.
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presented in the exposure draft, the Accounting Principles Board made
extensive changes in the concept.

Consequently, the term residual was

abandoned in favor of the term common stock equivalents in all drafts
prepared subsequent to the exposure draft of November 6, 1968.

Footnote

1 of the February 24, 1969 draft explained the change as follows:
. . . APB Opinion No. 9 refers to certain securities as residual
securities and the determination of residual status is based upon
the market value of the security as it relates to investment value.
In this Opinion, the Board establishes the term common stock equiva
lents as being more descriptive of the classes of securities other
than common stock which should be considered in the determination
of primary earnings per share. Underlying concepts which is [sic.]
somewhat similar to the residual concept and the criteria for de
termining common stock equivalent status are set forth in this
Opinion. 9
The concept of common stock equivalents, therefore, evolved as
a result of the Board's modification of the residual concept.

This

modification was necessary in order to provide guidelines for computing
earnings per share which could be implemented in practice on a consis
tent basis.

Most of the objections to the residual concept were a

result of the basic theory that securities could move in and out of
residual status through changes in market prices or investment values.
This problem of changes in residual status, which destroyed the interperiod and intercompany comparability of earnings per share, was height
ened by virtue of the impossibility of devising guidelines for determining
residual status which were not arbitrary.
Major problem areas created by the residual concept were the

2Q
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants, Draft, Proposed APB Opinion; Earnings per
Share. February 24, 1969 (New York; American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 2.
(Mimeographed.)
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retroactive adjustment of earnings per share for changes in residual
status, the enhancement of earnings per share by residual securities,
and the use of funds from the assumed exercise of warrants.

The Account

ing Principles Board had considered these problems in formulating the
guidelines set forth in the exposure draft but the solution of some of
these problems would have required abandonment or extensive modification
of the residual concept.

Since the Board had chosen to retain the re

sidual concept of APB Opinion No. 9 , the guidelines provided by the
exposure draft did little to resolve these problems.

Having failed in

its attempt to adapt the theory of the residual concept to practice, the
Board in effect reversed its mode of operation.

It resolved the prob

lems created by the residual concept on a practical basis in terms of
the desired end results and then created the concept of common stock
equivalents to support those results.
A discussion of the major problem areas which the Board encoun
tered in its attempt to make the residual concept operational follows.
In general, the organization of the discussion of each problem area is
as follows:

(1) a description of the problem, (2) the solution adopted

by the exposure draft of November 6, 1968, (3) the reaction of the
financial community as expressed in comment letters to the Board, and
(4) the resolution of the problem under the concept of common stock equi
valents in APB Opinion No. 15.

Retroactive Adjustment for
Changes in Residual Status
The question of whether or not the change in status of a security
from nonresidual to residual or vice versa should affect the
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earnings-per-share computations only on a prospective basis or also
retroactively presented the Accounting Principles Board with a dilemma.
A discussion of this problem, the proposed solution under the residual
concept, the reaction of the financial community to that solution, and
the solution adopted under the concept of common stock equivalents
follows.

The problem.

Traditionally earnings per share had always been

computed on the basis of the capital structure which existed in each
period.

Retroactive adjustment for changes in capital structure were

prohibited.

This policy was reaffirmed by APB Opinion No. 9 as follows:

. . . Accordingly, the computations of earnings per share in
annual reports to stockholders, whether related to the formal
statements in comparative form for two years or to the historical
summaries covering a period of years, should usually be based on
the capitalization structure existing during each period. . . .
The principal exception . . . occurs when a pooling of interests
has occurred. . . . Other exceptions to this treatment are the
result of (a) stock splits or reverse splits, and (b) stock
dividends . . .
In other words, earnings-per-share data as well as the related financial
statements are primarily of an historical nature and should not be
affected by subsequent events.
On the other hand, a basic premise of the residual concept was
that the capital structure of a corporation actually changed as the rela
tive values of its convertible securities changed.

The Lytle-Schuetze

T A

JUAccounting Principles Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Reporting the Results of Operations,
Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board, No. 9 (New York: American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1967), pp. 124-125.
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Draft of October 3, 1968 explains this aspect of the residual concept
as follows:
. . . Holders of this view believe that if a corporation has
securities outstanding which may become coiranon stock the real
capital structure of the corporation shifts depending upon the
relative values of the outstanding securities. They believe that
if a security which is not yet a common stock merely because a
holder has not exercised his privileges derives a substantial
portion of its value from its right to become common stock or
from its other common stock characteristics, then that security
should be considered the equivalent of common stock for the
purposes of calculating primary earnings per share.33
Under this point of view, changes in residual status did not
affect the comparability of earnings per share.

The logic supporting

this statement is as follows:
. . . Those who subscribe to this view are cognizant of the
fact that securities may acquire and lose residual status
depending upon factors beyond the control of the issuer or holder
of the security. Although such movements may cause periodic
earnings per share to lack comparability on their face, those
who uphold this view believe that these movements and their con
comitant effect on earnings per share truly portray the real
shifts in a corporation's capital structure.32
Philip L. Defliese, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Convertible
and Participating Securities, in a letter to the Accounting Principles
Board members, pointed out the consequences of not permitting retroactive
adjustment of earnings per share under the residual concept.

He stated:

. . . prospective treatment, in a sense, detracts from the com
parability of EPS data--there is little question but that a company
would have some cause to be disturbed if its total earnings in
creased and, as a result, the market price of stock went up, but
then its primary earnings per share declined because of a change in

33Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Lytle-Schuetze Draft. Proposed APB Opinion:
Earnings per Share, October 3, 1968 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 12. (Mimeographed.)
3^Ibid.,

pp.

11-12.
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status of a convertible security to that of a residual (of course,
there could be equal cause for concern if earnings and stock
prices declined but EPS increased).33
Defliese presented the argument against retroactive adjustment
of earnings

per share for changes in residual status as follows:

. . . Retroactive treatment of the change weakens the view of
a residual security as a somewhat basic concept and consequently
the need for its use in primary earnings per share data as long
as pro forma earnings per share data are given.
It also opens
the question of retroactive treatment for actual conversions in
order to be consistent.^
In the November 6, 1968 and all prior drafts, the Board chose
not to weaken the residual security concept by allowing retroactive
adjustment of earnings-per-share data for changes in residual status or
for actual conversions of convertible securities or the exercise of
options and warrants.
data

Disclosure of supplementary earnings per share

35
giving effect to such events was permitted, however.

Comments of the financial community.

As Table 25

on pages 180

and 181 indicates, most accounting and finance organizations were opposed
to the guidelines which permitted changes in status between residual and
nonresidual without allowing the retroactive restatement of earnings per
share to reflect those changes.

Although not indicated in Table 25,

33

Letter from Philip L. Defliese, Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Convertible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to
members of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants dated June 18, 1968.
34Ibid.
35

Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion; Earn
ings per Share, November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 10.
(Mimeographed.)
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the Securities and Exchange Commission had earlier expressed a prefer
ence for retroactive application.

The views of members of the Securi

ties and Exchange Commission on the proposed opinion had been obtained
in a meeting with members of the Subcommittee on Convertible and
Participating Securities on August 1, 1968.

The Securities and Exchange

Commission, however, did not take exception to the disallowance of
retroactive application in their comment letter on the exposure draft
of November 6, 1968.

Indications are that the Commission accepted as

a compromise the recommendation of the exposure draft that disclosure
of the effect of changes in residual status be made in a note to the
financial statements.^6
Many of the comment letters received from financial executives
of major corporations took exception to the prohibition of retroactive
adjustment of earnings per share for changes in residual status.

The

concensus of opinion was that failure to restate earnings per share for
prior periods destroyed the usefulness of the data for comparative pur
poses.

The following comments are typical;

. . . the rule forbidding the restatement of prior years
figures disregards the basic use that is made of historical
earnings per share--the establishment of trends for use in making
investment decisions. Paragraph 10 of the exposure draft indi
cates this quite explicitly, pointing out that one purpose of
earnings per share data is to provide assistance to the investor
in respect to changes in the business entity’s net income from
period to period in relation to the shares the investor owns.
This paragraph also says that earnings per share are used in

Memorandum prepared by Robert N. Sempier, Assistant Administra
tive Director of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Insti
tute of Certified Public Accountants, for the convertible securities
file of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants dated August 5, 1968.
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evaluating past earnings performances of a business and in forming
an opinion as to its future potential, etc. It seems obvious that
erratic changes in earnings per share figures arising from changes
in the residual status of convertible securities would destroy all
usefulness to the investor for this purpose.^7
. . . The fundamental error contained in the Exposure Draft is
the omission of a provision for the retroactive adjustment of the
statements of prior years. The only justification for dealing with
an imputed recapitalization for the current year lies in the assump
tion that the true nature of the original security had become dis
closed by events occurring subsequent to issuance. If such an
event occurs several years after the date of issuance, it would
seem completely proper to adjust not only the most recent year but
rather each year in which that security was outstanding. To assert
that the same security is residual in one column of a statement
while handling it as common in the second column of that same
statement would negate all sense of logic.
Because we feel that the prior year's statements are presented
to provide a reference point or "bench mark" for judging current
year's performance, we advocate restatement of the prior year when
ever a conversion in the current year results in significant dilu
tion of earnings per share. Restatement would especially be
necessary if the proposed definitions of "residual" securities
are sustained. At least, restatement for consistency would require
only one arbitrary decision and the result would stand for the
entire period being reported on. It follows that we would also
treat a security as residual for the entire year in which it
becomes residual.39

Solution under the concept of common stock equivalents.

Despite

the objections of the financial community, the Accounting Principles

07

Letter from J. P. McFarland, President and Chief Executive
Officer of General Mills, Inc. to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative
Director of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, dated January 10, 1969.
38

Letter from H. C. Knortz, Senior Vice-President and Comptroller
of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation to the Accounting
Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun
tants dated December 23, 1968.
■^Letter from Eugene H. Irmingh and R. W. Halliday, Comptroller
and Executive Vice-President--Finance, respectively, of Boise Cascade
to the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants dated December 7, 1968.

189

Board adhered to the principle that " . . .

information in financial

statements is of an historical nature and should not be affected by sub
sequent events."^®

Consequently, all of the drafts prepared after the

November 6, 1968 exposure draft, as well as APB Opinion N o . 15, con
tained the requirement that changes in outstanding securities from the
exercise of options, conversions, or changes in residual status should
be reflected in the computation of earnings per share only from the time
the change occurred.

Other changes in the final opinion, however,

alleviated the problem of retroactive adjustment to some extent.
Under the concept of common stock equivalents, the status of
convertible securities is determined at date of issue only.

Conse

quently the problem of retroactive adjustment was avoided because securi
ties do not change status after the original classification.^
theory, warrants are always common stock equivalents.

In

The problem of

retroactive adjustment remains, however, because of the method chosen

^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion; Earn
ings per Share. November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 8.
(Mimeographed.)
^Convertible securities classified as common stock equivalents,
however, would be excluded from the earnings-per-share computation if the
effect was to increase primary earnings per share or decrease the loss
per share as otherwise computed. The basis ultimately adopted by the
Board in APB Opinion No. 15 for classifying convertible securities as
common stock equivalents was a yield test. A convertible security was
classified as a common stock equivalent if, based on the security's
market price at the time of issuance, it had a cash yield of less than
66 2/3 percent of the then current bank prime interest rate. See
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Earnings per Share. Opinions of the Accounting
Principles Board, No. 15 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 229.
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by the Board for calculating the number of common stock equivalents.
As indicated in Table 24 on page 178, various assumptions about
the use of funds from the exercise of warrants had been considered by
the Board through the date of the release of the November 6, 1968 ex
posure draft.

Drafts after this date as well as the final opinion used

the treasury stock method in various forms for determining the common
stock equivalency of warrants.

Under the treasury stock method the

common stock equivalents attributable to warrants vary inversely with
the market price of the underlying common stock.

Consequently the prob

lem of retroactive adjustment of earnings per share remains because the
number of common stock equivalents attributable to a given warrant issue
is not constant from period to period.

Consideration must be given to

this attribute of the treasury stock method in drafting guidelines for
the computation of earnings per share of companies with warrants out
standing .

Anti-dilution
Another predicament resulting from the residual security
concept--the enhancement of primary earnings per share by residual
securities--caused the Accounting Principles Board some concern.

The

following discussion deals with this problem under the residual concept,
the opposition to the residual concept solution, and the final resolu
tion under the concept of common stock equivalents.

The problem.

The theory underlying the residual concept was

based on market relationships rather than on potential dilution.

A

security was residual if it derived a major portion of its value from
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its common stock characteristics.

If the residual theory was to be

internally consistent, residual securities which enhanced primary earn
ings per share also had to be included.

The Subcommittee on Conver

tible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles Board,
charged with the revision of APB Opinion No. 9 . accepted this conclusion
from the beginning of its deliberations.

This is indicated by the dis

cussion memorandum of an April 2, 1968 meeting as follows:
. . . The subcommittee has concluded (with P. L. Defliese dis
senting) that a security should be classified as a residual if the
appropriate market relationships prevail regardless of a resultant
increase in reported common earnings per share. This decision was
largely based on the view that the residual classification
represents a basic concept.4-2
The Subcommittee also reaffirmed the provisions of APB Opinion
No. 9 with respect to pro forma earnings per share.

The criterion for

the inclusion of convertible securities was potential dilution to earn
ings per share rather than the market relationships criterion of primary
earnings per share.

This is shown by the following excerpt from the

discussion memorandum of the April 2 meeting:
. . . The subcommittee concluded that the intent of paragraph
43 as expressed in its first sentence--that "earnings per share may
be subject to dilution in the future if any existing contingencies
permitting issuance of common shares eventuate"--leads to a con
clusion that pro forma per share earnings should include only those
convertible securities whose conversion would result in dilution
of common earnings per share and should exclude others.43

^Discussion memorandum enclosed in a letter from Philip L.
Defliese, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Convertible and Participating
Securities of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, to members of the Subcommittee on Con
vertible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants dated
April 10, 1968, p. 4.
^Ibid.,

p. 8.
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As a result, the dilution criterion of pro forma earnings per
share was inconsistent with the market relationships criterion of primary
earnings per share when a security classified as residual increased
earnings per share.

In early drafts and in the exposure draft of

November 6, 1968 this conflict was resolved by excluding residual securi
ties from the provisions of the dilution criterion in computing pro forma
earnings per share.44

in APB Opinion No. 15 the problem was resolved by

excluding from the primary earnings-per-share computation " . . .

common

stock equivalents or other contingent issuance for any period in which
their inclusion would have the effect of increasing the earnings per
share amount or decreasing the loss per share amount otherwise com
puted .

Opposition within the Subcommittee.

The eventual exclusion of

common stock equivalents having the effect of reverse dilution from the
computation of primary earnings per share can probably be attributed to
the influence of Philip Defliese, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Con
vertible and Participating Securities, and to the opposition of the
Securities and Exchange Commission to anti-dilution.
opposed to including reverse dilution issues " . . .

Defliese was
because (a) we are

^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion:
Earnings per Share, November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 13.
(Mimeographed.)
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Earnings per Share. Opinions of the
Accounting Principles Board, No. 15 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 228.
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in a peculiar position if we disregard the inherent rights of security
issues and the result is an increase in EPS over what that amount would
be if such rights had been taken into consideration . . . and (b) we
seem to be inconsistent with the position we adopted on pro forma EPS.'

L.C\

Theoretically the purpose of the residual concept was to reflect
in earnings per share the capital structure which existed in each period.
Under this concept, residual equity included senior securities which
derived a major portion of their value from their conversion rights or
their common stock characteristics in addition to the common shares out
standing.

Securities classified as residual, therefore, could cause

earnings per share to increase or decrease.

The exclusion from the earn-

ings-per-share computation of residual securities which increased earn
ings per share clearly weakened the basic concept unless the purpose of
the concept was modified.
In a statement defending his position, Defliese made a subtle
but important change in the purpose of the residual concept.

The purpose

of the residual concept was no longer that of allocating earnings to all
residual equities.

Instead, the objective of the concept was to prevent

the employment of residual securities as a substitute for common stock
for the purpose of increasing earnings per share.

Defliese interpreted

the residual concept as follows:

HDLetter from Philip L. Defliese, Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Convertible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, to
members of the Subcommittee on Convertible and Participating Securities
of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants dated April 10, 1968.
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. . . The residual concept, in my opinion, is an attempt to
prevent a senior form of a security which can obtain a substantial
part of its investment attractiveness only because of its common
stock characteristics being employed to give the appearance of
greater per share earnings than if common stock had actually been
issued. Pro forma calculations serve a somewhat related purpose
and deal with somewhat similar securities. In fact, the only dif
ference between residual securities and those for which pro forma
/
calculations are called for is one of degree. '
*7

The other four members of the Subcommittee continued to prefer
the basic residual concept.

Accordingly, all of the early drafts of the

opinion, including the November 6, 1968 exposure draft, retained the
residual classification for securities which increased primary earnings
per share.

In fact, a provision to prevent reverse dilution of primary

earnings per share was not included until the concept of common stock
A O

equivalents was introduced in the February 24, 1969 draft. °

Opposition by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The opposi

tion of the Securities and Exchange Commission to a residual security
concept which could result in the enhancement of primary earnings per
share was not surprising.

The Commission had just released Securities

Act of 1933 Release No. 4910 when the Subcommittee met to discuss the
proposed opinion with Commission members on August 1, 1968.

One of the

conclusions of that release had the effect of modifying the market

^Statement of P. L. Defliese, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Convertible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, to mem
bers of the Subcommittee on Convertible and Participating Securities of
the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants dated April 23, 1968.
AO

^“Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Draft, Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings per
Share, February 24, 1969 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 12.
(Mimeographed.)
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relationships criterion for determining residual status under APB
Opinion No. 9 to include a dilution test.

The following statement from

the release makes this point clear:
. . . In general, if at the time of issuance of a convertible
security in an acquisition, the terras are such as to result in
immediate material dilution to pro forma earnings per share, assum
ing conversion, then that security should be considered a residual
security whether or not a majority of its value may be derived
from its conversion right . ^
In the August 1, 1968 meeting between members of the Subcommittee
and members of the Commission, the preference of the Commission for the
dilution criterion was reaffirmed.

In fact, the Commission really

preferred only one earnings-per-share figure which would reflect all
potential dilution.

This is indicated by the following statement:

The view was expressed by L. Millard of the SEC, that dilution
of earnings per share should be the basis for determining whether
a convertible security is a residual. It was also indicated that
the most meaningful earnings per share figure would be that which
gave effect to all convertibles as though they were in fact con
verted (i.e. pro forma earnings per share).
The Commission's attitude did not change with the release of
the November 6, 1968 exposure draft which permitted reverse dilution of
primary earnings per share.

In commenting on the exposure draft Andrew

Barr, Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
stated:

^Securities and Exchange Commission, "Securities Act of 1933
Release No. 4910," Financial Analysts Journal, XXIV (September-October,
1968), 68.
^^Memorandum prepared by Robert N. Sempier, Assistant Administra
tive Director of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Insti
tute of Certified Public Accountants, for the convertible securities file
of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants dated August 5, 1968.
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In our discussion with members of the subcommittee, and as
reflected in Securities Act Release No. 4910, we have made it
clear that the Commission's primary concern with the calcula
tions of earnings per share is the dilutive effect of other
securities on the earnings per share of the common stock. That
is, the proper determination of the earnings per share attri
butable to the common stock gives effect to participations of
other security holders. Securities which do not have a dilu
tive effect or which would enhance earnings per share, assuming
conversion, would not enter into the calculations.51
The Accounting Principles Board had hoped that the Securities
and Exchange Commission would suspend enforcement of the provisions of
Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4910 in favor of the guidelines set
forth in the exposure draft.

Barr made it clear that the Commission

would not do so in the following statement:
We also believe that guidelines based on the investment value
concept, and even the market parity concept, are not adequate to
cope with all situations in which dilution is so great as to
cause us trouble. While we will not oppose adoption of the
proposal, we do not abandon the criterion specified in Securities
Act Release 4910 but will apply it only when failure to do so
would materially distort the effect of the securities to be
issued.52
Practically none of the comment letters on the November 6, 1968
exposure draft took exception to the enhancement of primary earnings
per share by residual securities.

This would be expected since most of

the responses came from the top level of management of firms which were
likely to be affected adversely by the opinion.

Some concern was ex

pressed that the draft conflicted with the Securities and Exchange Com
mission ruling, as shown by the following excerpt:

■^Letter from Andrew Barr, Chief Accountant of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director
of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants, dated January 7, 1969.
52Ibid.
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Our second specific difference concerns the possibility of
differing rules issued by the American Institute and by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Paragraph 57 of the opinion
implies that a security not be regarded as residual merely because
of the effect the classification has on primary earnings per
share. The SEC has issued a ruling stating that securities
should be considered residual if they have a material effect of
dilution on earnings per share when issued. Before any opinion
is issued by the Institute, we feel that this apparent differ
ence between the AICPA and the SEC rule should be resolved.^3
A few letters also pointed out the previously discussed incon
sistency between primary and fully diluted earnings per share.

These

respondents usually urged that fully diluted earnings per share should
also include securities the conversion or exercise of which would result
in an enhancement of the figure.

The logic for their inclusion in the

computation is expressed in the following quotation:
As we view paragraphs 70 and 72, it appears that inconsis
tent assumptions are required to be made in the calculation of
fully diluted EPS where a company has several classes/types of
outstanding convertible securities which are not classed as
residuals, only these which will adversely affect EPS are to be
included in the calculation. In most instances the fully diluted
concept rests upon an assumption that the market price of common
stock will increase to the point where conversion is advantageous
from the viewpoint of the security holder. Since this is the
assumption necessary to give meaning to the fully diluted EPS
presentation, it must be assumed consistently, i.e., as to all
outstanding convertible issues, if it is not to mislead the
investing public altogether. It is not a question of infringing
upon the time-honored principle of conservatism--it is simply the
logical consequence of adopting the fully diluted concept.54

- ^ L e t t e r from J. P. McFarland, President of General Mills, Inc.,
to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the Accounting Prin
ciples Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
dated January 10, 1969.

-^Letter from J. Kenneth Kilcarr, President of the Airline
Finance and Accounting Conference, to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative
Director of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, dated January 13, 1969.
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Solution under the concept of common stock equivalents.

The

adoption of the concept of common stock equivalents eliminated the in
consistency in criteria between primary and fully diluted earnings per
share.

Primary earnings per share excluded those common stock equiva

lents which would increase earnings per share or decrease loss per
share as otherwise computed.

The concept also resolved much of the

conflict with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

There remained,

however, the possibility that a security which could result in material
potential dilution would not be classified as a common stock equivalent
under the guidelines of APB Opinion No. 15. Although such securities
would enter into the computation of fully diluted earnings per share,
Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4910 would also require their inclu
sion in the computation of primary earnings per share.

Andrew Barr,

Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission, did not
mention this discrepancy in his comment letter on the pre-ballot draft
of March 14, 1969.^

Perhaps the Commission felt that the guidelines

were sufficiently restrictive to prevent this situation from occurring.

Use of Funds from the
Assumed Exercise of Warrants
Another problem which confronted the Accounting Principles Board
under the residual concept was the formulation of guidelines for deter
mining the use of funds derived from the assumed exercise of warrants.
The following discussion is concerned primarily with the treasury stock

-^Letter from Andrew Barr, Chief Accountant of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of
the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, dated March 27, 1969.
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method and modifications of the treasury stock method which the Board
eventually adopted in APB Opinion No. 15.

The treasury stock method

and other assumptions as to the use of warrant funds are treated more
extensively in Chapter 5.

The problem. Warrants had not been considered residual securi
ties under APB Opinion No. 9 .

They were, however, included in the com

putation of pro forma earnings per share if their exercise would result
in material dilution of future earnings per share.

No guidelines for

the use of the funds received from the assumed exercise of the warrants
were provided in the Opinion.

Consequently several different assumptions

developed in practice, as indicated by Frank Weston and Sidney Davidson:
. . . In computing supplementary pro forma earnings per share
data to determine potential dilution from outstanding options
and warrants, it is customary to attribute some increase in pro
forma net income as a result of the pro forma use of proceeds-either by an assumed reduction in interest expense (through pro
forma payment of debt) or by an increase in investment income,
both net of income tax effect. A third approach is to assume
that common shares are purchased for the corporate treasury with
the proceeds at current market prices, considering only the
excess of shares issuable under such instruments over the pro
forma shares so acquired as an increase in the pro forma out
standing shares for the dilution computation.^^
At least two members of the Accounting Principles Board, Weston
and Davidson, had reservations about methods of attributing earnings to
the proceeds of warrants assumed to have been exercised which resulted
in pro forma adjustments of historical net income for the purpose of

Frank T. Weston and Sidney Davidson, "What Will Accounting
Changes Do to Earnings?" Financial Analysts Journal. XXIV (SeptemberOctober, 1968), 62.
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computing primary earnings per share.

They expressed these reservations

as follows:
. . . However, when options or warrants qualify as residual
securities, there exists a major question as to whether the his
torical net income of the period should be revised in any way,
since the residual security computation is the basic, historical
computation for the period and should therefore be based on
actual net income. Accordingly, any increase in net income
resulting from an attribution of earnings to proceeds which have
not in fact been received would appear to be improper. On the
other hand, it would appear illogical to adjust upward the
outstanding common shares by the entire number of. shares
issuable under options and warrants without some recognition of
the fact that these instruments, upon exercise, do result in
additional funds being made available to the corporation.-^
Weston and Davidson concluded that the treasury stock method
might be most appropriate because the computation did not require a pro
CO

forma adjustment to net income.

Although net income is not adjusted

in the actual computation of earnings per share under the treasury
stock method, the effect on earnings per share is the same as if a
perhaps inappropriate earnings rate on warrant proceeds had been assumed
CQ

for the computation. 3

Proof that the treasury stock method assumes a

rate of return on warrant proceeds that varies inversely with the price
of the related common stock and that the rate assumed is always less
than the earnings-price ratio of the underlying common stock is shown
in Chapter 5.

57 ...
Ibid.

58

Ibid.

-^After further research of the treasury stock method, Weston
also reached this conclusion. See a letter from Frank T. Weston, mem
ber of the Subcommittee on Convertible and Participating Securities of
the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, to J. S. Seidman, member of the Accounting
Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun
tants, dated March 28, 1969.
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As Table 24 on page 178 indicates, early drafts of the opinion,
including the November 6, 1968 exposure draft, allowed management con
siderable latitude in selecting a return on the funds obtained from an
assumed exercise of warrants.

The August, September, and October, 1968

drafts permitted the following assumptions:
1.

Consistent with the company's financial policies or, in the
absence of a discernible relevant policy,

2.

The rate of interest being paid on outstanding debt, net of
tax effect,

3.

An assumed investment in government or similar obligations,
net of tax effect,

4.

The assumed use of funds to purchase stock of the issuing
company at current prices.^

Assumptions prohibited by the November 6, 1968 exposure draft.
The November 6, 1968 exposure draft eliminated the purchase of treasury
stock option, substituting in its place the option that funds received
from the exercise of warrants would earn at the current borrowing rate
of the company, net of tax effect.^

Furthermore, the treasury stock

^®See Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Draft, Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings
per Share, August 26, 1968 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), pp. 25-26; Accounting Principles
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Draft,
Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings per Share, September 16, 1968 (New
York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968),
p. 29; and Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Lytle-Schuetze Draft, Proposed APB Opin
ion: Earnings per Share, October 3, 1968 (New York: American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), pp. 49-50.
61

Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion; Earn
ings per Share, November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 12.
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method was not allowed even if it were consistent with the company's
financial policies.
statement:

The Board prohibited its use in the following

"An assumed use of funds to purchase stock of the issuing

company is not appropriate because of the number of estimates, restric62
tions, and other factors involved."0
Apparently the Accounting Principles Board had become concerned
with the legality of a company's purchase of its own stock.

In the

interest of protecting creditors, some state statutes limit the amount
of treasury stock which may be purchased.

Bond indentures may also

limit the purchase of treasury stock in order to protect the bondholders.
The Securities and Exchange Commission also regulates the purchase of
treasury stock.

For example, Rule 10b-6 of the Securities Exchange Act

of 1934 contains restrictions against trading by persons interested in
a distribution.^
By specifically prohibiting the treasury stock method in the
November 6, 1968 exposure draft, the Board appeared to be rejecting the
concept of substance over form.

Such a position was clearly untenable

because the entire concept of residual securities placed substance over
form.

David N. Judelson and Norman R. Forson, President and Treasurer,

respectively, of Gulf + Western Industries, Inc. pointed this out in
the following comments:
. . . Also the assumed use of funds to purchase treasury stock

62Ibid.
^Securities and Exchange Commission, General Rules and Regula
tions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as in Effect October 16,
1968 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp.
14-15.
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is more realistic than the approved methods. The objections to
the use of this method set out in the opinion are without sub
stance. The "number of estimates" involved are no greater than
under the acceptable uses. The limitations are presumably under
loan agreements. We believe that most loan agreements would
allow a company to retire stock in a dollar amount equal to the
amount of stock sold. The "other factors" might include the
problem of purchasing a large block of treasury stock at a fixed
market price. This assumption is no harder to accept than the
assumption that all warrants and options are exercised at the
same time.
The November 6, 1968 exposure draft and all preceding drafts
also rejected an assumed rate of return on the use of additional capital
for operating purposes.

The Accounting Principles Board gave the fol

lowing reasons:
a.

b.

A historical rate of return on book equity (which under
accounting conventions frequently does not reflect the
present replacement cost of tangible resources or sub
stantial intangible resources) is not a reliable indica
tion of a return to be expected on additional funds, and
in any event, assumptions as to future returns on the
employment of capital in business operations would be
conjectural.65
Several letters received by the Board in response to the ex

posure draft contained comments on the fallacy of these arguments.
Judelson and Forson pointed out that the argument against a historical
rate of return on book equity is an argument against basic principles of
accounting.

They also felt that " . . .

since the entire computation

^Letter from David N. Judelson and Norman R. Forson, President
and Treasurer, respectively, of Gulf + Western Industries, Inc. to
Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the Accounting Principles
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated
January 14, 1969.
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Exposure Draft, Proposed APB Opinion; Earn
ings per Share, November 6, 1968 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 12.
(Mimeographed.)

204

based on assumed exercise of warrants and options is conjectural, an
assumed use of funds might as well be conjectural also."
Corporate executives expressed dissatisfaction with the provision
disallowing the assumed investment of warrant proceeds in operating
assets.

Many felt that the proceeds would be invested in operating

assets rather than being used to retire debt or invested in government
securities.

The following comments are typical:

The assumed uses set out in the proposed opinion . . . are
probably the last thing a company which believes in leverage
would do. They would probably invest the proceeds in operating
assets with an expectation of a higher return on investment
The most serious defect in the dilution rules is the require
ment that proceeds from the exercise of warrants and options must
be dealt with as if used to retire debt, or invested in govern
ment securities if no debt exists. It is more likely that in nine
cases out of ten the proceeds will be reinvested in the business
and earn a higher return than the savings in interest on debt.
Obviously no rule can recognize all the possible uses of the funds
and the earnings they will produce but this does not justify a
rule that presumes debt repayment to the exclusion of all other
uses. By what authority is the most likely assumption replaced
by the least likely?®®
The proposals for assumed use of funds receivable by the
corporations upon the exercise of options or warrants by the
holders thereof, strike us as being particularly unrealistic.
It holders of such options suspected that the capital they were

®®Letter from David N. Judelson and Norman R. Forson, President
and Treasurer, respectively, of Gulf + Western Industries, Inc. to
Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the Accounting Principles
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated
January 14, 1969.
67Ibid.
fLQ

°°Letter from Clyde Skeen, President of Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.,
to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the Accounting Princi
ples Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
dated January 10, 1969.
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supplying would be limited to such returns, they would be less
than enthusiastic about exercising their options. The unwill
ingness of the authors to assume future returns on capital on
the ground that to do so would be "conjectural," struck us as
being inconsistent with other portions of the proposed Opinion
in which the authors displayed no reluctance to venture into
the world of conjecture. ^
In its response to the exposure draft, the Securities and Ex
change Commission took exception to the assumption that warrant proceeds
might be invested in accordance with the company's financial policies.
The Commission, in the interest of greater uniformity, preferred the
following bases which are listed in the Commission's suggested order of
priority:
1.
2.
3.

The rate of interest being paid on outstanding debt,
An assumed use of funds to purchase stock of the issuing
company, or
The current borrowing rate of the company but not in excess
of one point above the prime rate.7®

The Commission also stated that " . . .

the assumed use of funds to pur

chase stock is an appropriate basis and that it will produce the most
realistic results in many instances."7^

Adoption of the treasury stock method. Most of the Accounting
Principles Board's research with respect to warrants appears to have
been conducted after the release of the November 6, 1968 exposure draft.

^Letter from F. Edward Rugemer, Vice-President of Baltimore Gas
and Electric Company, to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of
the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, dated January 2, 1969.
7®Letter from Andrew Barr, Chief Accountant of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director
of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, dated January 7, 1969.
71Ibid.
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One of the reasons for the increased emphasis on warrants was an article
entitled "The New Warrant Game" published in The Value Line Warrant
Service. A copy of this article was circulated to members of the Sub
committee on Convertible and Participating S e c u r i t i e s T h e

tenor of

the article was that warrants were no longer being used just to facili
tate the sale of the securities to which they were attached.

They were

also playing a major role in mergers, acquisitions and corporate distri
butions.^
With the adoption of the concept of common stock equivalents
after the November 6, 1968 exposure draft, the Board placed more empha
sis on dilution as a criterion for the inclusion of warrants in the
primary earnings-per-share computation.

This is indicated by the elimi

nation of the requirements that the market price of the related common
stock be 125 percent or more of the exercise price of the warrant on
the date of issue or 150 percent or more subsequent to date of issue
for the warrant to be classified as residual.

All options previously

allowed management with respect to the assumed use of warrant proceeds
were eliminated in favor of the treasury stock method.

The elimination

of these options assured uniformity in the computation of earnings per
share.

It did not, however assure interperiod or intercompany compara

bility of earnings per share, as will be shown in Chapter 5.

In

72Letter from Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, to the members of the APB Subcommittee on Convertible
Securities of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, dated December 16, 1968.
73

York:

"The New Warrant Game," The Value Line Warrant Service (New
Arnold Bernhard and Co., Iric., l968)} p _ J7

207

addition, adoption of the treasury stock method did not assure the recog
nition, under certain circumstances, of the potential dilution of earnings
per share that might be caused by the exercise of warrants.

The Board

corrected this aspect of the treasury stock method, to a certain extent,
in a subsequent draft which is discussed later in this chapter.
The Board's adoption of the treasury stock method under the con
cept of common stock equivalents after having prohibited its use under
the residual concept " . . .

because of the number of estimates, restric

tions, and other factors involved"^ required justification.

Whereas

previously the method had been thought of as a bona-fide repurchase
assumption, it was now considered simply as a practical means of com
puting the dilution caused by warrants.

The February 24, 1969 draft

explains its use as follows:
. . . The Board recognizes that any assumption of use of
funds is hypothetical and that varying results would be obtained
depending upon the assumptions made. It has concluded, however,
that use of the foregoing method is the most practical means of
giving effect to the dilution of earnings per share which results
from the issuance of common stock at a price below the current
market price.75
The principal advantage of the treasury stock method in its
initial form as adopted in the February 24, 1969 draft were its simpli
city of application and the ready availability of the required data.

^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Exposure Draft. Proposed APB Opinion; Earn
ings per share. November 6. 1968 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1968), p. 12.
(Mimeographed.)
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Draft. Proposed APB Opinion: Earnings per
Share. February 24. 1969 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, 1969), p. 20.
(Mimeographed.)
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The number of common stock equivalents was determined by dividing the
total warrant proceeds by the current market price of the common stock
and deducting the results from the number of shares under option.

The

only information not provided by the warrant agreement was the market
price of the common stock.

With the possible exception of closely held

corporations, common stock prices are readily available.

On the other

hand, some other methods require the computation of rates of return or
warrant prices which in some cases may not be available.

Modifications of the treasury stock method.

Unfortunately, the

simplicity and ease of calculation provided by the treasury stock
method were short-lived.

Each subsequent draft contained modifications

of the method as the result of additional research and study of prob
lems inherent in the method.

The February 24, 1969 draft had specified

use of current common stock market prices for both primary and fully
diluted earnings per s h a r e . T h i s meant that both earnings-per-share
figures were always the same insofar as the effect of warrants.

In the

Subcommittee pre-ballot draft of March 14, 1969 and in the final opinion,
the average market price of the common stock was required for the primary
earnings-per-share computation.

The higher of the average or current

market price was specified for the fully diluted computation.77

This

was in line with the Board's concept that primary earnings per share was

76Ibid., pp. 20 and 22.
77Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Subcommittee Pre-Ballot Draft, Proposed
Opinion: Earnings per Share, March 14. 1969 (New York; American Insti
tute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), pp. 19 and 22.
(Mimeographed.)
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historical in nature whereas fully diluted earnings per share was pro
spective and designed to show the maximum potential dilution of current
earnings per share.
Another problem overlooked in the formulation of the treasury
stock method was that some warrant agreements permit the tendering of
debt or preferred stock, usually at face or par value, in lieu of cash
as satisfaction of the exercise price.

Some warrant agreements also re

quire warrant proceeds to be applied toward the retirement of debt.

The

Subcommittee ballot draft of April 2, 1969 included exceptions to the
treasury stock method for these situations.

If the market value of debt

which might be tendered at its face value was less than its face value,
warrant proceeds were assumed to be applied to the retirement of the
debt.

If the market value of the debt exceeded its face value, the

treasury stock method was required.

These same assumptions also applied

to preferred stock which might be tendered in lieu of cash.

The treasury

stock method was also inapplicable if the warrant agreement required that
proceeds be applied to the retirement of debt.

In such cases, the earn

ings-per-share computations were required to reflect the assumption that
debt was retired with the proceeds.

78

Another problem inherent in the treasury stock method was the
fact that it would not indicate potential dilution when the exercise
price of the warrants was above the market price of the underlying common

78
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Subcommittee Ballot Draft. Proposed Opinion:
Earnings per Share, April 2, 1969 (New York: American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Inc., 1969(, pp. 21-22.
(Mimeographed.)
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stock.

The analysis of warrant characteristics in Chapter 3, however,

indicates that, except in the time span immediately prior to the ex
piration date of the warrants, the relationship between the exercise
price of the warrants and the market price of the common stock has
little or no bearing on the number of warrants that will ultimately be
exercised.

The exercise price must be below the market price of the

common stock during only a brief period prior to expiration for the
warrants to be exercised.
Frank Weston and Emmett S. Harrington recognized the limitations
of the treasury stock method in reflecting potential dilution under cer
tain conditions.

Weston concluded that, when a large number of warrants

was outstanding in relation to the common shares outstanding, the assump
tion that the company could purchase those shares at current market
prices when most of the shareholders had just acquired the shares through
warrants exercised at less than market was unrealistic.^

Harrington

agreed with Weston that the treasury stock method did not always properly
reflect the dilutive effect of warrants.

This is indicated by the fol

lowing comments on the pre-ballot draft of March 14, 1969:
The present draft does not deal with warrants in a manner
which properly indicates the dilutive effect. Frank Weston's
analysis . . . clearly indicates that the treasury stock method
is not effective for this purpose, particularly at the time of
issuance. The deficiencies in this method are glaring when the

79

Letter from Frank T. Weston, member of the Subcommittee on
Convertible and Participating Securities of the Accounting Principles
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, to
J. S. Seidman, member of the Accounting Principles Board of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated March 28,
1969.
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number of warrants is very high in relation to the shares of
common stocks outstanding.88
Harrington offered three alternatives to overcome the limita
tions of the treasury stock method.

The first of these is as follows:

One alternative would be to call for the earnings per share
to reflect the greater dilution which would result from the use
of funds (a) for the purchase of common stock (the treasury
stock method), or (b) to produce a yield at either a specific
rate of interest or a
flexible rate based on the current bank
Q -1
prime interest rate. i
A second alternative offered by Harrington was the Graham-Dodd
method.

Under this method the number of common stock equivalents is

determined by multiplying the ratio of the market value of the warrant
to the market value of the common stock by the number of shares obtainable from exercise.

GO

This method produces dilution equal to or

greater than the treasury stock method in all possible cases.

An

advantage is that it will produce dilution when the exercise price of
the warrant is above the market price of the common stock.

A disad

vantage is that the market price of the warrant is required for the
computation.

This method is more fully analyzed in Chapter 5.

Harrington's third alternative was ", . . t o retain the treasury
stock method, but to require supplemental disclosure indicating the
dilution which would occur at various levels of market prices for common
Q O

stock.'

Harrington did not favor this method because it conflicted

88Letter from Emmett S. Harrington, member of the Accounting
Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun
tants, to Philip L. Defliese, member of the Accounting Principles Board
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated March
28, 1969.
81Ibid.
88Ibid.

82Ibid.
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with the dual equal prominence presentation of primary and fully diluted
earnings per share.
The Board adopted a modification of Harrington's first alterna
tive as a solution to the inadequacy of the treasury stock method to re
flect dilution under certain circumstances.

This last-minute change

first appeared in the ballot draft of April 21, 1969 and became known
as the 20 percent limitation.

When the number of shares of common stock

obtainable from the exercise of warrants exceeded 20 percent of the
current common shares outstanding, the use of proceeds was computed in
two steps as follows:
a.

As if the funds obtained were applied to the repurchase of
20% of the current outstanding common shares at the average
market price during the period (treasury stock method); and
then
b. As if the balance of funds were applied first to reduce any
short-term or long-term borrowings and any remaining funds
were invested in long-term government securities or commer
cial paper, with appropriate recognition of any income tax
effect.
The results of steps (a) and (b) of the computation (whether dilu
tive or anti-dilutive) should be aggregated and, if the net effect
is dilutive, should enter into the earnings per share computa
tion.84
The 20 percent limitation also applied to the fully diluted
earnings-per-share computation with the modification that treasury stock
was assumed to be purchased at the higher of the average price or the
current price.88

The same provisions were retained in the final opinion.88

^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants, Ballot Draft, Proposed Opinion: Earnings per
Share, April 21, 1969 (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 23.
(Mimeographed.)
85Ibid., p. 25.
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants, Earnings per Share. Opinions of the Accounting
Principles Board, No. 15 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), pp. 232-235.
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The 20 percent limitation

had the desired effect of making the

earnings-per-share computation more dilutive, as shown in the following
two hypothetical cases.
Case 1
Assumptions:
Net income for period
Common shares outstanding
Number of shares subject to purchase
through exercise of warrants
20% limitation on assumed purchase
Exercise price per share
Average and end-of-period market
value per common share
Computations:
Application of assumed proceeds
($5,000,000) towards purchase of
treasury stock
Reduction of 6% debt

Adjustment of net income:
Actual net income
Interest reduction net of tax
effect (3%)
Adjusted net income
Adjustment of shares outstanding:
Actual
Additional shares issuable
Case 1 (500,000 - 200,000)
Case 2 (500,000 - $5,000,000 =
$30
500,000 - 166,667)
Adjusted shares outstanding
Earnings per share:
Before adjustment
After adjustment

Case 2

$1,000,000
1,000,000

$1 ,000,000
1 ,000,000

500,000
200,000
$10

200.000

$8

$30

$1,600,000
3.400.000
$5,000,000

$5,000,000

$1,000,000

$1 ,000,000

102.000
$1,102,000

$1,000,000

1,000,000

1 ,000,000

500.000
$10

$5,000,000

300,000

1,300,000

$1.00
$0,845

333,333
1,333,333

$1.00
$0.75

The assumptions in both cases are the same, except that in Case 1
the exercise price of the warrants is below the market price of the
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common stock.

In Case 2 the market price of the common stock is high

in relation to the exercise price of the warrants.

In both cases the

ratio of the shares under option to the shares outstanding is high so
that the 20 percent limitation applies.
In Case 1 application of the treasury stock method without the
20 percent limitation would have resulted in no dilution because the
exercise price of the warrants was above the market price of the common
stock.

Case 2 demonstrates a situation in which the 20 percent test is

met but the number of shares purchased under the treasury stock method
is less than the 20 percent limitation.

Such results will occur when

the market price of the common stock is high relative to the exercise
price of the warrant.
Case 2 also illustrates the sensitivity of earnings per share to
the market price of the common stock.

For example, if the market price

of the common had been $50 per share rather than $30, earnings per share
would have been approximately 71 cents.

Proof is presented in Chapter 5

that under these conditions the effect of the treasury stock method on
earnings per share is the same as if the assumption were made that the
proceeds from warrants earned less than 2 percent, the earnings-price
ratio based on actual common shares outstanding.

In other words, the

company's rate of return on assets is less than its cost of debt, a
highly unlikely possibility for a company with a price-earnings ratio
of 50.

These characteristics of the treasury stock method are factors

which must be evaluated in formulating guidelines for the earnings-pershare computations of companies with warrants outstanding.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

During the 1960's the use of convertible securities and warrants
increased substantially.

The conversion feature facilitated the issuing

of debt and equity securities by allowing investors to participate in
the growth of the issuer through the option for the issuer's common
stock.

The issuer benefited through lower interest and dividends.

The

Accounting Principles Board was particularly concerned with the increase
in the use of convertible preferred stock in mergers and acquisitions.
Convertible preferred stock was used to permit the stockholders of
the acquired company to participate in the long-range potential of the
acquiring company.

This potential of the convertible preferred stock

holders, however, was not reflected in earnings per share.

Many

companies, therefore, were able to reflect a temporary improvement in
earnings per share through such acquisitions.
The Accounting Principles Board concluded that under these cir
cumstances the traditional earnings per share computation was inappro
priate.

As a result, in December, 1966, the Board released APB Opinion

No. 9 which contained a development of the concept of residual securi
ties.

A residual security was one which clearly derived a major portion

of its value from its conversion rights or its common stock characteris
tics.

Such securities were to be treated as common stock for purposes

of the earnings-per-share computation.

The criterion for determining

residual status was one of relative values--the investment value of a
convertible security compared to its total value.

Consequently, under

the appropriate circumstances, residual securities could increase earn
ings per share.

APB Opinion No. 9 also required a pro forma
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earnings-per-share computation if existing contingencies permitting the
issuance of common shares in the future would materially dilute earnings
per share.

The use of different criteria, relative values and dilution,

resulted in a potential conflict between the two earnings-per-share com
putations which was eventually resolved under the concept of common
stock equivalents by eliminating common stock equivalents which enhanced
earnings per share.
APB Opinion No. 9 contained no specific guidelines for determin
ing the residual status of securities.

The result was a lack of

uniformity in computing earnings per share.

In addition, warrants were

generally not considered to be residual securities by practitioners.
Consequently, by 1968 warrants were being used in mergers and acquisi
tions as a means of avoiding the detrimental effect on earnings per share
caused by convertible securities which were classified as residual.

For

these reasons, the Accounting Principles Board undertook a revision of
APB Opinion No, 9 .
In its early efforts the Board retained the residual concept.
The emphasis was, therefore, on formulating guidelines for determining
residual status in conformity with the residual concept as expressed in
APB Opinion No. 9 .

These guidelines, circulated in the exposure draft of

November 6, 1968, produced an unprecedented negative response from the
financial community.

As a result, the Board made such extensive changes

in the guidelines that they no longer conformed to the basic tenets of
the residual concept.

The term residual was subsequently dropped in

favor of the term common stock equivalents and the modified residual
concept became the concept of common stock equivalents.
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The basic difficulty the Board encountered in making the theory
of the residual concept operational was the fact that a security could
change residual status between periods as a result of market relation
ships.

Under the residual theory the changes in equity capital caused

by securities moving in and out of residual status were real and earn
ings per share should reflect these changes in equity capital without
retroactive adjustment to earnings per share.

Most of the financial

community felt that reflecting these changes,which were the result of
investment and market values over which management had no direct control,
destroyed the interperiod and intercompany comparability of earnings per
share.

The Board resolved this difficulty to some extent with the

adoption of the concept of common stock equivalents.

Under this con

cept convertible securities were classified as common stock equivalents
only if they met the yield test on the date of issue.
Warrants were always classified as common stock equivalents; how
ever, they did not enter into the earnings per share computations under
the treasury stock method unless:

(1) the market price of the related

common stock was greater than the exercise price of the warrants or (2)
the 20 percent test was met and the aggregate results were dilutive.
Earnings per share computations of companies with warrants outstanding
remained a partial function of market values.

Further, the relationship

was inverse: the higher the market price of the common stock, the lower
the earnings per share.

The Board continued to prohibit retroactive

adjustment of earnings per share although the number of common stock
equivalents could be expected to change from period to period because of
changes in market prices.

Despite these conclusions, the fact is that
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the number of shares under option and the funds that would be received
from exercise remain constant.

Clearly the results produced by the

treasury stock method in any given period would agree with the results
when warrants are actually exercised only if the company actually pur
chased treasury stock with warrant proceeds and the price of the common
stock did not change.

This aspect of the treasury stock method needs to

be considered in formulating earnings-per-share guidelines.
Under the residual concept, the purpose of including residual
securities in earnings-per-share computations was to reflect changes in
the residual capital of a company in the per-share figures.

Securities

meeting the relative value test were residual and therefore a part of the
common equity.

Under the appropriate circumstances, a residual security

could cause an increase in traditionally computed earnings per share.
The relative value criterion for classifying securities as residual,
therefore, placed the Accounting Principles Board in direct conflict
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which favored potential dilu
tion as the criterion.

In fact, the Commission had issued a release that

required securities which would result in material potential dilution of
earnings per share at issue to be classified as residual even if the
relative value test of APB Opinion N o . 9 was not met.

The Commission

declined to suspend the dilution test and, under the concept of common
stock equivalents, the Board excluded from the computation securities
classified as common stock equivalents which would have the effect of in
creasing earnings per share as otherwise computed.

Abandonment of the

residual concept permitted a more realistic definition of the purpose of
including securities other than common stock in the earnings-per-share
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computations.

Under the concept of

common stock equivalents the pur

pose was to prevent a senior form of security which obtained a substan
tial part of its investment attractiveness because of its common stock
characteristics from being employed to give the appearance of greater
per share earnings than if common stock had actually been issued.
The inclusion of warrants as common stock equivalents presented
the Board with a unique problem.

Unlike convertible securities, which

generally do not require the payment of additional cash upon conversion,
the exercise of warrants usually requires payment in cash.

Unlike debt,

the proceeds of which are frequently committed to specific purposes by
the indenture, warrant agreements rarely require warrant proceeds to be
used for specific purposes.

Management is therefore free to use these

funds for any legitimate corporate purpose.
The manner in which these funds are used clearly affects earn
ings per share.

Under the residual concept, the Board appeared to

accept this conclusion by permitting the assumption that the funds were
invested consistent with the company's financial policies.

The scope of

this provision was severely limited, however, by prohibition of the
assumption that the proceeds would be invested in operating assets.
The Board also disallowed the assumption that proceeds would be invested
in treasury stock, after having approved this method in early drafts.
The Securities and Exchange Commission was opposed to the assump
tion that funds could be invested in accordance with the company's
financial policies.

Perhaps as a result of this opposition and in the

interests of greater uniformity, the Board did a complete about face and
adopted the treasury stock method under the concept of common stock
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equivalents.

The method, however was not to be construed as a literal

repurchase assumption, but merely as a practical means of computing the
dilution of earnings per share caused by warrants.
tage of the method was its simplicity.

The principal advan

There is ample evidence, however,

that the Accounting Principles Board adopted the treasury stock method
without having fully considered its effect on earnings per share under
various operating conditions.

After adoption of the treasury stock

method under the concept of common stock equivalents in the draft of
February 24, 1969, each subsequent draft of the proposed opinion con
tained modifications of the method.
1.

These modifications included:

Use of the average market price of common stock rather than
the current market price for primary earnings per share and
the use of the higher of average or current market prices
for fully diluted earnings per share.

2.

Exclusion of warrants which permitted the tendering of debt
or preferred stock in lieu of cash and warrants which re
quired that proceeds be applied to debt retirement.

3.

The 20 percent limitation designed to produce greater dilu
tion of earnings per share when large numbers of warrants
are outstanding and the ratio of the market price of the
common stock to the exercise price of the warrants is low.

The introduction of these modifications destroyed the treasury
stock method's principal advantage of simplicity and did little to
correct its shortcomings.

Earnings per share continued to be a partial

function of the market price of the company's common stock with an in
evitable adverse effect on the comparability of interperiod and
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intercompany earnings per share.

The earnings rate attributed to war

rant proceeds by this method decreases as the price of the company's
common stock increases.

Companies with high price-earnings ratios are

assumed to be unable to invest funds as advantageously as companies with
low price-earnings ratios.

In formulating guidelines for the earnings-

per-share computations of companies with warrants outstanding, considera
tion must be given to the question of whether the assumptions of the
treasury stock method result in an appropriate rate of return on war
rant proceeds.
Chapter 5 is concerned with the formulation of guidelines for
computing earnings per share of companies with warrants outstanding.
These guidelines will be derived from:

(1) the attributes of earnings

per share which investors appear to use as developed in Chapter 2, (2)
the characteristics of warrants which need to be considered in earningsper-share computations as analyzed in Chapter 3, and (3) the analysis in
this chapter of the difficulties encountered by the Accounting Principles
Board in the development of the concept of common stock equivalents.
Various assumptions about the use of warrant proceeds will be analyzed
in terms of these guidelines to determine the most suitable method of
computing earnings per share of companies with warrants outstanding.

Chapter 5

THE FORMULATION OF GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTING
EARNINGS PER SHARE OF COMPANIES WITH
WARRANTS OUTSTANDING

In the preceding chapters of this study, a number of observations
about earnings per share, warrants, and the concept of common stock
equivalents has been made.

The purpose of these observations was to

provide information relevant to the formulation of guidelines for com
puting earnings per share of companies with warrants outstanding.

A

summary of these observations is presented in the first section of this
chapter in order to provide a convenient reference for use in the devel
opment of guidelines for computing earnings per share of companies with
outstanding warrants.
In formulating guidelines for computing earnings per share of
companies with warrants outstanding, two basic questions need to be
answered:
1.

Should the effect of warrants enter into both primary and
fully diluted earnings per share?^

2.

In reflecting the dilutive effect of warrants in earnings per
share, what rate of return should be assumed on the proceeds
from exercised warrants?
The question of whether the effect of warrants should be included

in all earnings-per-share computations is considered in the second

^"For convenience, the terminology of APB Opinion No. 15 has been
adopted.
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section of this chapter.

The rate of return on warrant proceeds is

investigated within the context of the development of guidelines for
computing fully diluted earnings per share in the next section.

At this

point, the various methods of computing fully diluted earnings per share
are tested against the guidelines.

Finally, the recommended method of

computing fully diluted earnings per share, based on the guidelines
developed within this study, is presented.

SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS IN REGARD TO EARNINGS
PER SHARE, WARRANTS, AND THE CONCEPT OF
COMMON STOCK EQUIVALENTS

Several important points were developed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4
with regard to earnings per share, warrants, and the concept of common
stock equivalents.

These observations are used in the remaining sections

of this chapter to formulate guidelines for the computation of earnings
per share of companies with warrants outstanding.
1.

The purpose of earnings per share is to attribute the earn

ings of a corporate entity to the capitalization structure of the entity
existing during that period.

By relating earnings per share to price

per share, comparisons among corporations with different capital struc
tures, as well as interperiod comparisons of the same company, can be
made.

Additionally, the relationship of earnings per share to dividends

per share provides information about the entity's dividend policy.
2.

Many common stock valuation models employ earnings per share

historically and/or prospectively, explicitly or implicitly, as a basic
variable.

Historical earnings-per-share data are sometimes used as the

basis for predicting future earnings per share and/or, by application
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of a dividend payout ratio, future dividends per share.

The trend and

variability of the trend of past earnings per share are qualitative
factors which influence the earnings multiple or capitalization rate
which is applied to historical or prospective earnings per share in
arriving at stock values.

Therefore the timing of the recognition of

the dilution, if any, to earnings per share caused by warrants will
affect the absolute amount, the trend, and the variability of earnings
per share.
3.
standing

Dividends are paid on the basis of legal common shares out

on the date of declaration

average common share

is therefore a

of the dividend. Earnings per
useful statistic for evaluating

dividend policy.
4.

Most warrants are issued:

(1) as a unit with other securi

ties for

cash or (2) as a unit with

other securities as part considera

tion for

the securities of another corporation.

The primary reason for

issuing warrants, therefore, is not to raise equity capital but to make
the issue of securities to which the warrants are attached more attrac
tive to potential investors by adding value to the security package.
This added value is reflected in lower interest or dividend rates and
in the higher value received from the sale of the security package.
Since these benefits are reflected in the financial statements from the
date of issue of the security package, management should also be held
accountable for the detriments of attaching warrants to other securities;
namely, the potential dilution of a current stockholder's equity if the
warrants are exercised.

The fact remains that warrants, although

attached to other securities for the purpose of making the issue more
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attractive, will result in additional equity capital if the warrants are
exercised.

Furthermore, management has very little control over the

timing of these cash inflows resulting from the exercise of warrants.
5.

Warrants are not purchased by investors for the purpose of

acquiring common equity.

Purchasing warrants for this purpose would be

irrational because warrants normally sell at a premium above their in
trinsic value and are purchased for the leverage they offer an investor.
Successful leverage depends upon the high volatility of underlying common
stock prices.

The volatility of the common stock prices of most com

panies with warrants outstanding is greater than that of the average
listed company.
6.

Many warrant issues expire without a substantial number of

warrants having been exercised.

The conversion of most warrants that

are exercised generally occurs in the period immediately preceding the
expiration date of the issue.

Practically all warrants will be exer

cised if the market price of the underlying common stock exceeds the
exercise price of the warrants during this period.

If the exercise price

exceeds the common stock price during this period, the issue will expire
with very few warrants having been exercised.

As a consequence, partial

exercise of warrant issues occurs infrequently.
7.

Additional equity capital equal to the exercise price of each

warrant converted is received when warrants are exercised.

Warrant

agreements, unlike long-term debt indentures, rarely require that war
rant proceeds be used for specific purposes.

Management, therefore,

has the discretion to use these funds for any legitimate corporate pur
pose.

The effect of the exercise of warrants on earnings per share is
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a function of the relationship between:

(1) the number of shares of

common stock outstanding and the earnings attributable to assets
existing prior to the exercise of warrants and (2) the number of common
shares issued through the exercise of warrants and the earnings attri
butable to the warrant proceeds.

Dilution to earnings per share will

occur when the percentage of increase in earnings attributable to war
rant proceeds is less than the percentage of increase in shares out
standing attributable to the exercise of warrants.
8.

The time horizon of the average investor appear to be within

the range of from one to three years.

The median life span of the war

rant issues included in this study is 10 years.
9.

The concept of substance over form and approximation are

accepted by accountants in order to provide timely information which
reflects the economic realities of an event.
tations, therefore, may include:

Earnings-per-share compu

(1) potentially issuable common

shares as well as the legally outstanding common shares and (2) esti
mates of the earnings from the proceeds of warrants assumed to be
exercised.

MODIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF COMMON STOCK
EQUIVALENTS UNDER APB OPINION NO. 15 TO
EXCLUDE THE EFFECT OF WARRANTS FROM
PRIMARY EARNINGS PER SHARE2
Under APB Opinion No. 15 warrants are always common stock

^The elimination of warrants as common stock equivalents reduces
primary earnings per share to earnings per average common share assuming
no other common stock equivalents, such as convertible securities, are
present. The validity of including these other common stock equivalents
in primary earnings per share is a question beyond the scope of this
study. Primary earnings per share which excludes warrants from common
stock equivalents will be referred to as earnings per average common
share in this chapter in order to simplify the terminology.
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equivalents which enter into the computation of both primary and fully
diluted earnings per share if the effect is dilutive.

The inclusion of

warrants in primary earnings per share is questionable since the result
reflects neither the imminence nor likelihood of exercise of the war
rants.

In addition, the inclusion of essentially the same number of

common stock equivalents resulting from warrants in both earnings-pershare figures is questionable because it denies the user an estimate of
the total potential dilution which might result from the exercise of
warrants.

These questions are examined in this section.

First, the

provisions of APB Opinion No. 15 with respect to warrants are analyzed.
Second, a modification to overcome the weaknesses of APB Opinion No. 15
is proposed.

Finally factors supporting the proposed modification are

discussed.

Requirements of APB Opinion No. 15
with Respect to Warrants
Under the concept of common stock equivalents, two types of
earnings-per-share data for corporations with complex capital structures
are required:
1.

Primary earnings per share which is based on:
(1) the average
common shares outstanding and (2) the average common stock
equivalents outstanding which have a dilutive effect.

2.

Fully filuted earnings per share which is based on:
(1)
average common shares outstanding and (2) the average shares
which would have resulted from all contingent issues that
would individually have reduced earnings per share had such
shares been issued at the beginning of the period or at the
date of issue of the security giving rise to the contingency.^

JAn exception to this statement occurs under the 20 percent
limitation. If the number of shares potentially issuable through the
exercise of warrants is greater than 20 percent of the outstanding
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The purpose of requiring the inclusion of common stock equivalents in
primary earnings per share is to prevent the senior form of a security
which appeals to an investor primarily because of its potential share in
common stock appreciation being employed to give the appearance of
greater earnings per share than if common stock had actually been issued.
The same purpose is served by requiring that all securities which contain
a provision for the contingent issuance of common shares and have a
dilutive effect be included in fully diluted earnings per share.
The difference between the two per-share figures is merely one of
degree.

In the case of convertible securities this difference between

primary and fully diluted earnings per share can be material because the
criterion for determining common stock equivalents excludes those con
vertible securities for which the cash yield is two-thirds or more of
the prime rate on the date of issue.

Companies that wish to avoid

having convertible securities classified as common stock equivalents can
do so through the terms of the issue by using appropriate interest or
dividend rates and conversion ratios.
The potential for difference between primary and fully diluted
earnings per share is much less in the case of warrants.

Since warrants

are always common stock equivalents, the same issues will usually be in
cluded in both primary and fully diluted earnings per share.

The number

of common stock equivalents entering into the fully diluted computation
may be slightly more, however, due to differences in the computational

common shares, warrant issues which would not currently be dilutive to
earnings per share under the treasury stock method may be included in the
computation.
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guidelines for the two per-share figures.

In computing the number of

common stock equivalents to be included in primary earnings per share,
the average price of common stock for the period is used.

For purposes

of computing fully diluted earnings per share, the higher of the average
price or the current price is required.

These same common stock price

guidelines also apply to the treasury stock assumed to be purchased
under the 20 percent limitation.
In the case of convertible securities, management can avoid the
common stock equivalent classification by the terms of the issue, but
common stock equivalents cannot be avoided in a warrant agreement.

At

best, management can only postpone showing the dilutive effect of war
rants in earnings per share.

Postponement of the dilutive effect can be

accomplished by setting the exercise price of the warrants at a level
which is high in relation to the market price of the common stock on the
date of issue.

Even this strategy may fail, however, if the number of

warrants issued is greater than 20 percent of the common shares out
standing.

Under the 20 percent limitation, funds assumed to be derived

from the exercise of warrants are first applied to the purchase of
treasury shares to the extent of 20 percent of the common shares out
standing.

Any remaining funds are then assumed to be used for the

reduction of debt and/or investment in government or commercial securi
ties.

If the aggregate effect is dilutive to earnings per share as

otherwise computed, then the results enter into the earnings-per-share
computation.

As shown in Chapter 4,^ the 20 percent limitation can cause

^See page 213.
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dilution of earnings per share even if the exercise price is higher than
the market price of the common stock.

Deficiencies of APB Opinion No. 15
and Proposed Modification
In formulating guidelines for the earnings-per-share computations
of companies with warrants outstanding, consideration must be given to
the question of whether the best interests of investors are being served
by presenting them with two earnings-per-share figures that are some
times identical and frequently similar.

As the preceding discussion has

indicated, the effect of warrants on primary and fully diluted earnings
per share is identical unless the end-of-the-period price of the related
common stock is higher than the average price for the period.

If this

situation exists, then fully diluted earnings per share will be lower
than primary earnings per share and the magnitude of the difference in
earnings per share will be directly related to the magnitude of the
difference between the average price and ending price of the common
stock.
Does this difference, when it occurs, provide any significant new
information to the investor?

The knowledge that warrants are outstand

ing which might be dilutive is imparted to the investor by either of the
figures; therefore two figures are not necessary for this purpose.•* As
a matter of fact, by including essentially the same dilutive effect of

-’The only exception to this statement occurs when the average
price of the underlying common stock is lower than the exercise price of
the warrants and the end-of-period price of the common stock is higher
than the exercise price of the warrants. Under these circumstances war
rants would enter into the fully diluted earnings-per-share computation
but not the primary earnings-per-share computation.
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warrants in both primary and fully diluted earnings per share, important
information is being withheld from the user of earnings-per-share data.
The impact of the dilutive effect of warrants is lost because the user
is provided no basis for comparison.

This situation is compounded if

the reporting company has dilutive convertible securities outstanding
which are not classified as common stock equivalents.

The inclusion of

the dilutive effect of these securities in fully diluted earnings per
share is likely to completely obscure any additional dilution attribu
table to warrants.
Ideally, the potentially dilutive effect of warrants on earnings
per share can best be shown by presenting two earnings-per-share
figures--one assuming no dilution and the other assuming full dilution.
These two contrasting figures provide the user of earnings-per-share
information with the best and worst possible outcomes which might result
from the outstanding warrants.

Further, potential dilution from war

rants is forcefully brought to the attention of the reader of the finan
cial statements through a comparison of the two earnings-per-share
figures.

Factors Supporting the Exclusion
of Warrants from Primary
Earnings per Share
A number of factors enters into the decision to exclude the poten
tial dilution of warrants from primary earnings per share.

The timing of

the exercise of warrants, the fact that many warrant issues expire without
exercise, and the fact that few warrant issues are partially exercised
are warrant characteristics which influence the decision.

The dividend

payout ratio is also more meaningful if it is based on earnings per com
mon share.

Each of these factors, as well as selected comments of

corporate executives and committees of various financial and accounting
organizations, is discussed in this section.

Elimination of the dilu

tive effect of warrants from primary earnings per share depends upon the
accounting and financial community's acceptance of the dual, equal
prominence concept of APB Opinion No. 15.

This acceptance, particularly

in relation to managements' emphasis on price-earnings ratios, is also
discussed in this section.

Warrant characteristics.

The analysis of warrant characteristics

in Chapter 3, as summarized by Observation No. 6 on page 225 of this
chapter, supports the argument that two earnings-per-share figures, one
assuming no dilution and the other assuming full dilution, are desirable
for companies with warrants outstanding.

The evidence, as presented in

Table 22 on page 150 of Chapter 3 is two-fold;
1.

Warrants are not exercised until shortly before their expira

tion date unless other factors contained in the warrant agreement induce
early exercise.

Table 22 indicates that the median cumulative percen

tage of warrants exercised from the 20 issues was only 1.8 percent by
the end of the period immediately preceding the period of expiration.
Although the median life span of the warrants included in this study is
10 years,7 the average investor's time horizon appears to be from one to

°For a discussion of these factors, see pages
^See Table 10, page 126.

151-153.
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three years (Observation No. 8, page 226).

Under these circumstances

the average investor would not be concerned with the effect on earnings
per share of the dilution caused by the exercise of warrants unless his
time horizon included the expiration date of the warrants.

Q

During

other periods the earnings per average common share which is computed
under the assumption that there is no dilution would appear to be as
appropriate for investment analysis purposes as the earnings per share
which is computed under the assumption that there is full dilution.
2.

Many warrants expire without being exercised.

As indicated

by Table 22, the median percentage of warrants exercised from the 20
issues was approximately 59 percent.

The percentage of warrants exer

cised for six issues was less than 1 percent.

On the other hand, the

percentage of warrants exercised for seven issues was 95 percent or
more.

Only one issue had a percentage of exercise which fell in the

range from 20 percent to 80 percent.

These statistics emphasize the

importance of providing an investor with earnings-per-share figures

8See page 52.
^This statement implies that potential dilution in the market
price of the common stock being evaluated is not reflected until the ex
piration date of the warrants approaches. Alternatively, it implies
that the investor adjusts the earnings multiple or discount factor used
in his evaluation of the stock to reflect the market's discount of the
potential dilution. Lerner and Auster have concluded that the market
does discount potential dilution. Their conclusion, however, applies
primarily to the potential dilution resulting from convertible securi
ties. In addition, their study is not addressed to the question of the
timing of the recognition of the potential dilution. See Eugene M.
Lerner and Rolf Auster, "Does the Market Discount Potential Dilution?"
Financial Analysts Journal. XXV (July-August, 1969), 118-121.
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which assume no dilution as well as those which assume full dilution.
The investor is then in a position to make his own assessment as to the
probability that the outstanding warrants will be exercised and the
effect that the exercise or non-exercise of these warrants will have on
earnings per share and the common stock price.

Such information is denied

the investor under the provisions of APB Opinion No. 15.

Dividend policy.

The analysis of common stock valuation tech

niques in Chapter 2 (summarized in Observation Nos. 2 and 3 on pages 223224) disclosed several methods which employ estimates of dividends per
share.

A common practice is to base such estimates on estimated earnings

per share and dividend payout ratios.^-®

In such situations earnings per

common share assuming no dilution would be a useful tool to the investor
because:

(1) dividends are paid on the basis of actual shares out

standing and (2) warrants are rarely exercised (and therefore do not
become outstanding shares) until the period of their expiration.
The importance of providing investors with earnings per common
share assuming no dilution is demonstrated by the seemingly illogical
earnings-per-share statistics resulting from the application of APB
Opinion No. 15 to certain real estate investment trusts.

A number of

these trusts, in their initial offering to the public, attached a war
rant to purchase one share of beneficial interest to each share sold.
In order to qualify for favorable tax treatment, these trusts must dis
tribute at least 90 percent of their ordinary income to their

■^See pages 61-64.
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shareholders.

As a result of these circumstances, annual dividend pay

ments per share are likely to be higher than earnings per share when the
warrants become common stock equivalents as provided by APB Opinion N o .

Two examples from the many examples available should be suffi
cient to illustrate this aspect of APB Opinion No. 15.

American

Fletcher Mortgage Investors is a Massachusetts business trust which
qualifies as a real estate investment trust for tax purposes.

On

January 27, 1970 the trust offered for sale at $25 per unit 540,000 units
consisting of one share of common stock and a five-year warrant to pur
chase one share of common stock at $25 per share.

In its first year of

operation the trust's primary earnings per share was $2.40 and fully
diluted earnings per share was $2.17.

However, dividends of $2.51 per

share were paid in order for the trust to retain its favorable tax
status.
C. I. Mortgage Group is another Massachusetts business trust
which qualifies as a real estate investment trust for tax purposes.

For

the fiscal year ending October 31, 1972 it had primary earnings per
share of $2.29 and fully diluted earnings per share of $1.80.

Dividends

during the same period were $2.63 per share.
The prohibition of the presentation of earnings per average com
mon share outstanding by APB Opinion No. 15 does a disservice to investors
of these trusts who desire to evaluate the trusts' dividend policies or

^ S e e pages 85-86 for a discussion of the characteristics of real
estate investment trusts.
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to estimate future dividends based on earnings per share.

Neither pri

mary nor fully diluted earnings per share bears any relation to present
dividends or those that will be payable in the immediate future because
such dividends will be paid on the basis of actual shares outstanding in
each period.

Although these examples are extreme due to the unusual tax

status of real estate investment trusts, the principle remains the same
for companies in other industries.
promulgated

This deficiency in the methods

in APB Opinion No. 15 was recognized by Robert L. Forsberg,

Vice President--Finance and Treasurer of Arizona Public Service Company
in a comment letter to the Institute.

In opposing the substitution of

primary earnings per share for earnings per average common share, he
stated:
One of the criteria used in an investment decision is the divi
dend pay-out ratio. This is different with different industries.
By introducing a primary earnings per share statistic, the dividend
pay-out ratio would change and could possible [sic.] create a wrong
interpretation when the ratio of one company is compared with that
of a different company. This could also be true in the pay-out
ratio of one industry against another.^

Opinion of major accounting and financial organizations and
corporate executives.

As indicated in Table 25 on pages

180 and 181 of

Chapter 4, most of the major accounting and finance organizations that
responded to the November 6, 1968 exposure draft were opposed to the
residual security concept and, by implication, to the common stock
equivalency concept as they related to primary earnings per share.

12

The

Letter from Robert L. Fosberg, Vice President--Finance and
Treasurer of Arizona Public Service Company, to Richard C. Lytle,
Administrative Director of the Accounting Principles Board of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated January 10,
1969.
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comment letters of these organizations indicated a preference for two
earnings-per-share figures--one assuming no dilution and one assuming
full dilution.

The opposition to an earnings-per-share statistic which

included residual securities or common stock equivalents as well as
common shares was directed toward the arbitrary nature of the criteria
for determining which securities were residual or common stock equiva
lents.

The concern of this segment of the financial community was that

the residual concept would ". . . i n the eyes of investors, infuse such
artificiality, complexity and confusion into earnings per share figures
1 O

as to undermine their value."
The Corporate Reporting Committee of the Financial Executives
Institute recognized that the earnings-per-share figures of a few com
panies were misleading because of the use of unusual or "gimmick" securi
ties.

They objected, however, to the Accounting Principles Board's

solution which denied the investor earnings per average common share.
This objection is indicated in the following statement:
Let us first state that our committee agrees with the objectives
of the SEC and the APB in attempting to arrive at a reasonable
"earnings per share" computation. The recent proliferation of
various unusual types of securities, "chinese securities," used
primarily in the case of acquisitions to confuse and, in some cases,
bury the true dilutive effect of the acquisitions, has resulted in
misleading "earnings per share" data for a relatively few companies
and this has created a question regarding the validity of the
reports of all companies.
However, in spite of our agreement with the objectives, we be
lieve that the solution proposed in the exposure drafts would

■'■Memorandum from the Corporation Finance Committee of the In
vestment Bankers Association of America to the APB Subcommittee on
Convertible Securities of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants dated January 7, 1969.
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result in more confusion and misunderstandings regarding the true
results of the large number of companies that have confined the
issuance of securities to the standard issues which do not in
essence distort the "earnings per share."^
Edward F. Gee, Chairman of the Commercial Lending Committee of
the American Bankers Association, expressed his concern as follows:
As proposed, any statement of common earnings per share would
partially involve arbitrary assumptions based on arbitrary criteria.
This, I submit, is not desirable and can lead only to misunderstand
ing and confusion. It denies the reader a solid base of existing
legal reality from which to start his assessment of the signifi
cance of the fully diluted potential.^
A task force committed of the American Accounting Association
recommended, pending further research, that earnings per average common
share and earnings per share on a fully diluted basis be reported.

The

conclusions of this committee were based on the relevancy of the various
statistics as shown in the following statement:
We can identify potential value for a calculation of earnings
per share based on currently outstanding shares; for instance, as
one basis for evaluating dividend policy. We can also identify
potential value for a calculation of earnings per share based on
full conversion of all securities. However, the selection of an
equivalent number of shares somewhere between these two extremes
and a related earnings figure implies that some other purpose is
being served.^

^Letter from J. J. Hangen, Chairman, Subcommittee on Convertible
Securities of the Corporate Reporting Committee of the Financial Execu
tives Institute, to the Accounting Principles Board of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants dated December 30, 1968.
15

Letter from Edward F. Gee, Chairman of the Commercial Lending
Committee of the American Bankers Association, to Joseph Caramanica of
the American Bankers Association dated March 31, 1969.
■^Task Force Committee of the American Accounting Association,
"Statement of Task Force Committee of American Accounting Association on
Exposure Drafts of Proposed APB Opinions on Accounting for Convertible
Debt and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase Warrants and Earnings per
Share dated November 6, 1968," no date, p. 8.
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The Task Force Committee rejected the residual security concept
on the grounds that it could find no valid purpose being served by pri
mary earnings per share.

The committee stated:

We are disturbed that a particular intermediate earnings per
share figure has been selected and designated as "primary"
(namely, of singular importance) when this figure has in no way
been established as being relevant to any user or use. For
example, neither the investment value test nor the parity test
for determining inclusion in the denominator of the earnings per
share calculation has any necessary relationship to the potential
dilution of share equity. Further, neither of these tests reveals
either the imminence or likelihood of ultimate conversion of con
vertibles or exercise of warrants or options. One can argue
normatively that imminence and/or likelihood of the ultimate dilu
tion is relevant to certain types of decisions. We could not
develop any rational basis for determining that the "primary"
earnings per share as computed was relevant.^
Clyde Skeen, President of Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., also ques
tioned the relevance of an earnings figure which included some but not
all potentially dilutive securities.

He stated:

The residual concept is no more than an intermediate calculation
somewhere between a factual one based on actual shares outstanding
and the ultimate in theory represented by the fully diluted concept.
If any calculation is justified to show what might be, it should
deal with all possibilities rather than certain prescribed effects.
We conclude that there is no need for the residual concept under
any circumstances and recommend that it be completely discarded.
Other respondents to the November 6, 1968 exposure draft favored
earnings per average common share as the primary earnings-per-share
figure because of its conformity to the legal realities of capital struc
tures, its ease of calculation, and its understandability by the average

■*-^Ibid. , pp. 8-9.
1 Q

AOLetter from Clyde Skeen, President of Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.,
to Richard C. Lytle, Administrative Director of the Accounting Principles
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated
January 10, 1969.
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investor.

The following comments are typical of those received by the

Institute in support of this position:
. . . there should be a full recognition of the nominal facts
and of the legal realities as they actually existed during and as
of the end of the earnings period. This is tangible, determinable,
definite, legally factual, and capable of computation and inter
pretation without dependence on assumptions or suppositions or
market evaluations or other arbitrary criteria. It is, of course,
the orthodox view of common stock earnings, and dividends, and net
book value, per share. It assumes nothing--it relates only to the
nominal legal and accounting realities that existed at the time.
Although there was some disagreement as to whether fully diluted
earnings per share should be given equal prominence with earnings per
average common share by placing it on the face of the income statement
instead of relegating it to the notes to the financial statements, most
comment letters favored the fully diluted concept.

The following

comments of Edward F. Gee summarize the points made by most respondents
to the November 6, 1968 exposure draft;
It is highly desirable, of course, that the Board require a
computation and prominent presentation of earnings per share
based on the maximum number of common shares or common share
equivalents that can, under all existing issues, contracts, and
agreements, be outstanding at some point in the future, after
giving full effect to all debt-conversions, preferred stock
conversions, stock options, warrants, stock purchase contracts,
participating securities, two-class commons, contingent shares,
or other capital structure devices. . . . This results in
showing clearly the maximum existing potential dilution in
common-share earnings, based on the most adverse suppositions.
It thus presents the bleakest possible picture for a corporation's
current per share common earnings. Certainly, no analyst or
investor can ever be mislead when the presentation of such an ex
treme re-statement of current earnings is an essential accounting
requirement.20

•^Letter from Edward F. Gee, Chairman of the Commercial Lending
Committee of the American Bankers Association, to Joseph Caramanica of
the American Bankers Association dated March 31, 1969.
20Ibid.
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Dual, equal prominence concept.

The Accounting Principles Board's

insistence that primary earnings per share include common stock equiva
lents even though fully diluted earnings per share would also be required
suggests a lack of confidence in the dual, equal prominence concept of
APB Opinion No. 15.

The Board had introduced the concept in APB Opinion

No. 9 by strongly recommending that earnings per share and pro forma
earnings per share be included in the statement of income.
concluded that this reporting format would " . . .

The Board

help to eliminate the

tendency of many users to place undue emphasis on one amount reported as
earnings per share.
Many respondents to the November 6, 1968 exposure draft supported
the dual, equal prominence concept although they were opposed to the
residual security concept and use of the word "primary" to describe one
of the figures.

In their opinion the practice of labeling one figure

primary defeated the purpose of the dual, equal prominence concept.

This

was the view of a task force committee of the American Accounting Asso
ciation, as reflected in the following comments.
We committee members believe that the provision of only one
earnings per share carries the implication that it is generally
relevant for many users making different decisions. Similarly,
any earnings per share figure labelled as "primary" will carry
the implication. We do not believe that any earnings per share
figure can well serve the wide variety of uses to which it may be
put. The majority of our committee believes that reporting only
one earnings per share figure in the income statement will only
serve to perpetuate and add support to an overly simple view of
earnings per share. We therefore recommend that, as a minimum,

21
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Reporting the Results of Operations, Opinions
of the Accounting Principles Board, No. 9 (New York: American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1967), p. 119.
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earnings per common share outstanding (weighted average for the
year) and fully diluted earnings per share be required by the
present opinion.22
The Board's refusal to allow earnings per average common share
outstanding as one of the earnings-per-share figures may have reflected
a fear that earnings per average common share would be emphasized and
fully diluted earnings would be ignored by management in its press re2^
leases and by the financial press and statistical services. J

William

H. Harrison, Vice President and Controller of General Telephone and
Electronics Corporation, pointed out this danger to the Accounting
Principles Board in the following comments:
As a general comment pertinent to this and other bulletins, we
feel that the accounting profession should recognize and be sen
sitive to the widespread use of investment information sources
other than the fully detailed certified financial statements con
tained in annual reports and prospectuses. . . . The practical
fact is that many investors inform themselves solely by reference
to newspaper reports, stock guide summaries and other cryptic
sources. ^

22

Task Force Committee of the American Accounting Association,
"Statement of Task Force Committee of American Accounting Association on
Exposure Drafts of Proposed APB Opinions on Accounting for Convertible
Debt and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase Warrants and Earnings per
Share dated November 6, 1968," no date, p. 6.
2 % a n y investors rely on information sources other than annual
reports and Security and Exchange Commission filings. For example, Baker
and Haslem, in a survey of common-stock investors in metropolitan
Washington, D. C., found that 46.8 percent of the 775 respondents rated
stockbrokers as the most important source of information. The most im
portant source of investment information for 15.6 percent of the respon
dents was advisory services, followed by newspapers for 11.3 percent.
Only 7.9 percent rated financial statements as the most important source.
See H. Kent Baker and John A. Haslem, "Information Needs of Individual
Investors," Journal of Accountancy. CXXXVI (November, 1973), 64-69.
2^Letter from William H. Harrison, Vice President and Controller
of General Telephone and Electronics Corporation, to Richard C. Lytle,
Administrative Director of the Accounting Principles Board of the Ameri
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated January 16, 1969.
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The Board had considered the space problems created by two earnings-per-share figures early in its deliberations.

For example, the Sub

committee on Convertible and Participating Securities met with
representatives of Standard & Poor's Corporation on August 27, 1968.
Standard & Poor's indicated that " . . .

there would be space problems

if they tried to give equal prominence to both figures, but they would
do all they could to comply."

25

Experience subsequent to the release of APB Opinion No. 15 indi
cates that the major investor services and financial newspapers do pub
lish both earnings-per-share figures.^6

The argument that such

publications would emphasize earnings per average common share outstanding

2S
Memorandum prepared for the convertible securities file of the
Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants dated August 27, 1968.
26

The stated policies of two major publishers of investor ser
vices are offered as proof of this statement.
See Moody's Investors
Services, Inc., Moody's Industrial Manual; 1974, I (New York: Moody's
Investors Services, Inc., 1974), x for the following statement of Moody's
policy:
Earned per common share is generally shown as reported by the
company in its annual report. Where shares outstanding have in
creased during the year earnings per common share is usually based
on the average number of shares outstanding during the year (in
some cases including common equivalent shares). Earned per share
based on common on a fully diluted basis, is shown when reported
by the company.
See also Standard & Poor's Corporation, Security Owner's Stock Guide.
XXVIII (June, 1974), 1 for the following statement of Standard & Poor's
policy:
Earnings per share are in general on a "Primary" basis as
reported by company, excluding extraordinary items. If common
equivalents are dilutive, the primary earnings are prefixed by
symbol S; if potential dilution is significant, the extent is
indicated for the latest year by reporting the "Fully Diluted"
in the footnotes.
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through the omission of fully diluted earnings per share appears, in
retrospect, to be without merit.

There is, however, at least one excep

tion to this statement.
As discussed in Chapter 2, price-earnings ratios have been added
to the price, volume, and dividend information contained in the daily
stock quotations published by many newspapers.^7
constraint in publishing these quotations.

Space is a critical

As a result, primary earnings

per share is the earnings figure selected for computing the daily priceearnings ratio.

28

Management's emphasis on price-earnings ratio.

The presumption

that management would emphasize earnings per average common share while
ignoring fully diluted earnings per
that investors would

share is based on the assumption

place a highervalue on the shares because of the

higher earnings per share.

Some managements, however, place great

emphasis on the price-earnings ratio.

High price-earnings ratios were

the key to some of the acquisitions by conglomerates during the middle
1960's. Childs and others have shown that earnings per share of the
acquiring company will increase in the year of the acquisition of a
company provided:

(1) the price paid per share for the acquired company

divided by the acquired company's earnings per share is lower than the

27see page 60.
28

For example, on November 7, 1972 Daylin, Inc. announced primary
earnings per share of $1.60 and fully diluted earnings per share of $1.43
for the period endedSeptember 3, 1972. Daylin's stock closed at 17 7/8
on November 8, 1972,
resulting in a reported price-earnings ratio of 11
based on primary earnings per share. Had fully diluted earnings of $1.43
per share been used in the computation, the price-earnings ratio would
have been 13 (rounded to the nearest integer).
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acquiring company's price-earnings ratio and (2) the acquisition is
accounted for on a poolings of interest basis.^9

This increase in earn

ings per share of the acquiring company occurs only in the year of the
acquisition.

Further increases related to the acquisition depend upon;

(1) increasing the rate of return on the assets acquired (synergism) and
(2) the return on the earnings of the acquired company which are retained
and reinvested.

This tendency of some managements to judge their success

in terms of the price-earnings ratio of their stock is shown by Childs
in the following statement from an unidentified executive;
Everything has changed, the name of the game today is get the
current earnings up, boost the price-earnings ratio in every way
possible and use the inflated paper to boost current earnings
again and again by more acquisitions.
Look at the millions of dollars of stock value that such
tactics create.30
A current example of management's emphasis on fully diluted earn
ings per share for purposes of computing price-earnings ratios is
provided by Mesulam Riklis, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
Rapid-American Corporation.

As of January 31, 1974 Rapid-American had

4,053,333 shares of common stock reserved for the exercise of warrants.
This amounted to 60.3 percent of its 6,726,679 outstanding common
shares.

Riklis stated:

We have made a basic decision in our company that we are going
to emphasize fully-diluted earnings. We did that last year. It's

2Q

^See John F. Childs, Earnings per Share and Management Decisions
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971), pp. 33-36. See
also Marvin M. May, "The Earnings per Share Traps," Financial Analysts
Journal. XXIV (May-June, 1968), 113-117.
John F. Childs, Earnings per Share and Management Decisions
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 125.
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the only way you can really make a comparison. So this year we
will only show fully-diluted. We will not even show the others,
because we don't like to be shown at a six-time multiple when
^
on the fully-diluted basis we are a 10 or 11-time multiple. . . .
If the price of Rapid-American's common fully reflects the
anticipated dilution, an investor would perhaps be justified in using
the higher multiple based on fully diluted earnings per share for cer
tain of his investment decisions such as long-term price estimates.
However, when the expiration date of the warrants is several years in
the future the possibility exists that the market has not fully dis
counted the dilutive effect of the warrants.

In addition, certain

decisions are affected by the actual number of shares outstanding.

In

vestment decisions of this type, such as short-term price estimates and
dividend payout, might be more appropriately based on earnings per
average common share.
The conclusion is that there is no one earnings-per-share figure
appropriate for all purposes.

Earnings per common share, which reflects

the current legal rights of common shareholders, and fully diluted earn
ings per share, which reflects all potential dilution, are more appro
priate, ipso facto, than primary earnings per share for the investment
decisions discussed above.

The common stock equivalents used in comput

ing primary earnings reflect neither the imminence nor likelihood of the
ultimate exercise of warrants.

As a result, primary earnings per share

does not appear to be a relevant tool for investment decisions.
Based on these conclusions, this study will proceed under the

O 1

"People and Profits--Rapid-American Corporation," Wall Street
Reports, VII (April, 1973), 58.
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assumption that, as a minimum, two earnings-per-share figures are rele
vant to an investor who chooses to use earnings per share in evaluating
the common stock of companies with warrants outstanding.

The first,

earnings per average common share outstanding,^ assumes no dilution of
earnings through the exercise of warrants.

The second, fully diluted

earnings per share, indicates what earnings per share might have been
had all warrants been exercised during the period.

By comparing the two

figures, an investor can determine the magnitude of the dilution which
could occur if the warrants are exercised.

This comparison is not pos

sible under the guidelines of APB Opinion No. 15 because primary earnings
per share includes essentially the same number of common stock equiva
lents resulting from warrants as does fully diluted earnings per share.
The conclusion that the potentially dilutive effect of warrants
should be reflected only in fully diluted earnings-per-share computations
leaves unresolved the question of what assumptions should be made re
garding the use of the proceeds which would be received if the warrants

on

J The use of average common shares in computing
mon share is based on the Institute's position. Others
number of shares outstanding at the end of the period.
Eric L. Kohler, in a comment letter to Richard C. Lytle
6, 1968 exposure draft, stated:

earnings per com
would use the
For example,
on the November

. . . Averaging outstanding shares during a reporting
period . . . can be justified only where earnings have actually
been modified by changes in such shares (as from a takeover).
Aside from this exception, I have never seen a situation where
other types of changes in outstanding shares have had any notice
able effect on net income. "Earnings per share" is a ratio of the
moment, not one that has been effective throughout a reporting
period. . . . Where additional shares have been sold or issued,
say, as a bonus shortly before the end of the period, the APBO-9
formula may have the effect of seriously overstating the ratio.
Consideration of this question is beyond the scope of this study.
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were exercised.

APB Opinion No. 15 makes the general assumption, for

computational purposes, that the funds would be used to purchase common
stock at current market prices.

The result of this assumption is that

earnings per share varies inversely with the price of the underlying
common stock.

This and other assumptions regarding the use of warrant

proceeds are considered in the following sections of this chapter.

DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTING
FULLY DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE

In Chapter 2 of this study the attributes of earnings per share
were examined.
analyzed.

In Chapter 3 the characteristics of warrants were

The purpose of this section is to formulate guidelines for

reflecting the potentially dilutive effect of warrants in fully diluted
earnings per share.

In formulating these guidelines the characteristics

of warrants will be related to the attributes of earnings per share used
by investors in order to determine the most appropriate method of re
flecting the dilutive effects of warrants.

During the course of this

analysis, reference will be made to the summary of observations about
earnings per share and warrants detailed in the first section of this
chapter.
Earnings per share relates the absolute amount of earnings
theoretically available to common stockholders to the capital structure
which existed during the period (Observation No. 1).

Reducing earnings

to a share basis is necessary in order to establish valid relationships
with other variables which influence common stock investment decisions.
These other variables are usually expressed on a per-share basis.

For
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example, common stock prices are always quoted on a per-share basis and
dividends are usually expressed in terms of one share.
Investors who use earnings per share to evaluate common stocks
are interested in comparisons.

They compare current period earnings per

share with those of preceding periods for the same company or they com
pare earnings per share of one company with those of another company in
the same time frames.

Similar comparisons are made by relating earnings

per share to price per share and to dividends per share.

Chapter 2 con

cluded that the important attributes of earnings per share were the
absolute amounts, the trend, and the variability of the trend (Observa
tion No. 2).
In reflecting the potentially dilutive effect of warrants in
earnings per share, the characteristics of warrants and the effect of
these characteristics on the attributes of earnings per share must be
considered.

These characteristics of warrants and their effect on the

attributes of earnings per share are discussed within the following
framework:

(1) the period over which dilution should be reflected, (2)

the amount of dilution which should be reflected, (3) the rate of
return on warrant proceeds, and (4) the variability of the rate of
return.

Period over Which Dilution
Should be Reflected
Recognition of potential dilution in fully diluted earnings per
share reduces the absolute amount of earnings per share.

Consequently

the trend and variability of the trend of earnings per share are also
affected (Observation No. 2).

Since these are important attributes of
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earnings per share, the question of the timing of the recognition of
potential dilution becomes important.
Chapter 3 of this study concluded that the issuance of warrants
is a management decision.

Warrants are usually attached to other securi

ties as an inducement which facilitates the sale of the securities and/or
reduces the interest or dividends.

These benefits are reflected in the

financial statements from the date of issue of the warrants (Observation
No.4).

Certeris paribus, earnings per share during the period over

which the warrants are outstanding is higher than it otherwise would have
been.
This improved performance for which management receives credit
is not without potential cost to common stockholders.

The cost to a

current stockholder of management's decision to issue warrants is the
dilution of his equity in the corporation if the warrants are exercised.
A proper matching of the sacrifices resulting from the issuance of
warrants with the benefits derived therefrom requires, therefore, that
the potentially dilutive effect of warrants be reflected in fully diluted
earnings per share from the date warrants are issued to the date of
exercise or expiration.

Reflecting the potential dilution in fully

diluted earnings per share during the period warrants are outstanding
accomplishes the following:

(1) management is made accountable for the

sacrifices as well as benefits of issuing warrants and (2) the common
stockholder is made aware of the possible dilution to his equity.

The

conclusion is, therefore, that the dilutive effect of warrants should be
recognized in fully diluted earnings per share during all periods in
which warrants are outstanding.
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Amount of Dilution Which
Should Be Reflected
The term dilution is used in several different but interrelated
contexts by financial analysts and investors.

Dilution may refer to a

loss of voting power, a decline in asset values (book value) per share,
a decline in earnings per share, or a decline in market value per share.

33

In each context the cause of the dilution is related to the issuance of
additional shares of common stock.

Since this study is concerned with

the potential dilution in earnings per share which might be attributed to
warrants, an understanding of dilution in its various contexts and of how
dilution is reflected in earnings per share when warrants are exercised
is important.

Dilution of voting power.

Dilution of voting power occurs when

additional common stock is issued to new stockholders.

The amount of

the dilution for the current stockholders as a group is the number of
new shares issued to non-current stockholders expressed as a percentage
of the total number of shares owned by current stockholders.

Since

warrants are frequently attached to debt, preferred stock, and nonpreemptive common stock issues, a loss of voting power usually occurs
when warrants are exercised.

If an individual stockholder wishes to

avoid dilution of voting power, he must purchase shares of the new issue
proportional to his current holdings.

■^Philip M. Hubbard, Jr., classifies dilution into these four
categories in an article entitled "The Many Aspects of Dilution." The
discussion of dilution which follows is based, in part, on the ideas
presented in that article. See Philip M. Hubbard, Jr., "The Many
Aspects of Dilution," Financial Analysts Journal. XIX (May-June, 1963),
33-40.
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Dilution of asset values. Asset values are diluted when an
issue of common stock is sold at a price per share (or exchanged for
other assets valued at fair market expressed on a per-share basis) which
is lower than the current book value per share.

Theoretically, book

value should be based on the current replacement cost of assets rather
than original cost in order to provide for the comparability of assets
presently employed with those being acquired by the new issue of common
stock.
Since assets are reported at original cost rather than replace
ment value, dilution of asset values will not be reflected in the finan
cial statements unless the assets acquired through the issuance of
additional common stock, expressed on a per-share basis, are less than
the book value per share of existing assets valued at original cost.
This dilution of book value has important implications for earnings per
share.

If the funds acquired through the issuance of additional common

stock which dilutes book value earn at the same rate as existing net
assets, dilution of earnings per share will occur.

Management should

not, therefore, issue common stock at prices which dilute asset values
unless the new assets can be employed in a more productive manner than
existing assets.

If the new assets are more productive, then the cur

rent dilution of assets values will be offset in the long run through
increased earnings retained in the business.

Dilution of earnings per share.

Dilution of earnings per share

occurs when the percentage of increase in earnings produced by the assets
acquired through the issuance of additional common stock is less than
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the

percentage of

the

issue.

increase in common shares outstanding as a result of

Dilution of earnings per share, therefore, is a function of:

(1) the earnings produced by existing assets,

(2) the earnings produced

by the assets acquired through the issuance of additional common stock,
(3)

the number of

common shares outstanding prior to the new issue, and

(4)

the number ofshares issued to acquire the new assets (Observation

No. 7).
An analysis of the relationships among these functions will pro
vide an understanding of the dilution which will be reflected in earn
ings per share when dilutive warrants are exercised.
(3),

for the purposes of this analysis, are constant.

tion (1)

Functions (1) and
Dividing Func

(the earnings produced by existing assets) by Function (3)

(the number of common shares outstanding prior to the new issue) pro
duces the earnings per share which would have existed had warrants not
been exercised.

Dividing Function (2) (the earnings produced by the

assets acquired through the exercise of warrants) by Function (4) (the
number of shares issued through the exercise of warrants) gives the
earnings per share produced by the additional capital.

Dilution of

earnings per share will result if the earnings per share produced by the
additional capital received from the exercise of warrants is less than
the earnings per share of the existing capital.
Given the rate of return of existing net assets and the book
value per share of those assets, the dilution which will be reflected
in earnings per share through the exercise of warrants is determined by
two variables:

(1) the exercise price of the warrants and (2) the rate

of return earned on the exercise price.

The effect of each of the nine
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possible combinations of these variables on earnings per share is as
follows:
Status of Variables
Affecting Earnings per Share

Effect on Earnings
per Share

Approximate Rate of
Return on Exercise
Price Required to
Prevent Dilution

Less than
rate of
return on
exercise
price

Non-dilutive

Not applicable

Less than exer
cise price per
share

Equal to
rate of
return on
exercise
price

Non-dilutive

Not applicable

Less than exer
cise price per
share

Greater than
rate of
return on
exercise
price

Indeterminate;
depends on rate
of return on
exercise price

EPS on existing assets
divided by exercise
price per share

Equal to exer
cise price per
share

Less than
rate of
return on
exercise
price

Non-dilutive

Not applicable

Equal to exer
cise price per
share

Equal to
rate of
return on
exercise
price

Non-dilutive

Not applicable

Equal to exer
cise price per
share

Greater than
rate of
return on
exercise
price

Dilutive

Not applicable

If Book Value
per Share of
Existing Net
Assets Is_____

If Rate of
Return on
Existing Net
Assets Is

Less than exer
cise price per
share
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Status of Variables
Affecting Earnings per Share

Effect on Earnings
per Share_____

Approximate Rate of
Return on Exercise
Price Required to
Prevent Dilution

Less than
rate of
return on
exercise
price

Indeterminate;
depends on rate
of return on
exercise price

EPS on existing
assets divided by
exercise price per
share

Greater than
exercise price
per share

Equal to
rate of
return on
exercise
price

Dilutive

Not applicable

Greater than
exercise price
per share

Greater than
rate of
return on
exercise
price

Dilutive

Not applicable

If Book Value
per Share of
Existing Net
Assets Is

If Rate of
Return on
Existing Net
Assets Is

Greater than
exercise price
per share

Earnings per share, therefore,will always be diluted through the
exercise of warrants if the exercise price is equal to or less than the
book value per share of existing assets and the rate of return on the
exercise price is less than the rate of return on existing net assets.
If the rate of return on the exercise price and the rate of return on
existing net assets

are equal, dilution will occur if the exercise price

is less than the book value per share of existing assets.
Dilution of earnings per share through the exercise of warrants
may also occur when the exercise price is higher than the book value per
share if the rate of return on the exercise price is sufficiently lower
than the rate of return on existing net assets.

On the other hand, dilu

tion will not occur when the exercise price per share is lower than the
book value per share of existing assets if the rate of return on the
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exercise price is sufficiently higher than the rate of return on existing
net assets.

In each of these two cases, the approximate rate of return

on the exercise price necessary to prevent dilution is the quotient
obtained by dividing the earnings per share of existing net assets by
the exercise price per share.

This rate is referred to as the cost of

the capital obtained by the exercise of warrants.

Dilution, therefore,

will be reflected in earnings per share whenever the rate of return on
warrant proceeds is less than the cost of the capital obtained from the
warrants exercised.

Dilution of market price on common stock. Although this study
deals primarily with the dilution of earnings per share caused by the
issuance and exercise of warrants, many investors are perhaps more con
cerned with the dilution of market price of the underlying common shares
which may result from the exercise of warrants.

The investor's interest

in the dilution of earnings per share may be limited to the extent that
he believes dilution of earnings per share will be reflected in a dilu
tion of the common stock price.
Dilution of earnings per share through the exercise of warrants
is only one of many factors which might be related to a dilution of mar
ket price.

In fact, an immediate dilution in earnings per share caused

by the exercise of warrants might not result in a dilution of price.

If,

for example, investors feel that the funds provided by the exercise of
warrants will be invested profitably and thereby result in a future in
crease in the growth rate of earnings per share, the price of the shares
may increase rather than decrease.

On the other hand, a failure to

257

maintain the dividend rate because the exercise of warrants has increased
divident requirements would result in the dilution of market price to
the extent that price is determined by dividends rather than earnings.
Unless offset by other factors, dilution of market price will also re
sult from an increase in the supply of shares made available for trading
through the exercise of warrants.

Regardless of the causes for dilution

of market price, the importance of warning investors of this potential
dilution is apparent.

Earnings per share is perhaps the most effective

device for providing this warning.

By reflecting the potential dilution

of warrants in fully diluted earnings per share for the entire period
that warrants are outstanding, the investor is alerted to the potential
dilution of the market price of his shares.

Rate of Return on Warrant Proceeds
In the preceding discussion of dilution, the conclusion was
reached that dilution of earnings per share through the exercise of war
rants will occur when the rate of return earned on warrant proceeds is
less than the cost of the capital derived from the exercise of warrants
where the cost of capital provided by warrants is defined as the rate
obtained by dividing the earnings per share of existing assets by the
exercise price per share.

In theory, therefore, the dilution which is

reflected in earnings per share when dilutive warrants are exercised is
easily calculated, given the rate of return earned on warrant proceeds
and the cost of the capital provided by those proceeds.
The application of this theory in practice, however, presents
some problems.

In order to determine the rate of return on warrant
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proceeds or the cost of the capital provided by the exercise of warrants,
the absolute amount of earnings must be separated into two component
parts:

(1) the earnings applicable to existing capital and (2) the earn

ings applicable to warrant proceeds.

The earnings applicable to warrant

proceeds, of course, is a function of how the funds are employed by man
agement.

Warrant agreements, unlike bond indentures, generally do not

require warrant proceeds to be used for specific purposes.

Thus the

funds become a part of the pool of corporate assets and lose their sepa
rate identify.

As part of the pool of assets the funds may be used:

(1) to provide additional working capital, (2) to purchase plant and
equipment,

(3) to purchase long-term investments, (4) to retire debts,

(5) to acquire treasury stock, (6) to pay dividends, or (7) for any
other legitimate corporate purpose as well as any combination of these
purposes.
Barring a specific provision in the warrant agreement, any projec
tion on the date of issue as to how warrant proceeds will be utilized if
and when the warrants are exercised five, ten, or fifteen years in the
future is pure speculation.

In the first place, there may be no warrant

proceeds because many issues are not exercised (Observation No. 6).
Secondly, if the warrants are exercised, the proceeds become a part of
the pool of assets and their specific identity is lost.
Under these circumstances, determination of the exact amount of
dilution in earnings per share which is caused by the exercise of warrants
is impossible.

The closest approximation to the appropriate rate of

return on warrant proceeds would appear to be the rate of return on aver
age assets before interest and taxes for the period in which the warrants

259

are exercised.

In applying this rate to warrant proceeds, adjustment

for income taxes must be made.

The rate of return on average assets

before interest and taxes is preferable to a rate of return on average
owner's equity because the latter rate includes the leverage effect of
debt.
Although the rate of return on warrant proceeds can be approxi
mated by the rate of return on average assets before interest and taxes,
thus excluding the leverage effect of debt, the cost of the additional
capital provided by warrants is affected by leverage because the earn
ings per share of existing capital reflects the effects of any debt
securities outstanding.

As previously explained, the cost of the war

rant capital is the earnings per share of existing capital divided by
the exercise price per share.

Given the rate of return on warrant

proceeds, the cost of warrant capital is readily determinable because
the values of all other variables are already known or can be calculated.
These variables and the sources of their values are;

(1) earnings per

share of existing capital determined by subtracting from total earnings
the earnings applicable to warrants and dividing the result by the aver
age number of shares of common outstanding exclusive of those issued
through the exercise of warrants and (2) exercise price per share as
provided by the warrant agreement.
The key variable, therefore, for determining the dilution to earn
ings per share caused by the exercise of warrants is the rate of return
earned on warrant proceeds.

Unless the warrant agreement provides

specifically for the utilization of proceeds, the funds received from
the exercise of warrants are commingled with existing funds and become
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a part of the pool of assets of the business.

Thus the determination of

a specific rate of return for the warrant proceeds becomes impossible.
Under these circumstances, the rate of return on average assets before
interest and taxes appears to be the appropriate approximation of the
actual rate of return.

Variability of Rate of Return
on Warrant Proceeds
In the preceding section, the conclusion was reached that the
basic variable determining the amount of dilution which is reflected in
earnings per share in the period in which warrants are exercised is the
rate of return earned on the warrant proceeds.
mining this rate has been explained.

The difficulty of deter

Dilution, however, will automati

cally be reflected as a reduction of earnings per share when the warrants
are exercised regardless of whether the amount can be accurately deter
mined or not.
The problem with which this study is concerned is that of reflect
ing the actual dilution of earnings per share encountered when warrants
are exercised in fully diluted earnings per share for every period in
which the warrants are outstanding.

Clearly this is impossible.

Even

if the rate of return on warrant proceeds were known in advance, as would
be the case if the warrant agreement provided that warrant proceeds were
to be used to retire a specific debt issue, the amount of the dilution
could not be determined in advance of the warrant exercise.
true for two reasons.

This is

First, the warrants might not be exercised and thus

no dilution would result.

Secondly, the amount of actual dilution is

dependent not only on the rate of return on warrant proceeds but also on

261

the cost of warrant capital in the year of exercise.

As previously

explained, the cost of the capital provided by the warrants is a func
tion of the earnings per share of the existing capital in the period of
exercise and of the exercise price of the warrants.

The cost of the

warrant capital, therefore, cannot be determined until the period of
exercise.
Given these conditions, the potential dilution to earnings per
share which will be reflected in fully diluted earnings per share must
be estimated from information available when the periodic financial
statements are prepared.

Ideally, the rate of return on warrant proceeds

selected will be the one which produces a dilution estimate that most
closely approximates the actual dilution which will be reflected in
earnings per common share when the warrants are exercised.

As pointed

out in Chapter 2, investors consider variations in the trend of earn
ings per share a significant attribute of earnings per share for common
stock evaluation purposes (Observation No. 2).

They place a lower multi

ple on earnings with higher variability and vice versa.

Therefore, the

rate of return on warrant proceeds selected should, in each period,
produce a consistent estimate of the actual dilution without causing
variations in fully diluted earnings per share from period to period
because of variations in the rate which are attributable to factors not
related to dilution as it will ultimately be reflected in earnings per
common share.
Any method of computing fully diluted earnings per share designed
to reflect the potential dilution of warrants which employs the market
price of the underlying common stock and/or the market price, premium,
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or theoretical value of the warrants is inappropriate.

The reasons for

the unsuitability of such methods are discussed in the following two
paragraphs.
The market price of the underlying common stock and/or the market
price, premium, or theoretical value of the warrants are not variables
which enter directly into the determination of the dilution which is re
flected in earnings per share when warrants are exercised.

These vari

ables do have an indirect effect on dilution in that their status in the
period immediately preceding the expiration date of the warrants deter
mines whether the warrants will be exercised (Observation No. 6).

The

conditions precedent necessary to induce exercise are that the theoreti
cal value of the warrants be positive and that their market price be
close to their theoretical value.

As previously explained, the relevant

variables for determining the dilution of earnings per share are the
earnings per share which would have existed had the warrants not been
exercised, the exercise price of the warrants, and the rate of return on
the warrant proceeds.
Even if the pricing variables described above were relevant to
the dilution actually reflected in earnings per share upon the exercise
of warrants, as would be the case if warrant proceeds were actually used
to purchase treasury stock, the use of the pricing variables to estimate
dilution in other periods would be inappropriate.-^

For example, the

"^Barring a specific need for treasury stock, the purchase of
treasury stock with warrant proceeds is unlikely because it is an admis
sion by management that it cannot invest the warrant proceeds at a rate
sufficiently high to return the cost of capital. The Accounting
Principles Board adopted the treasury stock method not on the grounds
that warrant funds are likely to be used to purchase treasury stock but
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treasury stock method of computing fully diluted earnings per share, as
well as any other method utilizing common stock or warrant prices, intro
duces variability into the trend of earnings per share.

This variability

is unrelated to the actual dilution which may result from the exercise
of warrants and is therefore undesirable.

These methods assume that the

price relationships which exist between common stock and warrants in
each period will be the same as those existing when the warrants are
exercised.

Such an assumption is unwarranted because it ignores the

volatility of common stock prices.

As documented in Chapter 3,^"* the

common stock prices of companies with warrants outstanding are likely to
be more volatile than those of the average listed company because the
leverage which appeals to warrant investors is derived from fluctuations
in the underlying common stock price.
The conclusion is that methods of computing fully diluted earn
ings per share designed to reflect an estimate of the actual dilution of
earnings per share which may result from the exercise of warrants should
utilize only those variables which actually affect dilution.

Price re

lated variables that have no direct affect on the actual dilution which
may be reflected in earnings per share when warrants are exercised merely
introduce variability into fully diluted earnings per share and destroy
interperiod and intercompany comparability.

merely as a convenient means of reflecting dilution in earnings per share
during the periods warrants are outstanding. The treasury stock method,
however, is not a reliable estimator of the actual dilution which may
result from the exercise of warrants. This is shown in the text which
follows.
^-*See pages 86-87.
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Summary of Guidelines for Computing
Fully Diluted Earnings per Share
In summary, the preceding analysis of the attributes of earnings
per share in relation to the characteristics of warrants leads to the
conclusion that any method of computing fully diluted earnings per share
which is designed to reflect an estimate of the actual dilution which
may occur when warrants are exercised should meet the following guide
lines :
1.

The dilutive effect of warrants should be reflected in fully

diluted earnings per share from the date of issuance to the date of exer
cise or expiration of the warrants.

Management is thus held responsible

for the sacrificies as well as the benefits of issuing warrants and the
potential dilution of control, net asset values, earnings per share and
market price is forcefully brought to the attention of investors.
2.

The amount of dilution which should be reflected in fully

diluted earnings per share during each period warrants are outstanding
is the current best estimate, based on the latest relevant data avail
able, of the actual dilution which will result if and when the warrants
are exercised.

The amount of dilution which would have resulted had

warrants been exercised in the current period being reported is relevant
only to the extent that it is a good estimate of the actual dilution
which will result if and when the warrants are exercised.
3.

The actual dilution which will be reflected in earnings per

share when warrants are exercised is a function of the number of common
shares issued through the exercise of warrants, the number of common
shares outstanding when the warrants are exercised, the earnings on the
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warrant proceeds, and the earnings of assets existing prior to the
exercise of warrants.

Dilution of earnings per share will occur if the

earnings from warrant proceeds per share of common issued through the
exercise of warrants is less than the earnings per share of the capital
existing prior to the exercise.

In other words, dilution occurs if the

rate of return on warrant proceeds is less than the cost of the warrant
capital.

The key variable in determining dilution, therefore, is the

rate of return on warrant proceeds.

The method chosen for computing

fully diluted earnings per share should incorporate a realistic estimate
of the rate of return that will be earned on warrant proceeds.
4.

The method chosen for computing fully diluted earnings per

share should not incorporate an estimated rate of return on warrant
proceeds which injects variability into fully diluted earnings per
share that is not a result of the operating conditions experienced by
the firm during the period.

In other words, the estimated rate of return

chosen to approximate the actual rate of return on warrant proceeds
should not vary from period to period as the result of factors external
to the firm which have no direct bearing on the dilution of earnings per
share.

The introduction of variability not related to operations of

the firm could result in incorrect decisions by those investors who are
influenced by variability in the trend of earnings per share.

CONFORMITY OF VARIOUS METHODS OF COMPUTING FULLY
DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE TO GUIDELINES

There are basically four different methods which might be used
to compute fully diluted earnings per share when the purpose is to
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reflect in the computation an estimate of the actual dilution which may
result from the exercise of warrants.

These are:

I - equivalent shares considered outstanding - no credit given
for earnings on potential proceeds
II - equivalent shares considered as outstanding - credit given for
earnings on potential proceeds:
(a) - at some earnings rate determined from data independent
of the corporation's own rate of return
(b) - at a rate based on the earnings of the corporation in
relation to the current market price of its common stock
III - shares outstanding considered to include shares under option
reduced to a portion based on the relationship of the exercise
price of the warrant and the current market price of the common
stock - also known as the purchase of treasury stock method
IV - shares outstanding considered to include shares under option
reduced to a portion based on the relationship of the market
price of the warrant and the current market price of the common
stock - the Graham-Dodd formula.36
In the following section each of these methods of computing fully
diluted earnings per share is analyzed in terms of the guidelines devel
oped in the preceding section.

These methods and the relationships among

them can perhaps best be explained by expressing them as equations.

The

following symbols are used:
EPS = earnings per share
NI = net income applicable to common shares
CS = common shares outstanding
WS = common shares issuable through the exercise of warrants
MPC = market price per share of common stock

o/:

JOLetter from Frank T. Weston, member of the Subcommittee on Con
vertible Debt of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, to Philip L. Defliese, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Convertible Debt of the Accounting Principles Board of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, dated January 20,
1969. These four categories are not completely exhaustive of all possi
bilities. Category II should perhaps be expanded to include internal
rates of return such as the cost of debt and the return on assets.
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MPW = market price of warrants necessary to acquire one share
of common stock
EPW = exercise price of warrants per common share
R = designated earnings rate on warrant proceeds, net of tax
effect.

Method I
No earnings are assumed on the proceeds from warrants under
Method I and the equivalent shares under option are considered to be
outstanding.

Fully diluted earnings per share is simply the net income

for the period divided by the sum of the ccmmon shares outstanding and
the common shares issuable through the exercise of warrants.

The equa

tion is:
EPS = NI / (CS + WS)
where NI > 0.
This method will reflect an estimate of dilution in every period
in which there is net income available to common stockholders.

However,

this method fails to conform to the guidelines for computing earnings per
share because the amount of estimated dilution is excessive.

The assump

tion of a 0 percent earnings rate on warrant proceeds is clearly
unrealistic.

Since warrant agreements generally do not restrict the use

of warrant proceeds, the funds could always be invested in government
securities until the firm developed a more profitable project.

The use

of a constant rate of return on warrant proceeds, although inappropriate
in this case, does prevent variability which is not related to the
operating conditions of the firm from influencing the trend of fully
diluted earnings per share.

Interperiod and intercompany comparisons
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are therefore valid as long as the method is consistently used in all
periods and by all companies.

The conclusion is that this method fails

to meet the requirements of Guidelines Nos. 2 and 3 in that the dilution
produced by this method is not a good estimate of the actual dilution
which will be reflected in earnings per share if and when the warrants
are exercised.

This method does not produce a good estimate of actual

dilution because it assumes an inappropriate rate of return on the
warrant proceeds.

Method II-(a)
Method II-(a) assumes an earnings rate on warrant proceeds inde
pendent of the corporation's own rate of return.

The effect of this

assumption is to assert that the corporation will invest warrant proceeds
in private or governmental securities.

The rate of return is therefore

dependent on the type of security designated in the assumption.

Thus

the designated rate might be the bank prime rate, the U. S. treasury
bill discount rate, the commercial paper rate, or any other rate of
return on investment securities independent of the corporation.

The

equation for earnings per share under this method is;
EPS = NI / (CS + WS) + (R) (EPW) (WS) / (CS + WS)
where (NI / CS) > EPS > 0 .
This method will provide an estimate of dilution in every period
warrants are outstanding except during periods when there is a net loss
or the earnings rate selected for warrant proceeds exceeds the cost of
the warrant capital.

This method is always less dilutive than Method I.

In fact, Method II realistically recognizes that the exercise of warrants
may result in enhancement rather than dilution of earnings per share.
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Enhancement of earnings per share will occur if the rate of return on
the assumed investment is greater than the cost of warrant capital.
The assumption that warrant proceeds are invested in the securi
ties of other corporations or governmental units results in a realistic
estimated rate of return on warrant proceeds.

As a matter of fact, this

course of action by management would not be unreasonable if the timing
of exercise of warrants was such that the funds were not currently needed
in operations.

A temporary investment in securities would produce

revenues until a more profitable use of the funds materialized.
Although investment in short term securities may be the course
of action pursued by management when warrants are exercised, the use of
the rate of return on such investments during interim periods as an
estimator of the actual dilution may be inappropriate.

The rate of re

turn on investments would be undesirable as an estimator of actual dilu
tion if it caused excessive variability in the periodic computations of
fully diluted earnings per share.

Inevitably some variability would re

sult because interest rates do change over time.
has been gradual until recent years.

The change, however,

For example,the U. S. bank prime

rate remained unchanged at 4.5 percent from August 23, 1960 until
07

December 6, 1965.

Other interest rates, although more variable, tend

to correlate with the prime rate.

Unfortunately all interest rates

have become more volatile in recent years.

Despite this increase in

volatility, interest rates remain much more stable than stock prices.

07

J/J. T. Ball, Computing Earnings per Share: Unofficial Account
ing Interpretations of APB Opinion No. 15 (New York: American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1970), p. 108.
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Use of an interest rate as the estimator of the rate of return on war
rant proceeds is, therefore, preferable to an estimator which is based
on stock prices.
In summary, Method II-(a) meets most of the guidelines for com
puting fully diluted earnings per share.

Except for the variability

introduced into the computation by changing interest rates, this method
provides for interperiod comparability.

Intercompany comparability is

also good if the assumption is made that all companies are required to
use the same rate of return.

Method II-(b)
Method II-(b) is based on the current earnings per share of the
company, computed without regard to dilutive securities, in relation to
the current market price of the common shares.

The equation for comput

ing fully diluted earnings per share under this method is:
EPS = NI / (CS + WS) + (((NI / CS) / MPC) (EPW) (WS))
/ (CS + WS)
where (NI / CS) > EPS > 0.
This method of computing fully diluted earnings per share pro
vides an estimate of actual dilution of earnings per share in periods
when a net loss has not been incurred and the exercise price of the war
rants is less than the market price of the common.

A serious disadvantage

of this method is that it will not produce an estimate of dilution in
periods when the exercise price of the warrants exceeds the market price
of the common.

As shown in Chapter 3, the fact that the warrant exer

cise price exceeds the common stock price during interim periods bears
no relationship to the ultimate dilution which may be reflected in earn
ings per share if warrants are exercised.

The relationship between the
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warrant exercise price and the common stock price assumes importance only
in a brief span of the time immediately preceding the expiration date of
the warrants.

During that period the market price of the common must

exceed the exercise price of the warrants if conversion is to occur.
The term ((NI / CS) / MPC) in the equation for Method II-(b) is
the rate of return on the current market price of common stock; i.e., it
is the reciprocal of the price-earnings ratio, usually referred to as
the earnings-price ratio.

In capital budgeting this rate is considered

to be the cost of common equity capital.

Method II-(b) will, therefore,

produce higher estimates of dilution than Method II-(a) when the earnings-price ratio is less than the rate of return assumed from data
independent of the corporation.

Thus high price-earnings ratio companies

would show less fully diluted earnings per share under this method than
under Method II-(a) while low price-earnings ratio companies would show
higher fully diluted earnings per share.
Method II-(b) makes the assumption that warrant proceeds can
never earn at a rate greater than the cost of common equity capital
((NI / CS) / MPC).

This is tantamount to saying that warrants will

always be dilutive when exercised because the cost of common equity capi
tal must be less than the cost of warrant capital ((NI / CS) / EPW) in
order for warrants to be exercised.

This is true because the market price

of the common (MPC) must exceed the exercise price of the warrants (EPW)
in order for a rational investor to exercise.

It is the rate of return

which can be earned on warrant proceeds, not the cost of common equity
capital, in relation to the cost of the warrant capital which determines
the actual amount of dilution, if any, to earnings per share.
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The impropriety of assuming that warrant proceeds earn at a rate
equilavent to the company's earnings-price ratio is clearly demonstrated
in the following tabulation:®®
First Quarter, 1974
Return on
Invested
Capital
(Percent)

Company
LTV
McDonald's
International
Business Machines
U. S. Steel

Return on
Common
Equity
(Percent)

Priceearnings
Ratio
4-30-74

Earningsprice
Ratio
4-30-74

2

8.3
14.6

18.5
24.0

38

.005
.026

19.2

20.4
9.8

20
6

.050
.167

8.0

The assumption that McDonald's and International Business Machines would
earn only 2.6 percent and 5 percent respectively on warrant proceeds
when they are currently earning 14.6 percent and 19.2 percent respec
tively on invested capital is not reasonable.

Equally unreasonable is

the assumption that LTV and U. S. Steel, currently earning 8.3 percent
and 8 percent respectively on invested capital, could achieve returns
of 50 percent and 16.7 percent respectively on warrant proceeds.
Another serious disadvantage of Method II-(b) as an estimator
of the dilution which will actually be reflected in earnings per share
when warrants are exercised is the variability which this method causes
to be reflected in fully diluted earnings per share.

This variability

is the result of using the market price of the common stock as one of
the variables in the estimated rate of return on warrant proceeds.

Use

of the common stock price in the term for the estimated rate of return

®®Compiled from "Survey of Corporate Performance: First Quarter
1974," Business Week. May 11, 1974, pp. 69-90.
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((NI / CS) / MPC) can produce incongruous results in fully diluted
earnings per share.

Assume, for example, that the absolute amount of

earnings increases and that as a result of increased earnings and ex
pectations of future increases in earnings, the price of the common
stock of a company with warrants outstanding increases.

The result is

a decrease in fully diluted earnings per share over what would have been
reported had there been no increase in the common price.

Yet the price

of the common stock will have no effect on the amount of dilution in
earnings per share when the warrants are exercised (except in the
unlikely event that the proceeds are used to purchase treasury stock).
Method II-(b), therefore, introduces variability into fully diluted
earnings per share that is not a result of the operating conditions en
countered by the company.
In summary, Method II-(b) fails to meet the guidelines for com
puting fully diluted earnings per share.

It fails to estimate dilution

in periods when the warrant exercise price exceeds the common stock
price.

An unrealistically low rate of return on warrant proceeds is

assumed for high price-earnings ratio companies and an excessively high
rate of return is assumed for low price-earnings ratio companies.
Further, the rate of return assumed in each period varies inversely
with the price of the common stock.

The result is that neither inter

period nor intercompany comparisons of fully diluted earnings per share
are valid.

Method III
Method III is known as the treasury stock method.

It is the

method, modified by the 20 percent limitation, adopted by APB Opinion
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N o . 15.

This method makes the assumption that warrant proceeds are used

to purchase treasury stock at current market prices.

Such an assumption

is unrealistic for at least two r e a s o n s . I n the first place, a
corporation would not normally purchase its own stock unless management
had reached the conclusion that the stock was undervalued in the market
place.

If the stock is undervalued, there is the likelihood that the

stock is selling below the exercise price of the warrants.

Thus no funds

from the exercise of warrants would be available for the purchase of
treasury stock.

In the second place, sizable purchases of treasury stock

could not be made without affecting the price of the stock.
The Accounting Principles Board recognized the limitations of the
purchase of treasury stock as an actual application of warrant proceeds.
The method was adopted because it offered ". . . a practical approach to
reflecting the dilutive effect that would result from the issuance of
common stock under option and warrant agreements . . . ."^O
The equation for Method III is:
EPS - NI / (CS + (WS - ((EPW) (WS) / MPC)))
where (NI / CS) > EPS "> 0.
The term ((EPW) (WS) / MPC) is the number of treasury shares assumed to
be purchased and these shares are deducted from the number of shares
issuable through the exercise of warrants.

Although the equation for

■^The two reasons cited are in addition to possible legal re
strictions on the purchase of treasury stock. For a discussion, see
page 202.
^Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants, Earnings per Share. Opinions of the Accounting
Principles Board, No. 15 (New York; American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1969), p. 231.
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Method III does not specify a rate of return on warrant proceeds, the
purchase of treasury stock is equivalent to a rate of return slightly
less

than the earnings-price ratio assumed by Method II-(b). Proof

this

statement is offered in the following paragraphs.

of

The terms of the equation for Method II-(b) can be rearranged as
follows:
EPS, Method II-(b) = (NI + ((NI / CS) (EPW) (WS) / MPC))
/ (CS + WS)
Noting that the term ((EPW) (WS / MPC) is the number of shares of common
assumed to be purchased under the treasury stock method and substituting
X for this term, Method II-(b) can be written
EPS, Method II-(b) = (NI + ((NI / CS) (X)) / (CS + W S ) .
Similarly, the equation for Method III can be written
EPS, Method III = NI / (CS + WS - X).
Net income (NI) Is a common term in the numerator
tions.

of both equa

In Method II-(b) the assumed proceeds from warrants ((NI / CS)

(X)) is added to net income (NI).

There is no adjustment for warrant

proceeds in the numerator of Method III.

Therefore the numerator in

Method II-(b) reflects an increase over the numerator of Method III of
((NI / CS) (X) (100) / NI) percent.
In the denominator the common term of both equations is the
total number of shares outstanding after the assumed exercise of warrants
(CS + WS).

Under Method III the number of shares assumed purchased under

the treasury stock method (X) is deducted from the total shares out
standing if warrants have been exercised (CS + WS ) .

Since there is no

adjustment to the denominator of Method II-(b), the denominator of
Method III reflects a decrease over the denominator of Method II-(b)
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of ((X) (100) / (CS + WS)) percent.
Method II-(b) will always produce greater earnings per share than
Method III if the percentage of increase in the numerator ((NI / CS) (X)
(100) / NI) is greater than the percentage of decrease in the denominator
((100) (X) / (CS +WS)).

In other words, the term ((NI / CS) (X) (100)

/ NI) must be greater than the term ((X) (100) / (CS + VJS)).

By can

celling and rearranging terns, the percentage of increase in the numera
tor becomes ((100) (X) / CS, which will always be larger than the
percentage of decrease in the denominator of ((100) (X) / (CS +WS)).
Method III, therefore, is always more dilutive than Method II-(b).

Since

Method II-(b) assumes that warrants earn at the earnings-price ratio and
Method III always produces a lower earnings per share than Method II-(b),
the conclusion is that the treasury stock method of computing fully
diluted earnings per share assumes a rate of return on warrant proceeds
that is less than the cost of common equity capital.
Method III fails to meet the guidelines for computing fully di
luted earnings per share for the same reason as Method II-(b) because
this method also assumes a rate of return on warrant proceeds which is
based on the current market price of the common stock.

As a result, this

method fails to provide a dilution estimate in periods when the exercise
price exceeds the common stock price.

The rate of return assumed on war

rant proceeds is even less than the price-earnings ratio assumed under
Method II-(b).

Consequently, the rate of return which high price-earnings

ratio companies are assumed to earn on warrant proceeds is absurdly low.
In addition, the rate of return varies inversely with the price of the
common stock.

Interperiod and intercompany comparisons are therefore
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invalid because of variations in fully diluted earnings per share not
related to the operations of the firm.

Method IV
Method IV is the method recommended by Graham and Dodd.
assumes that the warrants " . . .

It

are equivalent to additional outstand

ing common shares with the same aggregate market value as that of the
warrant i s s u e . T h e

equation for computing fully diluted earnings

per share under this method i s :
EPS = NI / (CS + ((MPW / MPC) (WS)))
where (NI / CS) > EPS > 0.
This method is similar to Method III in that the equation for
computing fully diluted earnings per share does not specify a rate of
return for warrant proceeds.

It relates the market value of the warrant

to the market value of the common stock in order to determine the equi
valent common shares considered to be outstanding.

This relationship

differs from that of the treasury stock method which relates the
theoretical or intrinsic value of the warrant (i.e.. the difference
between the market price of the common and the exercise price of the
warrant) to the market value of the common.
Method IV results in an implied rate of return on warrant pro
ceeds which is less than that assumed by Method II-(b) and less than or
equal to the implied rate of Method III.

Since the implied rate of

return for Method III has already been demonstrated to be less than that

^Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, Security
Analysis: Principles and Technique (4th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1962), p. 227.
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of Method II-(b), the preceding statement can be proved by showing that
the implied rate of Method IV is equal to or less than the implied rate
of Method III.

Proof is offered in the following paragraphs that fully

diluted earnings per share under Method IV is always less than or equal
to fully diluted earnings per share under Method III.
The equation for computing fully diluted earnings per share under
the treasury stock method is:
EPS, Method III - NI / (CS + (WS - ((EPW) (WS) / MPC))).
By factoring out the variable WS, the term (WS - ((EPW) (WS) / MPC))
becomes ((WS) (1 - EPW / MPC)).

The term (1 - EPW / MPC) is equivalent

to ((MPC - EPW) / MPC) so that the revised equation for Method III be
comes
EPS, Method III, Revised = NI / (CS + (((MPC - EPW)
/ MPC) (WS))).
The revised equation for Method III is in a form that is com
parable with Method IV.

The terms in both equations are identical except

that the fraction for determining the equivalent shares resulting from
outstanding warrants is ((MPC - EPW) / MPC) for Method III and (MPW / MPC)
for Method IV.

The term (MPC - EPW), the difference between the market

price of the common and the exercise price of the warrant, is the theo
retical or intrinsic value of the warrant.

The difference between the

intrinsic value and the market value of the warrant, i.e.. the differ
ence in the two equations, is the premium at which the warrant is selling.
This premium reflects the leverage advantage which the warrant offers
the underlying common stock.

The value of the premium approaches zero

as the intrinsic value of the warrant increases and as the expiration
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date of the warrant becomes imminent.
Since the market price of warrants will almost always be equal
to or greater than their intrinsic value

the numerator in the frac

tion for determining equivalent shares under Method IV will always be
greater than or equal to the numerator for determining equivalent shares
under Method III.

Consequently the number of equivalent shares added to

the common shares outstanding under Method IV will be equal to or
greater than the equivalent shares under Method III.

As a result, fully

diluted earnings per share calculated under Method IV will be less than
or equal to fully diluted earnings per share calculated under Method III.
Thus the implied rate of return on warrant proceeds under Method IV is
less than or equal to the implied rate of return under Method III and
less than the earnings-price ratio of Method II-(b).
Although Method IV is an improvement over Method II-(b) and
Method III in some respects, it also fails to comply fully with the
guidelines for computing fully diluted earnings per share.

Unlike

Methods II-(b) and III, Method IV will reflect an estimate of dilution
in every period in which warrants are outstanding.

Since the implied

earnings rate on warrant proceeds is either equal to or less than that
of Method III, the amount of the dilution estimate is excessive for high
price-earnings ratio companies.

As with Methods II-(b) and III, the

implied rate of return varies inversely with the price of the underlying
common stock.

^Arbitrageurs prevent warrants from selling below their intrin
sic value for any appreciable length of time. For a discussion of
arbitrageurs, see page 151.
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Summary of Conformity of Various
Methods to Guidelines
Table 26 presents a comparison of the conformity of the basic
methods of computing fully diluted earnings per share to the guidelines
formulated by this study for the computation of fully diluted earnings
per share "when the purpose is to estimate the dilution which may result
from the exercise of warrants.

Methods I, III, and IV can be discarded

immediately for failure to meet the guidelines.

Method I offers an

objective method for computing fully diluted earnings per share by
simply avoiding the problems of estimating a rate of return on warrant
proceeds.

The assumption of a zero rate of return on warrant proceeds

is unreasonable because warrant proceeds can be readily invested in
short-term securities until a more profitable project materializes.
Method III also offers a practical method of computing fully
diluted earnings per share by indirectly avoiding the problem of esti
mating a rate of return on warrant proceeds.

The purchase of treasury

stock, however, is equivalent to some implied rate of return which will
always be less than the current cost of common equity.

As a conse

quence, this method overstates the dilution which will be experienced
by high price-earnings ratio companies and, to some extent, understates
the dilution of low price-earnings ratio companies.

This method would

not be a good estimator of actual dilution even if the corporation
actually purchased treasury stock with warrant proceeds.

The volatility

of common stock prices would cause variability in the periodic earningsper-share computations completely unrelated to the operations of the
firm.

Table 26. A Comparison of the Conformity of Various Methods of Computing Fully Diluted Earnings per
Share to the Guidelines for Computing Fully Diluted Earnings per Share When Warrants Are Outstanding

Methods3
Guidelines

I

II-(a)

II-(b)

III

IV

1.

Method should provide an
estimate of actual dilu
tion, if any, in every
period warrants are out
standing .

Provides an
estimate in
every period
whether or
not actual
dilution is
incurred

Provides an
estimate in
every period
in which cost
of warrant
capital ex
ceeds select
ed rate of
return on
warrant pro
ceeds

Provides an
estimate in
every period
in which mar
ket price of
common ex
ceeds exer
cise price

Provides an
estimate in
every period
in which mar
ket price of
common ex
ceeds exer
cise price

Provides an
estimate in
every period
whether or
not actual
dilution is
incurred

2.

Method should reflect
the best estimate,
based on relevant
variables, of actual
dilution, if any,
which will be in
curred .

Estimated
amount of
dilution is
excessively
high

Estimated
amount of
dilution is
reasonable

Estimated
amount of
dilution is
excessive
for high
price-earn
ings ratio
companies

Estimated
amount of
dilution is
excessive
for high
price-earn
ings ratio
companies

Estimated
amount of
dilution is
excessive
for high
price-earn
ings ratio
companies

3.

Method of calculation
should incorporate a
realistic estimate of
actual rate of return
which will be earned
on warrant proceeds.

Unrealis
tic; as
sumes zero
rate of
return

Realistic;
rate select
ed is one of
several pos
sible rates
of return
which might
be earned on
warrant pro
ceeds

Unrealis
tic; rate
of return
for high
price-earn
ings ratio
companies
too low

Unrealis
tic; im
plied rate
of return
for high
price-earn
ings ratio
companies
too low

Unrealis
tic; im
plied rate
of return
for high
price-earn
ings ratio
companies
too low

Table 26 (continued)
Methods3
Guidelines
4.

Method should not in
corporate a rate of
return on warrant
proceeds which intro
duces variability into
earnings per share not
related to the opera
tions of the firm.

I

II-(a)

II-(b)

No variabil
ity because
rate of re
turn is a
constant

Extent of
variability
not related
to opera
tions de
pends on
rate of re
turn select
ed

High vari
ability in
earnings
per share
caused by
price
volatility
of common
stock

III
High vari
ability in
earnings
per share
caused by
price
volatility
of common
stock

IV
High vari
ability in
earnings
per share
caused by
price
volatility
of common
stock and
warrants

aThe basic assumptions of each method are:
Method I - equivalent shares considered as outstanding with no credit given for earnings on warrant
proceeds
Method II-(a) - equivalent shares considered as outstanding with credit given for earnings on warrant
proceeds at an earnings rate determined from data independent of the corporation's
own rate of return
Method II-(b) - equivalent shares considered as outstanding with credit given for earnings on warrant
proceeds at a rate based on earning's of the corporation in relation to the current
market price 0f its common stock; i.e.. the earnings-price ratio
Method III - shares outstanding considered to include shares under option reduced to a portion based
on the relationship of the exercise price of the warrant and the current market price of
the common stock; i.e., the treasury stock method
Method IV -

shares outstanding considered to include shares under option reduced to a portion based
on the relationship of the market price of the warrant and the current market price of
the common stock; i.e., the Graham and Dodd method.
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Method IV also indirectly avoids the problem of estimating a
rate of return on warrant proceeds by assuming additional common shares
are outstanding based on the relationship of the market price of the
warrant to the market price of the common stock.

This method, advocated

by Graham and Dodd, is not as practical as the treasury stock method,
however, because the computation requires warrant prices which may not
always be available.

The implied rate of return assumed by this method

is less than the cost of common equity and also less than or equal to
the implied rate of the treasury stock method.

Consequently the estimate

of dilution for high price-earnings ratio companies is even more seri
ously overstated.

As with the treasury stock method, fully diluted

earnings per share varies inversely with the price of the common stock.
Thus variability unrelated to the operations of the firm is introduced
into fully diluted earnings per share.
Methods II-(a) and II-(b) both incorporate an estimated rate of
return on warrant proceeds.

Since the rate of return on warrant pro

ceeds is the key variable1^

in determining the actual dilution, if any,

which will be reflected in earnings per share when warrants are exer
cised, an analysis of these two methods may provide an appropriate rate
of return for estimating dilution.
Method II-(a) employs a rate of return on warrant proceeds
selected from data independent of the corporation's own rate of return.

^Dilution of earnings per share occurs if the cost of the war
rant capital (earnings per share of existing capital divided by the
warrant exercise price) exceeds the rate of return on the warrant pro
ceeds. The rate of return on warrant proceeds is termed the key
variable because management has little control over the cost of warrant
capital once warrants have been issued.
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In other words, the assumption is that warrant proceeds are invested in
securities of other corporations or governmental agencies.

Investment

of warrant proceeds in securities is one of several options available to
management.

Consequently Method II-(a) meets the guidelines better than

any of the other methods considered.

The principal fault with this

method is that periodic changes in the interest or discount rate selected
will cause variability in the estimated dilution which may not be re
lated to the operations of the firm.
Whereas Method II-(a) employs a rate of return derived from
sources external to the firm, Method II-(b) uses internal data of the
firm as well as data from external sources.

This rate, usually referred

to as the cost of common equity, relates the firm's earnings per share
to the current price of its common stock.

This method therefore assumes

that a firm can never invest warrant proceeds profitably because the
cost of the warrant capital will always exceed the cost of common equity.
This is true because the market price of the common must exceed the
exercise price of the warrants for exercise to occur.

Basing the rate

of return on the current common stock price severely understates the
rate of return which high price-earnings ratio companies may earn on
warrant proceeds.

Earnings per share is also subject to variability not

related to the operations of the firm because of the volatility of com
mon stock prices.

RECOMMENDED METHOD OF COMPUTING FULLY
DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE

Both Methods II-(a) and II-(b) fail to meet the guidelines for
computing fully diluted earnings per share because their rates of return
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on warrant proceeds employ, in part at least, data external to the firm.
Such rates exclude the possibility that the funds derived from the exer
cise of warrants will be employed internally in the operations of the
firm.

Under these circumstances warrant proceeds lose their separate

identify because they are comingled with the other operating assets.
The rate of return earned on the proceeds, therefore, is the rate of re
turn earned, before interest and taxes, on average assets employed
(hereinafter referred to as the operating rate of return).
The operating rate of return produces results which comply favor
ably with the guidelines for computing fully diluted earnings per share.
This compliance with the guidelines is indicated by the following
comparison:
1.

An estimate of dilution is reflected in fully diluted earn

ings per share in every period in which the operating rate of return is
exceeded by the cost of warrant capital.

This method properly reflects

no dilution in periods in which the operating rate of return exceeds the
cost of warrant capital.

Failure to reflect dilution is appropriate

because the best estimate, based on the latest relevant data, is that
no dilution of earnings per share will occur if warrants are exercised.
This contrasts with Methods II-(b) and III which assume that no dilution
will occur if the exercise price exceeds the market price of the common
stock and with Methods I and IV which always assume that dilution will
occur.
2.

The amount of dilution which this method estimates is reason

able because the process of estimation is based on the relevant variables
which determine actual dilution when warrants are exercised.

This
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contrasts with some of the other methods under consideration.

Method I

estimates excessive dilution because it assumes that warrant proceeds
will produce no earnings.

Method II-(b) overestimates dilution for high

price-earnings ratio companies because it assumes that warrant proceeds
cannot earn at a rate higher than the cost of equity capital.

Method

Ill's assumption that warrant proceeds will be used to purchase treasury
stock produces results similar to Method II-(b), except that the dilution
estimate is higher.

Method IV produces dilution estimates similar to,

but generally higher than, Methods II-(b) and III because it somehow
assumes that dilution of earnings per share is a direct function of the
market prices of the warrants and the related common stock.
3.

Barring a requirement of the warrant agreement that warrant

proceeds be utilized for a specific purpose, the operating rate of re
turn is the most appropriate estimate of the rate of return which will
be earned on warrant proceeds.

As previously explained, warrant proceeds

are likely to become a part of the firm's pool of assets used in opera
tions.

Under these circumstances, a specific rate of return applicable

only to the proceeds cannot be determined.

The operating rate of return

will, however, reflect the benefits or detriments derived from the use
of the funds.

The operating rate of return, adjusted for tax effect, is

preferable to the return on owner's equity because it eliminates the
effects of leverage.
4.

The operating rate of return injects no variability into

earnings per share that is not the result of the operations of the firm.
This is a major advantage that this method offers over some of the other
methods considered.

Methods II-(b), III, and IV cause earnings per share
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to vary inversely with the price of the common stock because they incor
rectly employ the common stock price as a variable in the dilution com
putation.
In addition to substantial conformity to the guidelines for
computing fully diluted earnings per share, this method has the advantage
of simplicity of calculation.

All of the data necessary for the computa

tion is readily available from the financial statements of the company
and the warrant agreement.
The conclusion is that fully diluted earnings per share should
be computed in accordance with the equations of Methods II-(a) or II-(b),
except that the operating rate of return should be substituted for the
rates specified in those equations.

If, however, the warrant agreement

specifies the use of proceeds, the appropriate rate of return is that
which conforms to the terms of the agreement.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

There is no one earnings-per-share figure appropriate for all
investment decisions.

As a minimum, two earnings-per-share figures

should be reported for companies with warrants outstanding:

(1) earn

ings per average common share and (2) fully diluted earnings per share.
Earnings per average common share has validity for decisions which are
affected by actual shares outstanding, as, for example, dividend payout
estimates.

Earnings per average common share may also be a useful tool

for evaluating stock prices in short-term investment decisions if the
expiration date of outstanding warrants is not imminent.

Earnings per

average common share, when reported with fully diluted earnings per
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share, permits an investor to estimate the potential dilution in earnings
per share that would occur if warrants were exercised.

In addition,

fully diluted earnings per share is appropriate for long-range stock
evaluation purposes; i.e.. for periods which encompass the expiration
date of the warrants.
The concept of a primary earnings per share which includes essen
tially the same number of common stock equivalents for dilutive warrants
as is included in fully diluted earnings per share is rejected.

The in

clusion of the dilutive effect of warrants in both earnings-per-share
figures prevents the investor from estimating the amount of dilution.
Further, the common stock equivalents used in computing primary earnings
per share reflect neither the imminence nor likelihood of the ultimate
exercise of warrants.
One reason for the Accounting Principles Board's adoption of
primary earnings per share rather than earnings per average common share
was the fear that the financial reporting services, because of space
limitations, would publish only one earnings-per-share figure.

Thus

earnings per average common share, which reflects no potential dilution,
would have been emphasized to the detriment of fully diluted earnings
per share.

Experience subsequent to the publication of APB Opinion No.

15 has shown this argument to be without merit.

Most financial re

porting services do publish both earnings-per-share-figures.
Once the decision is made that the dilutive effect of warrants
should be reflected in fully diluted earnings per share, the problem of
how to estimate the dilution arises.

Various methods with differing

assumptions and results complicate the problem.

The purpose of this
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study is to formulate guidelines which can be used to select the appro
priate method.

These guidelines were formulated by relating the attri

butes of earnings per share as used by investors to the characteristics
of warrants.
1.

Briefly summarized, the guidelines are as follows:
The method selected should reflect the potential dilution

of warrants in fully diluted earnings per share from the date of issuance
to the date of exercise or expiration of the warrants.
2.

The method selected should reflect the best possible estimate

of the actual dilution which will be incurred if the warrants are exer
cised .
3.

The method selected should incorporate a realistic estimate

of the actual rate of return which will be earned on warrant proceeds.
Dilution of earnings per share occurs only when the rate of return on
warrant proceeds is exceeded by the cost of the warrant capital.
4.

The method selected should not incorporate an estimated rate

of return on warrant proceeds which causes variability in fully diluted
earnings per share that is not the result of operating conditions ex
perienced by the firm during each period.
None of the basic methods of computing fully diluted earnings
per share of companies with warrants outstanding complies fully with
these guidelines.

Most of the methods fail to comply because they are

based on variables external to the operations of the firm, such as com
mon stock or warrant prices, which have no direct bearing on the actual
amount of dilution which would be reflected in earnings per share if
warrants were exercised.

These variables, because of their high volatil

ity, introduce an undesirable variability into fully diluted earnings
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per share that is unrelated to the operating conditions experienced by
the firm in each period.
The method which most fully complies with the guidelines for com
puting fully diluted earnings per share employs an operating rate of re
turn which is derived from internal data of the firm.

This method will

reflect dilution in every period in which the cost of warrant capital
exceeds the operating rate of return.

The estimate of dilution which

this method produces is reasonable because it utilizes the same vari
ables that determine actual dilution when warrants are exercised.

The

actual rate of return earned on warrant proceeds may be impossible to
determine because these proceeds usually become a part of the pool of
assets used in the firm's operations.

Under such circumstances, the

operating rate of return must be considered a reliable estimator of the
actual rate of return.

An additional advantage of this method is that

the operating rate of return will not introduce variability into fully
diluted earnings per share that is unrelated to the operations of the
firm.
The resulting fully diluted earnings-per-share figures provide
interperiod and intercompany comparability.

The conclusion is, there

fore, that fully diluted earnings per share should be computed by this
method.

Chapter 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

During the 1960's warrants to purchase common shares of the
issuing corporation were frequently attached to debt and equity securi
ties in order to facilitate the sale or exchange of these securities.
These warrants presented a definite hazard to investors who purchased
common shares of the issuing corporations because exercise of the war
rants could result in a dilution of the corporations' book value, their
earnings per share, and the market value of their shares as well as the
voting power of the individual stockholders.

In May, 1969 the American

Institute of Certified Public Accountants adopted the treasury stock
method of reflecting the potentially dilutive effect of warrants on
earnings per share through the issuance of APB Opinion N o . 15.

The

treasury stock method of computing the earnings per share of corporations
with outstanding warrants makes the assumption that the corporation uses
the funds obtained from the exercise of warrants to purchase treasury
shares at the average price of the common shares during the period
and/or at the current price of the shares at the end of the period.

The

Institute recognized that many corporations would not actually purchase
treasury stock with warrant proceeds, but this method was adopted be
cause it was a practical means of reflecting the potential dilution of
warrants in earnings-per-share computations.
On a theoretical basis the treasury stock method has certain
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disadvantages.

While the treasury stock method makes no specific assump

tion about the rate of return earned on warrant proceeds, the use of
this method results in an earnings rate on warrant proceeds which is
less than the earnings-price ratio of the corporation.

Such a rate is

unrealistically low for corporations with high price-earnings ratios and
perhaps overly optimistic for corporations with low price-earnings
ratios.

In addition, the treasury stock method causes the earnings per

share of corporations with warrants outstanding to vary inversely with
the price of the corporations' common stock.
The purpose of this study has been to evaluate, on a theoretical
basis, several methods of reflecting the potential dilution of warrants
in the earnings-per-share computations.

The desirability of including

the potentially dilutive effect of warrants in both primary and fully
diluted earnings per share has also been considered.

Guidelines for

this evaluation of the earnings-per-share computations were developed
through an analysis of:

(1) the attributes of earnings per share that

investors perceive to be useful in the evaluation of common stocks, (2)
the characteristics of warrants which might affect earnings per share,
and (3) the problems encountered by the Accounting Principles Board in
its promulgation of APB Opinion No. 15.

The methodology for achieving

these objectives included a survey of the accounting, finance, and in
vestment literature related to warrants and earnings per share.

The

earnings-per-share files of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants were also examined.

In addition, the characteristics of

warrants listed on the American Stock Exchange between 1950 and 1972 were
analyzed.

A summary of the results of these investigations and of the

conclusions reached follows.
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ATTRIBUTES OF EARNINGS PER SHARE

Prior to World War I few common stocks were considered to be
quality investments.

Investment decisions with regard to common stocks

were made on the basis of a balance sheet analysis.

Very few corpora

tions included complete income statements in their annual reports and
the financial press did not report earnings per share.
The acceptance of common stocks as investments began in the
1920's after the publication of E. L. Smith's study, Common Stocks as
Long-Term Investments.

Common stock valuation techniques shifted from

an emphasis of the balance sheet to the income statement.

More firms

began publishing income statements, but generally these statements pro
vided insufficient information for investment decision-making purposes.
The financial services began publishing earnings-per-share statistics
and investors, frustrated by inadequate accounting information, began
to evaluate common stocks by estimating future earnings per share and
applying an earnings multiple to the projected earnings.
The earnings-per-share statistics of the 1920's and 1930's were
sometimes misleading because the method of calculation was not stan
dardized.

Accountants felt that common stock valuation techniques should

not be based solely on earnings per share and refused to include earn
ings per share in the financial statements.

Accountants finally recom

mended that earnings per share be included in the statement of income in
December, 1966 with the publication of APB Opinion No. 9 .
The earnings capitalization model developed in the 1920's con
tinues to be the method most frequently used by practitioners today in
the valuation of common stocks.

The basic variable of this model is
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earnings per share.

Future earnings per share is estimated and a price-

earnings multiplier or capitalization rate is applied to the estimate.
Earnings per share is also frequently used in present value models in
that future dividends are often estimated by applying a dividend payout
ratio to estimated earnings per share.
The attributes of earnings per share which are important to the
earnings capitalization model are:
1.

The absolute amount of earnings per share.

Current or esti

mated future earnings per share is one of the two inputs of the earnings
capitalization model.

The timing of the recognition of the potential

dilution of warrants, as well as the estimate of the amount of potential
dilution, affects this attribute.
2.

The trend of earnings per share.

The second variable in the

earnings capitalization model, the earnings multiplier or capitalization
rate, is influenced by the trend of earnings per share.

Investors place

a higher value on the earnings multiplier of companies which exhibit a
high growth rate in earnings per share.

The timing of the recognition

of the potential dilution of warrants therefore affects the trend of
earnings per share.

The accuracy of the estimates of the potential di

lution also affects the trend of earnings per share.
3.

The variability of the trend of earnings per share.

The earn

ings multiplier or capitalization rate is also influenced by the vari
ability of the trend of earnings per share.

Investors place a higher

multiple on earnings with a stable growth rate.

Estimates of the

potential earnings attributable to warrant proceeds should not, therefore,
introduce variability into the trend of earnings per share.
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THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WARRANTS

The characteristics of all warrants listed on the American Stock
Exchange during the period from January 1, 1950 through December 31,
1971 were analyzed.

The population selected consisted of 106 warrant

issues (94 warrant series) by 90 companies.

Fifty-six percent of the

warrants were issued with other securities for the purpose of raising
cash.

Thirty percent were issued as part of the consideration for the

securities of another corporation and 7 percent were issued in connection
with reorganizations or recapitalizations.

Four percent were issued as

distributions to stockholders in addition

to, or in lieu of, dividends.

Warrants do not appear to be used
future equity capital.

Instead, warrants

for the purpose

are attached to other securi

ties for the purpose of facilitating the sale
ties with which they are issued.

ofraising

or exchange of the securi

Warrants increase the total value of

the security package and reduce the cash flow for interest or dividends.
When warrants are distributed to stockholders as dividends, the purpose
appears to be that of establishing a market for the warrants in order to
increase their value as a merger currency.
The following characteristics of the warrants that were analyzed
in this study appear to be of importance in the formulation of earningsper-share computational guidelines of companies with outstanding war
rants :
1.

Warrants do not constitute legal common equity.

Consequently,

warrantholders do not participate in corporate management or receive
dividends.

Earnings-per-share statistics used in the calculation of

dividend payout ratios should, therefore, exclude the effect of warrants.
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2.

Warrants are attached to other securities for the purpose of

facilitating the sale or exchange of the securities rather than for the
purpose of raising future equity capital.

Management and current stock

holders benefit through the sale or exchange of the securities on more
favorable terms.

These benefits are reflected in the financial state

ments from the inception of the transaction.

The potential cost of these

benefits through the dilution of the stockholders' equity should also be
reflected in the financial statements.

The inclusion of an estimate of

this potential dilution in earnings per share is a logical means of
apprising stockholders of the potential detriment which might occur if
the warrants are exercised.
3.

Investors purchase warrants for the leverage they offer over

the underlying common stock.

As a consequence, warrants are generally

exercised during a brief span of time immediately preceding their expira
tion.

Dilution of owner's equity and earnings per share, therefore,

will usually not occur prior to the expiration date of the warrants.
4.

Many warrant series expire with practically none of the war

rants having been o«Kercised.

In such situations, earnings-per-share

calculations which include an estimate of the potential dilution caused
by the exercise of warrants will result in the understatement of earn
ings per share on a historical basis.
5.

Warrants add more value to a security package when the ratio

of the exercise price of the warrants to the market price of the under
lying common stock on the date of issue is low.

When this practice is

followed, fewer warrants per unit of capital solicited can be offered.
On the other hand, the likelihood that the warrants will be exercised
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and cause dilution is increased because of the lower exercise price.
6.

The potential dilution to earnings per share is increased

when the ratio of the exercise price of the warrants to the price of the
underlying stock on the date of issue is high because more warrants per
unit of capital solicited must be offered.

However, the probability of

actual dilution is decreased because of the higher exercise price.
7.

The relationship between the exercise price or the market

price of the warrant and the market price of the underlying common stock
has no effect on the number of warrants which will ultimately be exer
cised except during a brief span of time immediately prior to the expira
tion date of the warrants unless unusual circumstances intervene.
Methods of estimating the dilution to earnings per share based on these
price relationships therefore have questionable validity.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD

The Accounting Principles Board developed the concept of residual
securities in APB Opinion No. 9 in its first effort to resolve the prob
lem of reporting the dilutive effect of convertible securities and options
in earnings per share.

A convertible security was residual if it derived

a major portion of its value from its conversion rights.

Securities

which are classified as residual securities enter into the earnings-pershare computation.

In addition, a supplementary pro forma earnings-per-

share computation was recommended if outstanding convertible and option
securities not classified as residual securities might result in the
further dilution of earnings per share as computed under the residual
concept.

Practitioners, in their interpretation of the opinion, excluded
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warrants from the residual category.

The result was a noticeable in

crease in the use of warrants in order to avoid the detrimental effect
on earnings per share.
The original intent of APB Opinion No. 15 was to provide more
specific guidelines for the computation of earnings per share under the
residual concept.

However, a number of conflicts between practice and

theory was encountered.

The modifications necessary in order to make

the residual concept operational resulted in a change of its name to the
concept of common stock equivalents.

The Accounting Principles Board

encountered three principal areas of difficulty in its efforts to formu
late guidelines for the computation of earnings per share when poten
tially dilutive convertible and options securities were outstanding.
These problem areas were:

(1) the restatement of earnings per share for

changes in residual status, (2) anti-dilution, and (3) the use of funds
from the assumed exercise of warrants.
The Board concluded that earnings per share should not be re
stated for changes in residual status because of the basically histori
cal nature of earnings-per-share statistics.

The comparability of the

statistics with respect to convertible securities was improved with the
abandonment of the relative value test under the residual concept in
favor of a yield test at date of issue under the concept of common stock
equivalents.

The problem of the comparability of earnings per share

with respect to warrants remains, however, because of the adoption of
the treasury stock method for computing the common stock equivalents
attributable to warrants. Under the treasury stock method earnings per
share varies inversely with the price of the underlying common stock.
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This problem was considered in the formulation of the guidelines for com
puting earnings per share which were recommended by this study.
Under the residual concept securities classified as residual
could result in an enhancement of earnings per share.

This enhancement

of earnings per share was opposed by the Securities and Exchange Commis
sion and by some members of the Accounting Principles Board so that under
the concept of common stock equivalents, potentially dilutive securities
were excluded from the computation if their inclusion would result in an
increase in earnings per share or a decrease in net loss per share.

The

effect of this decision was to eliminate warrants, except under the 20
percent limitation, from the earnings-per-share computation during
periods when the exercise price of the warrants was above the related
common stock price.

This failure of the treasury stock method to provide

an estimate of the potential dilution of earnings per share in every
period during which warrants are outstanding was a factor which influ
enced the recommendations of this study.
The Accounting Principles Board originally adopted the treasury
stock method as a means of reflecting the potentially dilutive effect of
warrants in earnings per share because of its simplicity of application.
Subsequent modifications to the method complicated the calculations to
the extent that simplicity of application is no longer an advantage.
More importantly, the treasury stock method indirectly attributes a rate
of return to the proceeds assumed to have been received from the exer
cise of the warrants that is always less than the earnings-price ratio of
the company.

Such a rate of return, in addition to introducing vari

ability into earnings per share because of common stock price changes,
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is unrealistic for companies with either very high or very low priceearnings ratios.

This problem of an appropriate rate of return on

warrant proceeds was also considered in the formulation of earnings-pershare computational guidelines.

CONCLUSIONS

The two basic conclusions of this study are:
1.

A minimum of two earnings per share figures for those com

panies having outstanding warrants should be provided to investors.
Earnings per average common share should be based on the average shares
outstanding during the period.

Fully diluted earnings per share should

include an estimate of the potential dilution of earnings per share
which might occur if warrants were exercised.
2.

The most appropriate method of reflecting the potentially

dilutive effect of warrants in fully diluted earnings per share is the
operating rate of return method, which assumes that warrant proceeds will
earn at the current rate of return on assets.

This conclusion was

reached through an evaluation of various methods of computing the fully
diluted earnings per share of companies with warrants outstanding.

The

evaluation of these methods was based on the guidelines which were
developed during the course of this study.
The reasons for these conclusions are discussed in the following
sections.

Exclusion of the Dilutive
Effect of Warrants from
Earnings per Common Share
APB Opinion No. 15 requires that the potentially dilutive effect
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of warrants must be included in primary earnings per share as well as
fully diluted earnings per share.
favor of:

This procedure should be rejected in

(1) primary earnings per share based on legal common equity

and (2) fully diluted earnings per share which includes the potentially
dilutive effect of warrants.

This conclusion can be defended on the

following basis:
1.

By providing two earnings-per-share figures, one of which

assumes no dilution, the other of which assumes full dilution, an in
vestor is given a basis of comparison which permits him to determine
the full extent of the dilution which might occur through the exercise
of warrants.
2.

APB Opinion No. 15 denies an investor this information.
The life span of warrants is considerably longer than an

investor's time horizon.

Earnings-per-share computations that assume

no dilution are an appropriate tool for investment decisions during
periods prior to the expiration date of the warrants.
3.

Many warrant issues do not result in the dilution of earn

ings per share because they expire without exercise.

Earnings per share

computations that assume no dilution provide the investor with the
appropriate information in such cases.
4.

Dividend policy is best evaluated on the basis of earnings

per share figures that assume no dilution because dividends are paid on
the basis of legal capital.
5.

The argument for including the dilutive effect of warrants

in primary earnings per share because the financial reporting services,
due to space limitations, would ignore fully diluted earnings per share
has proved invalid.

In fact, some corporate managements have emphasized
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the fully diluted figure because this figure results in a higher priceearnings ratio.

Recommended Method for
Including the Dilutive Effect
of Warrants in Fully Diluted
Earnings per Share
Guidelines for the evaluation of various methods of including an
estimate of the dilutive effect of warrants in fully diluted earnings
per share were formulated in this study.
from:

These guidelines were derived

(1) the attributes of earnings per share which investors per

ceive to be useful in making investment decisions about common stocks,
(2) the characteristics of warrants which might have a bearing on the
earnings-per-share computation, and (3) an analysis of the problems
encountered by the Accounting Principles Board in the promulgation of
APB Opinion No. 15.
The method selected for the computation of the fully diluted
earnings per share of companies with outstanding warrants should:
1. reflect the potential dilution of warrants from the date of
issuance to the date of exercise or expiration,
2. provide the best possible estimate of the actual

dilution

which will be incurred if the warrants are exercised,
3.

incorporate a realistic estimate of the rate of return which

will be earned on warrant proceeds,
4.

and not introduce variability into fully diluted

earnings

per share that is not the result of operating conditions experienced by
the firm during each period.
These guidelines were used in the evaluation of various methods
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of reflecting an estimate of the dilutive effect of warrants in fullydiluted earnings per share.

Three of these methods make the following

assumptions with regard to earnings on warrant proceeds:

(1) no

return on warrant proceeds, (2) a return selected from data independent
of the corporation's rate of return, and (3) a return equivalent to the
earnings-price ratio of the firm.

Two other methods which were evalu

ated make no direct assumptions about the rate of return earned on
warrant proceeds.

The treasury stock method provides an estimate of

common stock equivalents based on the relationship of the exercise price
of the warrants and the price of the underlying common stock.

The

Graham and Dodd method produces an estimate of common stock equivalents
based on the relationship of the marketprice

of the

warrantsand

the

price of the underlying common stock.
Each of the above methods was rejected because of a lack of com
pliance with one or more of the guidelines.

The method which assumes no

earnings on warrant proceeds produces excessive estimates of dilution
because warrant proceeds could always be invested in income producing
securities if more favorable company projects were not available.

The

method which most closely complies with the guidelines assumes an earn
ings rate independent of the corporation's own rate of return.

The

effect of the assumption is that funds are invested in income producing
securities.

This method was rejected because it would result in vari

ability which is unrelated to operations due to thevolatility

of the

external rate of return selected.
The earnings-price ratio, treasury stock, and Graham and Dodd
methods failed to comply with the guidelines because these methods

304

produce unrealistic estimates of the rates of returns on warrant proceeds
and inject variability into fully diluted earnings per share which is
unrelated to the operation of the firm.

Each of these methods produces

excessively high estimates of dilution for high price-earnings ratio
companies.

These methods cause variability of fully diluted earnings per

share because of the volatility of the common stock prices on which they
are based.
The basic cause of the lack of compliance of the above methods
to the guidelines is the fact that most of the methods incorporate ex
ternal data into the calculation of fully diluted earnings-per-share.
Calculations based on this external data introduce variability into the
earnings-per-share figures which is unrelated to the operating condi
tions experienced by the firm during the period.

This variability causes

interperiod and intercompany comparisons of the earnings-per-share sta
tistics to be misleading.
The preceding observations led to the conclusion that an internal
rate of return should be applied to warrant proceeds in the calculation
of fully diluted earnings per share.

The dilution which will ultimately

be reflected in earnings per share through the exercise of warrants is
a function of the number of common shares outstanding prior to the exer
cise of the warrants, the number of common shares issued through the
exercise of the warrants, the rate of return on assets existing prior to
the exercise of the warrants, and the rate of return earned on the war
rant proceeds.

Stated another way, dilution of earnings per share will

result from the exercise of warrants if the cost of the capital provided
by the exercise of the warrants (earnings per share of existing assets
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divided by the exercise price per share) exceeds the rate of return
earned on the warrant proceeds.

Thus, given the rate of return earned

on warrant proceeds, the dilution to earnings per share caused by the
exercise of warrants is easily calculated.
Warrant agreements, however, generally place no restrictions on
the use of warrant proceeds.

Consequently, funds received from the exer

cise of warrants become a part of the pool of corporate assets which may
be used for any legitimate corporate purpose.

Under these circumstances,

the appropriate rate of return on warrant proceeds is the average rate
of return on assets before interest and taxes (the operating rate of
return).
The operating rate of return, net of tax effect, produces results
that conform closely to the guidelines for computing fully diluted earn
ings per share.
1.

This conformity is shown in the following comparison:

An estimate of dilution will be reflected in every period in

which the cost of the warrant capital exceeds the operating rate of re
turn.

No dilution will be reflected in those periods when the operating

rate of return is greater than the cost of the warrant capital.

No

dilution should be reflected in these periods because the status of the
relevant variables indicates that no dilution will be incurred when the
warrants are actually exercised.
2.

The amount of dilution estimated by this method is a reason

able approximation of the actual dilution which will be incurred if the
warrants are exercised because the estimation process utilizes the
relevant variables which determine the actual dilution, if any, when
warrants are exercised.
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3.

The operating rate of return is an appropriate estimator of

the actual rate of return which will be earned on warrant proceeds.

Un

less the warrant agreement requires that warrant proceeds be employed
for a specific purpose, warrant proceeds are comingled with other cor
porate funds and the determination of a specific rate applicable to the
warrant proceeds becomes impossible.
4.

The operating rate of return injects no variability into

fully diluted earnings per share that is not the result of the opera
tions of the firm.
In conclusion, fully diluted earnings per share which includes
an estimate of the dilutive effect of warrants computed by the operating
rate of return method will provide investors with an earnings-per-share
statistic that is comparable over time and among companies.

This

statistic, in combination with earnings per common share, provides
investors with meaningful information for making decisions related to
the common stock of companies with outstanding warrants.
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